






This thesis examines the claims that philosophy can provide the foundation
for science, that philosophy can show the presuppositions of science to be
necessary, and that philosophy itself is presuppositionless.
The investigation begins by considering Husserl's attempt to provide such
a foundation - in particular, to show that it is pure logic that grounds
science.
It is in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic that Husserl develops this argument,
through a sustained attack upon psychologism (the view that psychology
grounds logic). By considering this attack in detail we attempt to demon¬
strate the emergence of certain limitations in the beginnings of Husserl's
own views as to the nature of science, logic and truth. It is argued that
these limitations entail the failure of the Husserlian project, as
presented in the Logical investigations.
A resolution of these limitations is developed through a consideration of
the phenomenology of Hegel, and his arguments concerning the way philosophy
should begin if it is to yield truth. In particular, Hegel's arguments
for the necessity of phenomenology as preceding all other philosophy and
providing the complete justification for science, for his particular
conception of science, and for the nature of experience as being dia¬
lectical are examined. It is argued that these arguments enable science
to be properly grounded.
The final section of this thesis briefly reconsiders the Husserlian
position in the light of the Hegelian position adopted.




PART I HUSSERL'S ARGUMENTS IN THE PROLEGOMENA 7
1. Introduction 7
2. The Investigation of Logic 7
3. Psychologism 13
4. The psychologistic interpretation
of the laws of logic 22
5. Relativism 25
6. Two proponents of relativism 33
7. Critical observations 35
8. The first psychologistic prejudice 42
9. The second psychologistic prejudice 49
10. The third psychologistic prejudice 53




14. Existence, Truth and Science 77






3.2 How should logic begin? 153
3.3 The Notion of the beginning
further considered 181
3.4 Identity, Non-identity and Contradiction 184
3.5 Experience 202
3.6 The dialectic process 208
3.7 The dialectic process and formalization 221
3.8 Truth 226
PART I I I HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY 238
1. The ideal and the real 238
2. Phenomenology 251
3. Hegel - A concluding note 259
BlBLIOGRAPHY 263
PREFACE
In philosophy par excellence there is the problem of foundation.
This problem can be expressed in the following manner: is it possible
to adequately (scientifically) justify ones philosophical beginning,
to show that it does not rest on any presuppositions; and, that
given this beginning philosophy can realize its task?
The following investigations are concerned to provide an answer to
this question. And it is with Husserl's philosophical beginning
that the investigations begin. Husserl's power is to take philo¬
sophy seriously, he attempts to get to the basis of it and submit
it to scrutiny in an attempt to answer the question of foundation.
i
It is Husserls express aim to situate philosophy on a scientific
foundation, and in pursuing this aim he begins by investigating
the philosophies of his time. Through a detailed study he finds
these philosophies unable to provide such a foundation due to the
confusions and ambiguities they contain. It is by working through
such philosophies and pointing out their shortcomings that Husserl
is able to clear the way for his own philosophical standpoint. It
is therefore appropriate to begin by considering Husserls investi¬
gations into the grounding of philosophy and why he finds other
philosophies unacceptable.
The question posed above arose through a dissatisfaction with the
methods and starting points adopted by some present day philosophies.
2.
In particular, it was philosophies that based themselves on the
traditional logic that seemed to be affected by this foundational
malaise. And it seemed that the logical analysis of human reality
was unable to deal with the subject matter at hand - the process
of knowledge, the attainment of truth. By itself, logical analysis
is paralysis. It is a failure to provide a rational account of
reality, it is unable to reach truth. It is unable to understand
the process of knowledge because it is precluded from any knowledge
of process. It repudiates the sine qua non of any possible coherent
philosophy - the ideal of system. We shall show that the above is
the case and that such a logic therefore is unable to be properly
scientific.
It will be argued that philosophy is not on a par with empirical
science. Particular empirical sciences rest the justification
for the truth of their propositions on axioms or presuppositions.
To the extent that they remain within the boundary of these axioms
to that extent are they internally consistent. But these sciences
are not complete as the axioms upon which their procedures are
based are not capable of justification by the particular sciences
in question. The investigator is thus more a technician - operating
with a method that is given. The results obtained by empirical
science are therefore conditioned by the presuppositions that
initiated the investigations - truth is here conditioned.
Now unless the necessity of these axioms or presuppositions is
demonstrated, unless their truth is established, the truths that
follow are to that extent dependent (or suspect). It will be
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argued that it is philosophy that can give this necessity to
empirical science - philosophy will warrant the axioms
necessary.
To think that without fulfilling this requirement such methods
can be universalized to take into account all aspects of human
existence - to claim that empirical science and the logic it pre¬
supposes can, by itself, do adequate justice to man, is a grave
error, resulting in the reduction of man to that to which such
methods can apply together with a translation of other aspects of
human existence out of existence. It is the reduction of given
being being given to given being. Here it must be pointed out
that translation equals loss of meaning. it will be shown that
proper science does not provide a method which is then applied to
any subject matter at hand, but begins by demonstrating the
necessity of its own foundations. Assumptions or presuppositions
thus have no place in philosophy. We cannot build a system of
philosophy on assumptions anymore than we can build a house on
them, for both we require concrete foundations. As Whitehead puts
it "If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc
hypotheses, it must become philosophical, and must enter upon a
thorough criticism of its own foundations." ^
It does this through philosophy. By itself empirical (positive)
science cannot give its own presuppositions their necessity, not
1. A.N. Whitehead: Science and The Modern World, p.24.
k.
even a positive science that might call itself philosophy. This
is accepted by these sciences when they state that it is logically
impossible for any finite science to be both complete and consis¬
tent. Philosophy, if it is able to provide the foundation for
these sciences (and for itself) must be different in nature from
them. It is the claim of phenomenology that it can provide such
foundations - that it can give to all other disciplines their
intelligibility and truth. Husserl expresses it as follows: "It
is the distinctive peculiarity of phenomenology to include all
sciences and all forms of knowledge in the scope of its eidetic
universality ... The meaning and legitimacy of all the immediate
starting points possible and of all immediate steps in possible
(2)method come within its jurisdiction". It needs to be shown
how it is possible for phenomenology to avoid the limitations of
empirical science while being scientific itself. This is provided
in Part II of the following investigations:
Within phenomenology itself, there is much variation both in method
and content - but there is general agreement to the extent that
phenomenology must precede empirical philosophy, that it must
provide any philosophy with its foundation. It is phenomenology
that guarantees the truth of its presuppositions. It will be argued
in this thesis that phenomenology has a precise sense that allows
such foundations to be established.
It was in considering the problem of the nature of the self that
2. E. Husserl: Ideas § 62, p.166.
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I was led to the arguments of the phenomenologists. Empirical
investigations, both in psychology and philosophy had yielded
little fruit. Here the self was either trans1ated out of exis¬
tence being replaced by some ontological imposter, or else it was
reduced to another object amongst objects - a static symbol of a
frozen logic. Phenomenology, on the other hand, seemed to provide
access to the self, and to consciousness, without deforming them.
It considered consciousness as a being becoming through time, and
as always implicated through experience with its object. Pheno¬
menology described consciousness instead of destroying it.
It was through the arguments of the phenomenologists that I saw the
problem of the empiricist as an error and their method as the pro¬
blem. The view they (and especially Husserl) attacked was not a
new one. It is the view that destroys the possibility of any true
and genuine knowledge, and it is a view that will be reviewed as
Husserls arguments for a phenomenological programme are considered.
The initial investigations in phenomenology were centered on
Husserls Logical Investigations Vol. 1 (i.e. Prolegomena to Pure
Logic). But through this investigation certain problems arose
that severely limited the positive outcome of Husserl's critical
studies. It was through the philosophy of Hegel that a solution
was developed. In particular, through Hegel's arguments for
foundations or the way in which philosophy must proceed as con¬
tained in the Preface and Introduction to The Phenomenology of
Mind and The Science of Logic.
6.
It is therefore of value to critically review Husserl's arguments
against psychologism, and, more generally to assess the signifi¬
cance of his Prolegomena in that while Husserl's views changed
considerably in his subsequent publications (his later work becoming
more'historical') it will enable the writer to substantiate and
expand upon the preceding proleptic assertions concerning empiricism
and any theory that rests upon presuppositions. It will also enable
us to amplify and assess the adequacy of certain Husserlian and
Hegelian conceptions - especially their views on Science, Logic
and Truth.
The beginning of the investigation is the investigation of the




Husserl's Arguments in the Prolegomena
1 . Introduction
in the following sections Husserl's arguments in the Prolegomena
to Pure Logic will be reviewed as it was through these arguments
that Husserl was led to develop his phenomenological system. We
shall be concerned to establish the truth and value of these
arguments and their implications for philosophy itself. In pur¬
suing this intention certain general criticisms will be developed
which, due to the method of presentation of Husserl's arguments,
will unavoidably be repeated. This has the merit of constantly
reminding the reader of certain perspectives that are held to
be central to this thesis.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that while Husserl's views as
developed in the Prolegomena are essentially of a preparatory
nature, this in no way excuses him from the full force of certain
criticisms to be advanced in the body of this thesis; likewise it
in no way diminishes the many extremely important insights and
truths that he brings to light, concerning the nature of philosophy
and the method that its practitioners need to adopt.
2. The investigation of logic
Husserl is led to consider logic through his failure to provide a
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satisfactory grounding for arithmetic. He sees in the logic of his
day three confused tendencies - the formal, the psychological and
the metaphysical. Given this amalgam, it then becomes impossible
to separate out that which is solid and true - what Husserl calls
'the universally binding truth1 - from that which is mere opinion.
Husserl therefore states his intention as follows:
".... to make plain that all previous logic and our
contemporary psychologically based logic in particular,
is subject, almost without exception, to the above
mentioned dangers: through its misinterpretation of
theoretical principles and the consequent confusion of
fields, progress in logical knowledge has been gravely
hindered." (L.I. 55-6).
The dangers Husserl has in mind here are the employment of methods
which are wrong in principle - that is, not commensurate with the
disciplines' true objects. And the mixing up of different types
of proposition so that logically heterogeneous material is all
run together. With these dangers goes the following one of not
recognising the essential from the inessential - the correct
from the incorrect aim. This is a fundamental criticism which is
discussed at some length in the second part of this work. (cf.
Part 11, P.89). It is fundamental in the sense that if one is not
aware of the essential incommensurability of a particular method
with the aim to be pursued the following investigations can only
end up as incoherent either because they fail to follow their
stated method or because the aim is redefined so as to eliminate
9.
the incommensurability, the initial problem and the subject matter
as wel1.
Husserl continues by pointing out that if all the traditionally
disputed questions in logic are carefully considered, they can be
seen to collapse into two groups:
(a) Those which view logic as a theorectical discipline, being
formal and demonstrative and independent of psychology.
The paradigm being arithmetic.
(b) Those which view logic as a technology dependent on
psychology. Here it is seen as a practical discipline.
Husserl decides to begin with the accepted contemporary treatment of
logic - as a technology (group (b) above) and to exactly specify
what is meant by, and the justification of, such a treatment. This
involves the more basic question of the theoretical foundations
of logic itself and its relations to the other sciences - in this
case psychology. And, as Husserl points out, this is just the
epistemologica1 problem of the objectivity of knowledge. He adds
proleptically that his investigations will lead to the specifi¬
cation of a quite separate theoretical science which will provide
the foundation for logic as a technology - and for any technology
of scientific knowledge. This science will be a priori and demon¬
strative. We will thus be shown that group (b) rests on the
foundations of, and receives its sense from, logic viewed in the
manner of group (a).
10.
For Husserl, all the sciences are incomplete, that is, they cannot
satisfy us theoretically because they have not demonstrated all
their premisses - and they cannot do so. To achieve such a
complete demonstration we would require metaphysical investigations.
But metaphysical investigations are seen by Husserl as being
limited to those sciences that concern themselves with reality.
What about those sciences that do not concern themselves with
reality - such as pure mathematics, and, more important, what
about investigations concerning the nature of science itself?
The answer that Husserl gives is to see logic (as theory of science)
as supplying this foundation. Science aims at knowledge in the
sense of knowledge (qua judgement) having a certain 'mark' - this
being inward evidence.
"Ultimately, therefore, all genuine, and in particular
all scientific knowledge rests on inner evidence, as
far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge
extends also." (L.I.61).
Secondly, science aims at giving a systematic coherence to this
knowledge. If we did not have this coherence, we would end up
with a mere splatter of judgements leading us nowhere. ^
Validations must be grounded and achieve a systematic unity.
There are three requirements necessary for validations to be
satisfactorily grounded:
(1) This is just the criticism that S. Koch has recently levelled
at psychology viewed as a science: see S. Koch 'Psychology as
Science' p.5.
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1. They must have a fixed structure in relation to their
content.
2. They must be governed by regulative laws - this means
that no validating procedure stands in isolation.
3. They may be viewed as free of all essential relation
to a limited field of knowledge. For example, the
syllogistic forms do not apply to only one science.
Husserl sees validating arguments as having a regularity of form
which both gives the possibi1ity of existence of sciences and also
of a theory of science; the latter due to the independence of this
form of validating arguments from a particular field of knowledge.
It is only by validating arguments, which use language, that advance
in a science is made. Logic, as theory of science, is thus norma¬
tive in that it:
1. 11 ... establishes general propositions in which, with an
eye to a normative standard .... certain features are
mentioned whose possession guarantees conformity to
that standard, or sets forth an indispensable condition
of the latter." (L.I.71)
2. "... establishes cognate propositions in which the
case of non-conformity is considered or the absence of
such state of affairs is pronounced." (L.I.71)
if this normative standard is taken as an end the normativity gives
rise to technology - and when applied to science itself - a tech¬
nology of science. At this point there arises a problem. What
establishes logic as a scientific discipline? - Is it the
12.
practical standpoint that gives it this form while from the theore¬
tical standpoint all its propositions have been derived from other¬
wise known theoretical sciences (like psychology)?
That is, to put the matter simply, is logic (or any theoretical
doctrine) purely an empirical science, or is there some nucleus or
centre that is given a priori - a pure logic. Husserl's answer is
that logic as a practical discipline requires a basic norm to give
it coherence, and that this norm is not itself normative. Norma-
tivity presupposes the knowledge of certain non-normative truths.
So, given that there are non-normative truths - or a pure logic -
and that they do not come from any practical disciplines, where
(2)do they come from?
it is here that we encounter the psychologistic (and the anti-
psychologist ic) arguments. For one of the answers given by
philosophers such as Mill, Lipps, Sigwart, etc., is that psychology
provides this essential foundation of logic. Psychology grounds
logic.
Before proceeding to examine these arguments it should be noted that
when Husserl speaks of scientific knowledge possessing the 'mark'
of 'inner evidence1 he treads on very dangerous ground. For if
this 'mark' is not open to rational discourse it grounds science
(2) S. Rosen takes up this question of the norm or principle of the
science of science - and argues that it must be rendered secure by
something other than science if we are to avoid an infinite regress.
(See p.82 'Hegel - An Introduction of the Science of Wisdom'). The
question concerning the nature of science itself is considered in
Part I I.
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in myth. In this state we would not be able to counter any
assertion which was claimed to have the mark of inner evidence
for there would be no way of rationally doing this. Hence while
we agree wholeheartedly with Husserl's demand for a systematic
and unified science, we require an explication of the notion of
inner evidence that avoids the above danger.
3. Psychologism
Husserl proceeds to examine psychologism by adopting its standpoint.
He observes that though there may be opposing views on many issues
in psychology, it is universally agreed that psychology is a
factual and therefore empirical science. It is also universally
agreed that it does not possess exact laws. Given these two
statements, Husserl makes the following arguments.
(1) If psychological laws lack exactness, and psychology grounds
logic, the same must be true of the prescriptions of logic.
But logic is a paradigm of exactness with respect to its
laws - it does not depend upon inexact empirical fact. There¬
fore, any position basing logical laws on the empirical would
destroy logic as it is presently conceived.
(2) Natural laws are not and cannot be known a priori, nor
established by induction from singular facts of experience.
Thus, if logical laws are taken as mere natural laws that
happen to characterize the state of our minds when we think,
they would rank as mere probabilities, and thus nothing
14.
could be certainly judged correct. But logical laws all
seem to have a priori validity and are established by
'apodeictic inner evidence1. Therefore, though we have
insight into the truth of logical laws, we only have insight
into the probability of natural laws,
"Against the truth that is itself grasped with insight,
the strongest psychologistic argument cannot avail:
probability cannot wrestle with truth, nor surmise
with insight" (L.l.100).
Psychology cannot yield the absolutely exact laws which form
the core of logic.
(3) If the laws of thought are taken as causal laws, they can only
be stated in the form of probabilities. This would condemn us
to probabilism, for we can have no insight into causal laws.
Husserl sees two confusions underlying the psychol.ogi st ic
arguments concerning causation. In this argument there are
run together logical laws as contents of judgements, with
logical laws as those judgements themselves. As the former
they are ideal, but as the latter they are real events having
causes and effects. (This is the first mention of a distinc¬
tion that is to play a large part in Husserl's investigations ■
the ideal and the real. We shall have cause to examine this
distinction in greater detail following the exposition of
Husserl's position vis a vis psychologism, for it will be
maintained that by making the distinction as he does he makes
the path to science (Logic) impossible).
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The second confusion is run into the first one when law, taken
as a term in causation is confused with law taken as the rule
of causation - this leads to the rules of causal connection
functioning again as causes (i.e. as terms in this connection).
Husserl sums up this point as follows:
"The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental,
essential, never-to-be-bridged gulf between ideal
and real laws, between normative and causal regulation,
between logical and real necessity, between logical
and real grounds." (L.I. 104).
(4) If the psychologistic logician argues that the laws of logic
have their epistemological source in psychological matter of
fact then they must be laws for mental states and presuppose
the existence of such states. But no logical law implies a
matter of fact. Therefore logical laws are as little psycholo¬
gical as they are empirical. They are, for Husserl, pure, and
not established by induction (because they have no existential
content) but by insight. They exclude all other possibilities
of truth.
With these arguments Husserl disposes of the psycholog?stic argu¬
ments that claim that logical laws entail existential assertion
of mental fact, and also that logical laws are laws for mental
facts - for, with respect to this latter view only factual laws
have an empirical range, logical laws are fact free.
An immediate difficulty arises in these arguments in that they are
16.
based upon an empiricistic ground. Husserl is right to take the
psychologistic logician to task for relativizing truth (argument
(1)) and for destroying the difference between ideal and real laws,
and between a priori and aposteriori laws (arguments (2) and (3)).
But he overstates his case in that he makes the gap between ideal
pure laws and real causal laws unbridgable. And argument {b) can
certainly be questioned. For, though it is agreed with Husserl that
a logical law does not imply a matter of fact-, and, further, that
we should not confuse .... "the psychological presuppositions or
components of the assertion of a law, with the logical 'moments'
of its content" (L.I.106), this does not necessarily imply that the
meaning of the content can be given in a manner that is in no way
related to other than 'pure' phenomena.
It is clear that Husserl sees psychology as a purely empirical
science limited to empirical generalities - it is "the
objective science of animal mentality" (L.I. 867). And on this
view of psychology it is right to reject it as being able to give
any account of the genesis of the logical. But it is necessary
to provide £n account of the way these laws become constituted
for us - of the way these meaningful contents arise. It then
depends as to how one analyses the concept of meaning as to how
'pure' the account of such a genesis will be. That is, whether
it is possible to give an account of the meaning of a concept
without at the same time giving an account of the system of meanings
in which that concept is given as a concept.
Husserl did certainly recognize that it was necessary to give an
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account of the genesis of such logical contents - this was acknow¬
ledged as a major task in the Formal and Transcendental Logic:
.... "we must look for the manners in which the objects/take shape
as synthetic unities in the mode "they themselves", in those
experiences". (p.247).
So far no one has taken ".... the ideality of the formations with
which logic is concerned as the characteristic of a separate self-
contained "world" of ideal objects and, in so doing, to come face
to face with the painful question of how subjectivity can in itself
bring forth purely from sources appertaining to its own spontaneity,
formations that can be rightly accounted as ideal objects in an
ideal world". (260-1).
Phenomenology was then to move from the uncovering of the logical
structures to the specification of their subjective constitution.
But this constitution or uncovering is achieved by presupposing
a given sense to such terms as ideal/real, matter of fact/essence,
objectivity/subjectivity, etc. Husserl is already presupposing
certain senses to these terms that do not necessarily accord with
the way these terms arise or are given in and through experience, -
an experience that may extend and be inseparable from the system
or structures of meaning present* (This question is further
discussed in Part II section 3°6)„
Therefore argument 4 is correct in its criticism of the argument
of the psychologistic logician, but in saying that logical laws
are as little psychological as they are empirical he is presupposing
a sense to these conceptions that needs to be described, i.e. the
context of meaning,, This is to return to the problem of beginning,
and it is here that a phenomenological description is required in
that it will warrant necessary a particular law by showing how it
emerged from conscious experience.
This is the phenomenological description that is attempted by Hegel
in his Phenomenology of Mind where he describes the way the various
concepts and laws arise and how they are related to the total con¬
ceptual system. Husserl also sees phenomenology as performing the
task of clarifying the way (transcendental) subjectivity con¬
stitutes such concepts and laws, though in a manner at variance
with, and we shall claim (in Part 111) inferior to the Hegelian
attempt.
We could perhaps put some of Husserl's points in a modified form as
follows: no logical law implies a matter of fact, but they do pre¬
suppose the having got to the point of being able to assert such a
law; of working up to the point of being able to form the notions
of the logical and the empirical (or natural). To separate this
development off - to ignore it - is to make the possibility of a
completely coherent account of science impossible. This criticism
does not mean that the a priori-ness of logical as against natural
laws has to be abandoned, it means that the notions of ideal law
and real law are not separated by a 1never-to-be-bridged gulf1.
19.
To demand such a separation is to make the possibility of any
relation between these two notions irrational, and to make the
path to idealism (or materialism) unavoidable,, This point was
picked up by one of Husserl's early critics, P. Natorp. As
Farber later expressed it:
"In Natorp's view the problem of the relationship between
the formal and the material, the a priori and the
empirical, the logical and the psychological is not
solved by Husserl; or, in the latter's terminology
between the ideal and the real. The material, empirical,
psychological, i.e. the "real" seems to remain as an
incomprehensible, irrational residue. The author of the
drama takes the side of the "ideal" and adheres to
idealism, in the Platonic sense; and the 'real' remains
standing as a strange, rejected residue which cannot be
eliminated. Natorp expressed the belief that Husserl
will be forced along Kantian lines (and in fact) Natorp
really indicated the course of Husserl's further
development." ^
We shall return to these points.
After stating these four arguments Husserl then introduces the
(A)
following Kantian proposition:
(3) M. Farber: The Foundation of Phenomenology, p.1A9 (slightly
compressed). See also The Aims of Phenomenology p.6.
{k) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (MacMillan) B1 - P.4l.
"All knowledge 'begins with experience', but it does not
therefore 'arise' from experience". (L.I. 109).
For Husserl all laws concerning matters of fact arise from experience
hence they must be inductively based on individual experiences.
The notion of 'immediate self-evidence' cannot apply here, for
these laws are mediated through individual experiences, whereas
ideal laws are not - they are timeless hence can be apprehended in
this immediate fashion. But again this proposition immediately
raises problems.
Kant held that the form of knowledge - the universal and necessary
form - was a priori,independent of experience and delimited to the
subject as its principle. This apriori knowledge is thus rationali-
stically held as absolutely independent of experience. ^ The
content of knowledge is held by Kant to be derived from an unknown
source and is given to us externally, a posteriori and in a com¬
pletely empirical fashion. Now Husserl in taking over this Kantian
position also takes over many of the problems associated with Kant's
philosophy. Husserl's distinction between ideal and real seems to
be congruent with Kant's distinction between the form and content
of experience.
The proposition as Husserl states it is also important, in that while
it is most unclear what Husserl understands by the concept of
experience, the development of two types of knowledge follows from
(5) Ibid B.2, P.A3.
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this. ^ Another consequence of this is that every law is not
necessarily empirical, nor temporally bound. And this ties in with
Husserl's distinction between real and ideal. Husserl also adds
at this point that 'no truth is a fact, i.e. something determined
as to time1. ^ It therefore follows that it is senseless to
talk of truths arising and passing away. If we take as an example
the laws of truth themselves then if these truly arose and passed
away we would have a state where laws arose and passed away in
accordance with the law - which Husserl sees as being patently
absurd.
But what does Husserl mean by experience? And what does he mean by
truth? On what basis are we expected to agree with Husserl's (and
Kant's) statement concerning the relationship of knowledge to
experience? It would seem that this proposition is just asserted
and not shown to necessarily follow from the development of
(8)
experience itself. And if it is claimed that is has the mark
of self-evidence, we would require an analysis of self-evidence
that made the notion of self-deception absolutely impossible.
A further problem can be mentioned here. When one attempts to express
anything, to make a claim to knowledge, it is effected through
language. For example, when it is claimed that " .... all knowledge
(6) E.P. Welch. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, p.38. Discusses
this point wel1.
(7) L.I. 109.
(8) Hegel..Science of Logic, p.613, where he attacks empirical
logicians who just assert, i.e. there are such and such
notions. Where do such propositions come from, where is
their necessity?
'begins with experience', but it does not therefore 'arise' from
experience" (L.I.109), such a claim presupposes a particular sense
of the terms used such that the meaning of the statement can be
conveyed. But this 'sense of the terms used' varies depending
upon what particular point of view - what particular structures of
(9)
meaning we embrace. To be adequate to the task of conveying the
particular sense intended the statement must be precise and the
terms that comprise it clear. That is, to specify the precise
sense of terms like 'experience' is to use further terms and state¬
ments which further develop the state of affairs first claimed -
it is to describe a form of knowledge. To be systematic, it
would seem that we need to show how all the different terms arise
and how they are related to the points of view possible. This is
an immense undertaking. However, in Part II we wi11 enquire into
the Hegelian view as to how one should begin such a clarification.
This problem is mentioned here in that it is the sense given by
Husserl to such terms as experience, truth, fact, etc. that is
, . , (10)
being questioned.
The Psychologistic interpretation of the laws of logic
So far we have seen that psychologism leads us to the view that
logical truths are merely vague probabilities resting upon the
authority of experience and induction, and concerning matters of
fact. Gone is their a priori and exact nature - their pure con-
(9) Merleau-Ponty develops this notion.of the structures or forms
of meaning in The Structure of Behaviour, showing how this
notion helps in solving the problems associated with perception.
(10) See P.89 where examples are given of what happens when there is
a lack of such a systematic development of concepts.
ceptuality. Husserl now proceeds to examine the psychological
interpretation of the law of contradiction (as espoused by Mill,
Spencer, Lange and Sigwart), and syllogistic inference (Heymans) .^ ^
His argument against the view that the law of contradiction is a
generalization from individual facts of experience (Mill) is that
the facts that are used to support this contention already pre¬
suppose mutual exclusion (i.e. light/dark, sound/silence). This
reduces the law of contradiction to a tautology. But it is evident
that this law is not a tautology.
Likewise the attempt to construe this law as having a two-fold
significance (Lange), both as a natural law, and as a normative
1 aw.
Husserl has already expressed himself concerning the divide between
natural (real) and Ideal law, and this applies to attempts at con¬
ceiving syllogistic inference psychologistically. The absolute
validity of certain inferences cannot be reached in psychology, nor
the notion of conformity to an ideal law. In all these cases we
find the confusion that conflates self evidence with opinion, exact
with empirical generality, logical with psychological incompati¬
bility, impossibility in terms of truth with impossibility in terms
of belief.
(11) In J.S. Mill: Logic; H.Spencer: Psychology; F.A. Lange:
Logische Studien; C.Sigwart: Logik; G.Heymans: Gesetze und
Elemente des wissen schaftlichen Denkens.
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Husserl then provides a short attack on empiricism, which he sees
as intimately linked with psychologism. His argument here is that
'extreme empiricism' cannot provide a rational justification of
mediate knowledge and hence is incapable of demonstrating that it
is a 'scientifically proven theory'. For in basing itself on
'singular judgements of experience' it is condemned to either a
vicious infinite regress or circularity when it attempts to account
for the principles governing its procedure. It is involved in the
former if the principles governing its procedure themselves require
further proof; that is, if these principles rest upon singular
judgements. And it is involved in circularity if these principles
of proof are justified by more principles of proof - if the prin¬
ciples are of the same form as those which they govern.
Husserl concludes that because extreme empiricism ignores all but
singular judgements of experience it is quite unable to rationally
justify mediate knowledge. Any attempted justification of its
mediate knowledge is performed with more mediate knowledge, the
latter being given in psychological terms. This relativizes the
whole procedure, for psychological terms are also mediate judge¬
ments of fact - from facts alone nothing can be know except
(12) Husserl develops this argument in more detail in Ideas, 8.
(We might add here (a) that "facts do not speak for them¬
selves, but always occur in a context of meaning, in which
they find their place." (Phenomenology and the Natural
Sciences - Ed. Kockelmans and Kisiel, p.23). (b) that 'the
fact' as an atom of experience is incoherent. It requires
i ts own h i s tory) .
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Husserl sums up as follows:
"It therefore fails to see that, having no insightful
justification for our mediate assumptions, no justifi¬
cation, therefore, for the relevant proof-procedures
from the immediately evident general principles that
they follow, its whole psychological theory, its whole
mediately known doctrine of empiricism is without
rational foundation, is, in fact, a mere assumption,
no more than a common prejudice." (L.I. 116).
This is partly what was asserted in the introduction to this thesis
that empiricism repudiates the sine qua non of any possible coherent
philosophy, this being the ideal of a system, of comprehending
totality. We shall see in Part II that this repudiation is tied
up with logic - where we find a similar repudiation of dialectical
logic. It will be argued that Husserl while demanding a system
where mediate knowledge is fully grounded fails to see any relation
between traditional logic (the logic of the understanding) and
dialectical logic.
5. Relativism
Husserl has not yet finished with psychologism and empiricism. He
presents a more powerful argument against the above - namely, that
they violate the conditions for the possibility of a theory as
such.
This is by no means a new argument, as was pointed out in the intro-
(1 3)
duction. In fact one writer, J. Wild devotes the majority of
his article (which is ostensibly on Husserl's critique of psycho-
logism) to Plato's attack on the above. Again Kojeve, in his
'A Note on Eternity, Time and the Concept' points out this argument
in relation to science and time* In considering these latter con¬
cepts he develops four possibilities of relation, the fourth being
that all our knowledge (what he calls the Concept) is temporal. He
says of this possibility:
"There is still possibi1? ty IV: the Concept is Temporal. But
this is no longer a philosophical possibility. For this
(skeptical) type of thought makes all philosophy impossible
by denying the very idea of truth: being tempora1, the
concept essentially changes; that is to say that there
is no definitive knowledge, hence no true knowledge in
the proper sense of the word."
He leaves off considering it further as he considers Plato, Kant and
Husserl to have sufficiently demolished this view. So what is
Husserl's argument?
If we enquire into the ideal conditions for the possibility of any
theory at all, we find two basic groups of conditions - what Husserl
(13) J. Wild 'Husserl's Critique of Psychologism" in M.Farber (ed)
Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl.
(14) A. Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, P.102.
calls the subjective (noetic) and the objective (logical). The
noetic conditions are a priori, and the possibility of both
immediate and mediate knowledge depends on them as does the
possibility of rationally justifying any theory. The latter
conditions concern the laws, which if denied, destroy any possible
coherent sense to the terms of a theory - terms such as theory,
truth, object, property, relation, etc. This denial leads to
logical offences, either in the presuppositions of a theory, in
the forms of theorectical connection in a theory, or in the thesis
that the theory sets forth. This provides an informal classifi¬
cation of theories as being false, nonsensical, logically and noe-
tically absurd, and sceptical, Husserl also adds that scepticism -
being a consequence of psychologism - involves noetic and logical
, (16)
absurdity.
Husserl's criticism of psychologism is that it is a sceptical
relativism - so he next investigates the concept of relativism.
Relativism is the view that all truth and knowledge is relative
to the judging subject or to the human species. The former can
be called individual relativism and the latter specific relativism
(or anthropologism). Individual relativism is a nonsensical
doctrine for it destroys the possibility of the sense of its own
assertions. Against specific relativism Husserl marshalls six
arguments which will be briefly summarized below.
(15) See Husserl's 'Formal and Transcendental Logic' and 'Experience
and Judgement'.
(16) § 14 of this work deals at greater length with the notions of
noetic and the logical stated above.
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Argument 1
Assertion: Specific relativism asserts that 'anything is true
for a given species of judging beings that, by their
constitution and laws of thought must count as
true1 * (,7)
Refutation; This would mean that truth is only bound to the
human species and may not hold for another species.
But this would mean that the same judgement could
be both true and false - and no judgement can be
so. For what is true is absolutely true, whether
(18)
apprehended by men or Gods.
Arqumentl I
Assertion: There could be beings not bound by the principles that
bind us, such as the principles of contradiction
and excluded middle. Or, what amounts to the
same thing, there could be judgements made by
those beings which did not conform to these principles.
Refutation; Either such beings understand the words 'true'
and 'false' in our sense, in which case they
would be merely being irrational; or else they
mean something different when they use such
words. This would reduce the dispute to one
(17) LI. 1 40,
(18) This, of course, depends on what is meant by truth and judge¬
ment. Hegel would say that all judgements are both true and
false. In this connection see S.Rosen: Hegel. The Science
of Wisdom, P.65-
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of words - and with each equivocation we would
obtain yet another 'truth1.
Argument I I I
Assertion: The form or constitution of a species is a fact.
From a fact we can only derive more facts. Hence
to base truth relativistically on the constitution
of a species is to give it a factual character or
foundation.
Refutation: Every fact is individual and therefore temporally
determinate - truth is not. Facts are causal -
truth is not. The above assertion confuses judge¬
ment as the content of a judgement - where the
notion of truth applies, with judgement as the
individual real act of judgement - where the
notion of fact applies.
Argument IV
Assertion: All truth has its source in our common human
constitution. Therefore if there is no con¬
stitution there is no truth.
Refutation: The thesis of this assertion is absurd. For
Husserl, " .... the proposition 'There is no
truth' amounts in sense to the proposition
'There is a truth that there is no truth'.
The absurdity of the thesis entails the
absurdity of the hypothesis." (L.I. 142).
Argument V
Assertion: The constitution of a species might yield the
'truth1 for the species, that there was no such
consti tution.
Refutation: To say that the non-existence of a certain
constitution could be based on that very con¬
stitution is to contradict oneself, i,e. that
the existent constitution should condition the
truth of its own non-existence,
Argument VI
Assertion: That truth is subjective, in that a change in
subjectivity would mean a change in the world.
Refutation: This view eliminates the world as existing in
itself. The relativity of truth entails the
relativity of existence. For Husserl the above
assertion amounts to the denial of the 'inner
evidence of immediately intuited existence', as
over against relativism, and in 'self-evident
conf1ict' with it.
These arguments have been reviewed here because it will later be
argued that Husserl's view of truth is not an acceptable one. It
will also be observed that these arguments against specific
relativism are not wholly convincing. For example, the refutation
in argument I assumes that truth is forever truth, which assumption
implies certain views concerning consciousness, its perspective
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and its experience which have not been made explicit* For if
consciousness is not a thing - not some static point from which
(19)
truths are apprehended - but a 'becoming' or a 'negativity
(as we shall argue later), then consciousness' perspective may
alter as consciousness itself changes and develops* Hence its
standard of self-evidence, its requirement for truth, and its
self-evident principles may change* It is not sufficient to adopt
the philosophical position of those whom one is investigating
unless this position is made explicit.
Similarly, in argument IV, it is not self-evident that there is
truth irrespective of the existence of the species. Kojeve puts
the point nicely as follows:
"Without Man, Being would be mute: it would be there
(Dasein) but it would not be true (das Wahre)."
Husserl is presupposing certain conceptions of truth and self-
evidence that require demonstration. For example, does self-
evidence have degrees? And surely it would never be completely
impossible for us to be suffering from some form of self-deception?
Again it is not self-evident that the statement 'that all truth
has its source in our human constitution' is equivalent to saying
that 'there is a truth that there is no truth'. What is being
included under the concept of truth as here employed? Is there
one concept of truth or two? Is there a truth that applies to
(19) i.e. If consciousness is not given being but being given*
(20) Kojeve, op* cit* P*l88*
propositions such as 1+1=2, that does not apply to propositions
of a more philosophical bent? Is it an acceptable methodological
procedure to investigate psychologism without the prior explication
of the point from which the investigations are being made - without
justifying or demonstrating the necessity of the viewpoint that is
being employed?
We shall return to the consideration of the questions raised here
in relation to the above arguments following the completion of the
exigesis of Husserl's arguments against psychologism.
Husserl sees relativism in an extended sense to be the doctrine
that somehow derives the pure principles of logic from facts.
Against this he argues that the pure truths of logic are all ideal
laws having their foundation in the 'sense', 'essence1, or 'content'
of the concepts of truth, proposition,relation etc. Hence if a
theoretical assertion is made which contravenes these laws, it
is not merely false, but logically absurd. Husserl's arguments
up to this point have been to demonstrate that any theory which
deduces logical principles from matters of fact is log? cally
absurd. And, secondly, that psychologism in all its varieties
is a relativism that does just that, it tries to ..... "deduce
truth from generic human nature, the ideal from the real, or,
more precisely, the necessity of laws from the contingency of
facts." (L. 1. 146).
For Husserl, any doctrine is relativistic (i.e. in a case of
specific relativism) if it treats the pure laws of logic as
though they were empirical, psychological laws. This is what
the empiricist does. Secondly, it is relativistic if it
deduces these pure laws somehow from some particular mode of
functioning of our particular human understanding, from some
innate quality that precedes all thought and experience.
Two proponents of relativism
As proponents of relativism (Anthropologism), Sigwart and Erdman
come up for detailed criticism - Husserl applying the arguments
already adumbrated. Our interest in these attacks centres on the
further statements that Husserl makes with regard to the nature
of truth, experience and ideality.
Husserl shows that Sigwart resolves truth into conscious experiences
that for Sigwart it is absurd to speak of truths holding unknown to
anyone. Without a thinker there can be no true judgement. But, if
experiences, judgements, etc. are real particulars, having a
temporal location, and if truth is eternal and beyond time; then
the 'experience' in which we apprehend truth will be entirely
different from that in which we apprehend phenomena.
For Husserl, truth is a universal, as is, for example, the species
Red. Red is not contained, as a part, in a red object - for where
the experience of the red of this object (the sensed redness) arises
and passes away, the 'experience' of Redness qua ideal unity (or
34.
(21) _
Universal or Idea) does not. Therefore we have differing
modes of apprehending singular and universal objects. Truth
cannot therefore (pace Sigwart) be resolved into conscious
experiences. Husserl puts his conclusion succinctly as follows:
"To define truth in terms of a community of nature is to
abandon its notion. If truth were essentially related to
thinking intelligences, their mental functions and modes
of change, it would arise and perish with them, with the
species at least, if not with the individual. With the
genuine objectivity of truth, the objectivity of being,
even the objectivity of subjective being or the being of
the subject would be gone".
"Truth and being are 'categories' in the same sense, and
plainly correlative: truth cannot be relativized while
the objectivity of being is maintained. The relativization
of truth presupposes the objective point to which things are
relative: this is the contradiction in relativism." (L.I.151)
Because Sigwart is unable to make the distinction between the logical
(the 'truths of reason') and the factual (the 'truths of fact') -
one which Husserl claims presupposes the 'sharp sundering of ideal
from real1, he is unable to provide this 'objective being' for the
relative to hand upon. The doctrine thus collapses.
(21) Husserl also discussed the distinction between sensed red
as against the perceived quality of red in the Phenomeno¬
logy of Internal Time Consciousness § 1, p»25.
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In his consideration of Erdmanns anthropologism the same basic
criticism is made. Erdmann confuses the real act of judgement
with the content of that judgement - thus making the content
relative to the possibility of the act, which destroys all absolute
truth the content may have had. Relativism is thus the inescapable
consequence. For Husserl, propositions that merely explicate the
concepts they contain make no assertion about the real - and are
to that extent trivial generalities. These propositions govern
the form to which our assertions, judgements etc. must conform,
Non-conformity entails absurdity, while conformity merely provides
forma 1 consistency.
7. Critical Observations.
This concludes Husserl's arguments concerning the consequences of
psychologism as a sceptical relativism. It is thus appropriate to
point out certain problems that are seen to arise from the arguments
Husserl has so far produced.
Husserl's introduction of the notions of self or inner evidence,
experience, truth, the ideal and the real, and the notion of
concept itself is unacceptable. In relation to the notion of
inner evidence as the mark that all properly scientific knowledge
possesses it has been argued that this 'mark' is not as yet a
coherent notion. What is the status of this inner or self-evidence?
Is it an ideal addition to an ideal concept and if so in what
relation does this self-evidence bare to our more psychological
conception where the possibility of error in the self-evidence
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cannot completely be ruled out? Again the notion of self-deception
seems to have a possible application in any case of inner evidence -
even Descartes' cogito seems logically open to this,,
Secondly, when Husserl speaks of two types of knowledge arising from
experience, what does he mean by the concept 'experience1? Is it a
dialectical interplay of a subject separating itself off from an
object to which it at the same time relates itself, or is it the
mere reception of sensations - for depending on what is understood
by this concept any later investigation is determined in a parti¬
cular fashion.
Thirdly, Husserl speaks of truths as being timeless, it being sense¬
less to speak of a truth ever coming into being or passing away. To
do so would be to confuse the content of a judgement with the real
act of judging. But the content of a judgement does not stand in
isolation from judgement, and judgement itself can be seen to
(22)
necessarily embody the denial of truth. Here truth is taken
as expressing totality - what Hegel calls speculative truth. Now
in taking truth in a different sense from this Husserl is pre¬
supposing the adequacy of what he should in fact be demonstrating,
if truly scientific knowledge is to be attained.
Fourthly, the notions of ideal and real, together with his discussion
of universal and particular are not seen as adequate,. In his dis¬
cussion of the universal red and its relation to the sensed red
(22) See Part II where the notion of judgement as incapable of
expressing truth is discussed.
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object Husserl asserts that these two are completely separate.
(23)
He speaks of a 'never to be bridged gulf' and a 'sharp
sundering' between the ideal (in this case the universal red)
and the real (the sensed red object). Given this radical
separation., it is then necessary to show how these two sundered
'objects' can be in any way related without destroying the
separation first specified. As Findlay has pointed out, this is
one point which "remains open to criticism in the whole
Prolegomena: the great gulf set by Husserl between ideal and
real objectivity, and his refusal to believe that the principles
of the former can have any connection with the principles of the
How can the ideal 'participate' in reality if it is radically
separate? And if there is no unity between these two we seem
to collapse into unintel1igibi1ity for we then appear to have
either a course of ideas inexpressive of reality, or a reality
that has no ideal form, and as Bosanquet points out, this des-
(26)
troys the essence of truth, Husserl suggests an answer
to this question in a later work - the Formal and Transcendental
Logic. There he says that the idealities of significations and
and of universal essences do have 'manners of possible partici-
(23) Lol. 104
(24) L.I. 152
(25) See Findlays Introduction L.I. 17
(26) B,Bosanquet: Implication and Linear Inference p.147-8.
(Also see Bail lie's Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology
of Hind, p.46).
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pation in reality1, while at the same time he maintains that this
(27)
in no way alters the 'essential separation' between them.
He then adds that more penetrating investigations are required
here.
Husserl points out here that he was in fact misled at the time of
the Prolegomena about the relation of ideal to real objects. But
the conception of two types of experience, that we pointed out
earlier allows him to develop this 'participation', though it
also throws the question asked onto the previous distinction of
'begin with/arise from' experience. In what manner does he advance
beyond the Kantian conception of this relation? In 'Experience and
Judgement' Husserl develops further this problem of the relation
of the real and the ideal. Talking in this section about judi¬
cative propositions he states:
'A proposition is not like a real object, individuated in
an objective point of time; rather, it is an irreal
object which, so to speak, is everywhere and nowhere. Real
objectivities are joined together in the unity of an
objective time and have their horizon of connection;
to the consciousness we have of them there belong,
accordingly, horizon-intentions which refer to this
unity.
On the other hand, a plurality of irreal objectivities,
(27) Op. Cit. § 58, P.115.
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e,g, a number of propositions belonging to the unity
of a theory, does not have for consciousness such
horizon intentions referring to a temporal connection.
The irreality of the proposition as the idea of a syn¬
thetic unity of becoming is the idea of something which
can appear in individual acts in any temporal position,
occurring in each as necessarily temporal and temporally
becoming, but which is the same "at all times". It is
referred to all times; or correlatively to whatever time
it may be referred, it is always absolutely the same; it
sustains no temporal differentiation, and, what is
equivalent to this, no extension, no expansion in time,
, , (28)and this in the proper sense.
Though we have here moved considerably away from the initial state¬
ments in the Prolegomena it can still be seen that Husserl is having
trouble relating these two types of objects in a way that does not
require some extensive ontological presuppositions. For here the
original question of the nature of the relation between ideal and
real simply passes to the relation between the temporal and the
atemporal - and it is here that Husserl brings in more rarified
notions, such as that of "supertemporality1 and 'omnitemporality1
(29)in an attempt to explain this. We shall return to this
problem presently.
(28) Experience and Judgement, P,259,
(29) Ibid P.261 ,
Returning to his discussion of Sigwart, Husserl appears to commit
another mistake. He argues that if we follow Sigwart, truth
would vanish with the human species. This view implies a confusion
in the perspective from which the statement is made, Husserl seems
to take the subject as separate from the object; truth from fact.
But without the prior explication of the notion of experience and
truth the position remains obscure. The force of Husserl's
arguments can be felt only from the epistemological position of
the empiricistic and psychologistic logician, but if their
position reduces to absurdity as Husserl often argues, what
rescues _us_ from this? He needs to show, and he does not show,
how we are able to apprehend this absurdity. That is, he fails
to show how he has got to the point of being able to put his
distinctions so that they receive a coherent sense, given the
absurdity of the above position.
Following Hegel, it will be argued that universal (abstract uni¬
versal, i,e, red) and particular (the real sensed red object)
are in contradiction if taken in isolation - that in some sense
the individual red object is both a particularization of the
universal and a universal i zation of the parti cular, In fact
it will be maintained that the bare isolated individual or parti¬
cular and the abstract universal are unthinkable and hence unreal.
But this argument presupposes for its possibility the prior
clarification of the relations that hold between epistemology and
(30) Bail lie puts it thus: "The science requires generality, the
experience requires individuality; the generality of science
must be individualized, the individuality of experience must
be generalized," Introduction to Phenomenology of Mind,
Hegel, P,46,
phenomenology. Until this has been performed, we ourselves are
open to the charge of not having demonstrated the having got to
the point where our views achieve a coherent sense - our arguments
are made from nowhere without this. In entering into discourse
consciousness implicates itself in its own arguments - the argu¬
ments developed are related both to the (in this case) psycholo-
gistic logician and to the Husserlian position.
We will also need to look closely at the limitations of an episte-
mological procedure such as Husserl's, and whether his epistemo-
logical view receives a coherent sense. To this end we are in
full agreement with Husserl's demands that for an epistemologica1
investigation to be properly scientific it must conform to the
principle of 'freedom from presupposition'. And secondly, that
any epistemologica1 investigation that is performed must be
grounded in - 'have its pure foundation in' - phenomenology;
though in what sense this 'presupposition' and 'phenomenology'
(31)
be taken is another matter to be clarified.
So far we have seen Husserl developing a powerful argument against
psychologism - viewed from the perspective of psychologism - namely
that it is a sceptical relativism which entails absurd consequences
Husserl puts his point most directly when he says that 'the
relativization of truth presupposes the objective being of the
point to which things are relative', and in the discussion of truth
especially Hegel's notion of it, we shall see how this 'objective
(31) L.I. P.263.
being of the point1 is explicated. However, the observations made
so far merely indicate in proleptic fashion certain basic problems
and the perspective from which Husserl's further arguments con¬
cerning the psychologistic arguments will be viewed.
The First Psychologistic Prejudice
Husserl turns from the consequences to the arguments of psycholo-
gism to show that its supposed truths are in fact delusive pre¬
judices. He puts the psychologistic arguments in the form of
three prejudices, which shall be considered briefly.
The first prejudice is stated as follows:
'Prescriptions which regulate what is mental must obviously
have a mental basis- It is accordingly self evident that
the normative principles of knowledge must be grounded
in the psychology of knowledge.' (L.I. 168).
But, Husserl argues, logical laws are not normative, they are not
prescriptive. They may be employed in a normative manner, but this
requires a 'fundamental transformation' of these logical laws.
Husserl emphasises that we must be clear that the logical laws do
not contain normativity in their thought content, whereas pre¬
scriptions do; though the former can be used as a foundation for
a normative statement. If this is not clearly perceived we fall
foul of the confusions that sustain both the psychologistic and
A3.
the anti-psychologistic positions. The psychologistic view mis¬
takenly collapses these two domains, the logical laws and the rules
governing the 'specifically human acquisition of knowledge1 into
the latter - or better, fails to see the logical laws as being in
any way different from the rules for human procedure; while the
anti-psychologistic view mistakenly attributes normativity to both
and hence is led to overlook the 'purely theoretical nature' of
logical laws,
Husserl sees logic, as a methodology (or as a technology) as con¬
cerned with providing the general norms for the critical evaluation
of our theoretical knowledge. But if logic in this role is aiming
at being a scientific discipline, then it, like all other sciences,
will presuppose certain theoretical knowledge, such as those truths
which cannot be denied on pain of vitiating any possible scientific
enterprise. Those truths ' «... which have their roots in such
essential constituents of all science considered as an objective
theoretical unity, truths which, accordingly, cannot be thought
away without thinking away all that gives science as such its
objective purchase and sense, such truths obviously provide the
fundamental standards by which we can decide whether anything
claiming to be a science, or to belong to one really lives
up to its intentions, or does not rather stand in an apriori con¬
flict with the ideal conditions of the possibility of theory and
science as such,' (L.I, 172)
It is these truths that cannot be grounded in psychology, or any of
the sciences dealing with 'matters of fact'. These truths are ideal,
and as such, are completely independent of the particular sciences.
Once we recognize this domain, we would according to Husserl, find
it impossible to deny the existence of a special science which
provides the concepts that constitute the 'Idea of System' or the
idea of theoretical unity, and whose business it is to investigate
the relationships and interconnections of these. This is thus a
science absolutely independent of all other sciences. And it
necessarily precedes all other sciences. For it provides the
forms for any possible science whatever (i.e. the law of contra¬
diction). It must also provide the forms for itself, which is
not, according to Husserl, problematic.
Here we may note again the radical separation of form from content,
the former being ideal, the latter real. Though Husserl claims
that there is no 'inner conflict' in this 'science' that provides
the foundations (or possibility) for itself, as well as for all
other sciences with respect to their form; it can be argued that
it is not a sufficient condition for the possibility or foundation
of itself, because of the criterion used to install such 'truths',
and the procedure followed in arriving at them. The idea of a
'fundamental standard' as some timeless existent of an ideal realm
of concepts, is one that could be called into question, for, as we
shall see when the Hegelian conception of science is discussed
(Part II), the idea of a standard that exists outside the temporal
domain and that guarantees the form of logic is mistaken. The
standard is not there to begin with but is only reached after a
considerable development of experience - a development which shows
the falsity of any such possible standards that are there in the
beginning for consciousness to so organize its content under.
Secondly, and related to the above point, Husserl's notion of the
absolute independence of pure logic from logic as a science con¬
cerned with matters of fact (and that of the separation of universal
and particular - Red, and a sensed red object) is unacceptable.
For as Collingwood points out:
"To abstract is to consider separately things that are
unseparable: to think of the universal, for instance,
without reflecting that it is merely the universal of
its particulars, and to assume that one can isolate it
in thought and study it in this isolation. This assump¬
tion is an error. One cannot abstract without falsify¬
ing. To think apart of things that are together, is
to think of them as they are not, and to plead that
the initial severance makes no essential difference to
their inner nature is only to erect falsification into
• • i ,, (32)
a pri nci pi e.
Husserl needs to show why we come to make such a separation, not by
showing this as the solution to the problems he sees arising from the
point of view of the psychologistic logician, but by demonstrating
that the judgements he makes concerning the separation of ideal
and real truths are based on presuppositions that can themselves be
verified. What is asked for here is that Husserl should specify the
(32) R. G. Collingwood: Speculum Mentis P.160
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ground that sustains such a set of judgements, for it shall be
argued that without such a specification the exact sense of the
judgements made cannot be properly grasped. This means that judge¬
ments do not stand on their own but are part of a structure or form
of knowledge. The particular judgements do not therefore present
something as immediate, or immediately evident, but are in part
reflective productions. We shall argue that there are no immediate
givens - that knowledge is always of a mediated nature.
It will be further argued that it is through the acceptance of
certain unexamined presuppositions that Husserl is led to consider
only the identity of a particular concept, not its identity and
(33)
non-identity in unity. This means that the understanding of a
concept, such as that of the ideal cannot be adequately accom¬
plished without considering the process of thinking in which such
ideality becomes constituted. This does not mean that we need to
examine the empirical process of thinking that the naturalistic
psychologist is concerned with. Husserl correctly dismisses this
approach as being unable to grasp the foundation upon which their
own empirical researches are performed, that foundation which gives
to this science its scientific form. What is required is that
(33) The cla im that Husserl accepts certain presuppositions uncriti¬
cally, and that these prejudice his investigations has been
made by many commentators, i.e.
Th. De Boer Husserl's Idealism, p.326, § 3
J. Derrida Speech and Phenomena, p.81
W. W„ Fuchs Phenomenology and the Metaphysics
of Presence p.4.
(Also see J. Kuczynski who claims that Husserl's phenomenology
must break down because of his limited view point cf. Homo
Creator vrs. Homo Contemplator, p.102.
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Husserl shows how the concept of ideality becomes constituted -
i.e. arises as a meaning, in the already existing meaning - content
(34)
that is thinking.,
However, given this separation of form and context, we can develop
two perspectives on any science,, The first being developed by
applying ourselves to the methods that a science uses in acquiring
and systematically investigating a particular region of truth.
Here we are concerned with real contingent conditions - with the
human constitution and the constitution of other phenomena. This
perspective is then concerned with the 'how' of the science, how
we acquire the truths etc, of a particular science. It is here
that psychology has its particular part to play. The concern
with methods appropriate to the acquisitions of truths by human
beings is called by Husserl methodological logic. However, this
logic, which has its foundations in psychology and in other
sciences, still has its first and essential foundations in pure
logic.
The second perspective that can be developed on any science focuses
on what that particular science teaches us - on the objective theo¬
retical content. This content consists of the particular truths
that each of the scientific statements of a science (ideally) state,
and also of the theoretical connections that each truth necessarily
sustains with the other truths of that science. This perspective
(34) Adorno argues that Husserl could not tolerate such a separation
of ideal and real, hence his introduction of the conception of
thinking - an ambiguous conception - in which ideal and real
could come into relation. Cf„ Husserl and the Problem of
Idea1ism. P„10 - 11.
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Husserl calls objective in that it is not concerned with the sub¬
jectivity of the scientists who make such statements, nor with any
particular matter of fact, but with the truths that such statements
(35)
state and their theoretical interconnection*
Now pure logic is concerned with this second perspective, but only
in respect of its form* As Husserl puts it:
"It does not aim at the peculiar material of the various
special sciences, or the pecularity of their truths and
forms of combination: it aims at what relates to truths
and theoretical combinations of truths as such* For this
reason every science must, on its objective, theoretical
side, conform to the laws of logic, which are of an
entirely ideal character,," (L*i. 173-4)
Pure Logic is thus concerned with each science insofar as it exem¬
plifies the essential form of all science* It is the form of the
subject matter and the form of its interconnections that is of
interest to pure logic*
From these two perspectives there can be obtained by a 'transforma¬
tion1, two classes of norms* Those relating to the objective ideal
side of a science, which tell us how we should conduct proof and
make theoretical connections; and those relating to the subjective
(35) This conception of objective in an abstract one* We abstract
from the materiality of existence - and because empty we claim
objectivity for it* (See Part II on the question)*
real side, to the general human constitution, telling us how we
should proceed in developing a particular domain of knowledge.
The former are again ideal, the latter real, It is, according to
Husserl, by failing to see these two perspectives and the two
classes of norms relating to them, that makes possible both the
psychologistic and the anti-psychologistic views.
The Second Psychologistic Prejudice
The second psychologistic prejudice runs as follows: If we look
at the actual content of logic, we find it is concerned with truth
and probability, presentations and judgements, etc. These are
mental phenomena. Thus the psychologistic logician argues that
because truth, necessity, possibility etc, are expressed in judge¬
ments - what the former refer to can only be exper?enced in
judgements, and judgements are real psychological acts, therefore
they should be studied by psychology as they are psychological
phenomena. This means that the distinction between logical (or
pure) and methodological propositions is irrelevant as this argu¬
ment affects both (both are expressed in judgements),
Husserl has shown the absurdity of the consequences of such a view,
now he turns to the actual arguments. He shows, using a mathe¬
matical analogy, that the actual thought-process, no matter of what
content, is fit material for psychological study; but the content
of that thought-process, of that experience, of that judgement etc,,
is not. Laws concerning the acts of judging or experiencing differ
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toto caelo from the laws concerning the con tent of these judgemental
or experiential acts. For example: the law of contradiction is
'a law for the contents of judging, in other words for the ideal
meanings which we call propositions', and not for the acts of
judging,
This is a very important point, which empirical psychology, for
example, is always one to flout. Current research into the higher
orders of human life such as the content of thoughts, of dreams,
etc, and the nature of understanding, forget that these areas
cannot be an object for empirical psychology, for empirical psycho¬
logy presupposes the taking of the content in a particular way for
(37)
its own intelligibility, Scheler puts the point as follows:
"Again, the epistemology of understanding is equally a pre¬
supposition for empirical psychology, not an object of
inquiry. The reports made by the experimental subject as
to what he may have found in self-observation, based on
experiment, have still got to be understood first of ail,
and even shared and reproduced by the person conducting
the experiment, before the report itself has any claim
to establish a 'scientific fact'. It is not for
empirical psychology to provide an account of this under¬
standing ,... for it is socially and epistemologically
presupposed in its own procedure".
(36) L.I. 184
(37) Scheler: The Nature of Sympathy P,222
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For Scheler, as for Husserl, there is a divide between the actual
occurrence of an experience and the content or meaning of this
experience. For Scheler the full significance of cognitive
activity (of meaningful experiences) can never be even accessible
to the empirical psychologist - because it is entirely beyond the
comprehension of empirical psychology due to its on to logical
hg\
status. To the extent that such an ontological difference
is ignored - to the extent that empirical psychology forces
itself upon the whole range of experience, to that extent will
human experience become a monotonic landscape with - as was
bluntly stated in the introduction - the translation of all
ontologically incompatible existents either out of existence, or
into an atrophied form amenable to experimental manipulation.
(39)
Levinas puts this point succinctly when he says that:
(38) By the ontological status of meaningful experiences we mean
to delineate the separate regions that the empirical and
the phenomenological occupy. The meaning of an experience
is phenomenologically but not empirically available. Like¬
wise the neurological activity of brain cells is empirically
but not phenomenologically available.
Husserl puts it as follows: "The relevant analyses are analyses
of meaning, and not in any degree psychological ones." (L.I.
183). (Though whether Husserl would claim that the two
regions are ontologically separate is a question we will
take up shortly). On this point see J. Howie: Metaphysical
Elements of Creativity in the Philosophy of W.E. Hocking.
Idealistic Studies Vol. Ill, No.l, 1973. He quotes Hocking
as follows: " .... a natural science (strict behaviouristic)
psychology is, by necessity of its method, a description of
the meaningful in terms of the meaningless." (p.64-5).
(39) 6. Levinas: The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's
Phenomenology P.114.
"The great mistake of other sciences - psychology for example
- is to see, in the ontology of nature the ontology of all
regions, or else to reject all ontology".
Once the limitations of such a procedure are grasped, the only reason
for the persistent following of such an erroneous method is of a
political nature - with which we are not here concerned.
Here we may briefly summarize the difference between the two
sciences, between that of the ideal and that of the real, which
Husserl continually invokes to destroy the psychologistic (and
anti-psychologisti c) standpoints. These two sciences are again
separated - as Husserl points out, there is 'an essential, quite
unbridgable difference' between them.
Sciences of the ideal are apriori, and contain ideal general laws -
which have no empirical range, Husserl sees these laws as being
grounded with intuitive certainty in certain general concepts whose
extension is of the lowest specific difference. These sciences
deal only with the ideal realm, its objects being 'ideal species'
and its terms 'ideal genera'. Only in these sciences do we
achieve genuine generalizations.
Sciences of the real are empirical - and their laws relate to the
sphere of fact. In these sciences we have insight into the proba¬
bilities of the facts to which these laws relate. The extension of
the general concepts is one of individual, temporally determinate
singulars, and its ultimate objects are empirical facts, and its
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terms-empirical classes. These sciences arrive at universal
propositions of fact.
Husserl points out here that to fully comprehend the differences
involved in these two different sciences, we must have completely
abandoned 'the empiricistic theory of abstraction, whose present
dominance renders all logical matters unintelligible'. In
all knowledge, Husserl sees three distinct patterns of connection,
which if not clearly seen, lead to the psychologistic view. For
example, if we take physics, it is possible to distinguish three
different patterns of connection: those of the thinking subject,
i.e. his mental states and their interconnection; the physical
world that he confronts; and the 'ideal pattern of connection of
the truths in physical theory'. If we reduce this last pattern
to any of the others we relativize truth and destroy ideality -
as Husserl has already shown.
10. The Third Psycholog?stic Prejudice.
The third prejudice deals with truth and inner evidence, and is
for this reason of more direct concern for the subsequent position
to be developed in this thesis. Here, however, we are only con¬
cerned with Husserl's attack upon the psychologistic/empiricistic
conceptions of the above and Husserl's own conceptions as related
to these.
(40) L.I. 185 - Husserl develops the attack against this theory
of abstraction in the second half of Investigation II.
Citing Hill, Sigwart, Wundt, Hofler and Meinong, Husserl states
what he considers to be their general argument. All truth is
related to judgement. A judgement is seen as being true when it
is 'inwardly evident1. Now the notion of 'inner evidence' is
here a notion of a'particular mental character or peculiar feeling
which guarantees the truth of the judgement to which it is
attached. Therefore logic - if it be concerned with truth - must
be concerned with these feelings - and logical laws are ipso
facto psychological. Thus we derive the logical from the psycho¬
logical, and truth from inner evidence.
What is wrong with this argument? In general terms the psycholo-
gistic argument fails to correctly understand the relation between
the ideal and the real, between the purely logical and the psycho¬
logical. Husserl begins his criticism of this argument by pointing
out that the pure laws of logic make no assertion concerning inner
evidence, nor with the conditions for its occurrence, though
Husserl does see these pure laws as being related to the psycholo¬
gical in what he calls 'an ideal and indirect way'. That is, it
is possible to transform any of the pure laws of logic (in an
apriori and inwardly evident way) so that we produce propositions
that do speak of inward evidence and its conditions. This trans¬
formation is possible due to what Husserl calls a 'general
equivalence1 between the propositions of the pure laws and the
propositions specifying judgements in accordance with such laws -
between such propositions as 'A is true' on the one hand, and
'It is possible for anyone to judge A to be true in an inwardly
(41)evident manner1 on the other. But given this 'general equi¬
valence' between the two propositions (above) it is certainly in¬
correct to assert that they state the same thing. For 'A is true'
says nothing about judgements, nor about anyone's act of judging.
And even if we did transform all pure laws of logic into the
equivalent propositions concerning judgements we would still be
(4?)outwith the province of psychology.
Husserl sees psychology as a purely empirical science concerned with
mental facts, and the natural conditions of our experience. From
within psychology, any talk of possibilities or impossibilities of
inner evidence is talk of real possibilities and impossibilities,
(43)of real conditions of our experience, of real relationships.
This gives three distinct groups of propositions:
(a) Those propositions stating or embodying the pure Cideal)
1 aws.
(b) Those propositions obtained through a self-evident trans¬
formation of the pure laws. These propositions are con¬
cerned with mental experiences, with the conditions under
(41) Cf. L.I.190. Here Husserl says: "The propositions, therefore,
whose sense lies in stating what necessarily is involved in
the notion of truth ... can certainly be transformed into equi¬
valent propositions which connect the possible emergence of
inner evidence with the forms of our judgement'.
(42) Cf. Hegel, in The Science of Logic (P.761) makes a similar
point to this.
(43) Levinas (op.cit. P.97) makes this point - that Husserl is
concerned with a purely naturalistic psychology.
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which inner evidence is attained. But they are not
concerned with the real - they are concerned with con¬
sciousness qua every possible consciousness, and are
apriori.
(c) Those propositions giving the natural conditions under
which inward evidence arises and perishes (i.e. such
conditions as mental alertness, practice etc.). These
are psychological propositions, they are external to
the content of the propositions of the other two groups
(i.e. groups (a) and (b) ) - and they are empirical.
For Husserl:
"Each truth stands as an ideal unit over against an endless,
unbounded possibility of correct statements which have its
form and its matter in common. Each actual judgement which
belongs to this ideal manifold, will fulfil, either in its
mere form, or in its matter, the ideal conditions for its
own possible inward evidence. The laws of pure logic are
truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in concepts
essentially related to this concept'. (L.I. 192).
What then is the relation between the ideal and the real, between
truth and inward evidence? Is it, as the psychologistic and
empiricistic view maintains, that ideal objects of thought are
mere 'verbal abbreviations whose true content merely reduces to
individual singular experiences', and is inner evidence a mere
feeling that externally attaches to certain judgements - the true
ones? Husserl answers categorically in the negative. Empiricism
totally misunderstands both relations. It takes the ideal unities
as real singulars, it takes inner evidence as psychological. But
before giving precise expression to the correct relation between
the ideal and the real, Husserl points out that we need an under¬
standing of the correct relationship between inner evidence and
truth.
For Husserl, inner evidence is the 'experience' of truth, 'ex¬
perienced' in the sense in which something ideal can be an
experience in a real act.
"Otherwise put: Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is
an actual experience in the inwardly evident judgement. The
inwardly evident judgement is, however, an experience of
primal givenness: the non-self-evident judgement stands
to it much as the arbitrary positing of an object in
imagination stands to its adequate perception." (L.I. 194—5)-
And further on Husserl states:
"The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is
itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an
assertion and the self-given state-of-affairs is inward
evidence: the Idea of this agreement is truth, whose ideality
is also its objectivity." (L.I. 195).
From these statements it logically follows that there can be no
inner evidence without truth, for inner evidence is most intimately
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related to truth. Secondly, this view eliminates the psychologistic
problem of the objectivity of insight, for on this view inner
evidence, as a psychological and perforce real phenomenon, may or
may not accompany a true proposition in each individual - we may
have a conflict between two people, one of whom judges J with
insight or inner evidence and the other who also judges J but
without the requisite insight. On Husserl's criteria, we have
'insight into the fact that no one's insight can be at variance
with our own', therefore the above situation could not occur, both
people would either judge J with insight because J was true, or
else they would not (though this would not necessarily mean that J
was therefore false). This brings up certain problems with
(44)Husserl's view that can be stated here.
First of all, Husserl bases a considerable weight of argument on
insight and yet nowhere does he systematically describe methodo¬
logical procedures for obtaining such insights as are necessary
(45)for the foundation of his view.
Secondly, his view still requires that we recognize (experience)
the meant qua meant before an agreement between this and the
meaning can be obtained. The relation presupposes the relata.
Hence there is needed some other notion of the presence of the
(44) See the section on Truth in Part II below, where the above
are further considered.
(45) E.P. Welch. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl P.214, and
Levin op. cit. P.42 - 48 discuss this.
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meant that precludes the generation of an Infinite regress of
relations, that avoids silence (or non-scientific discourse)
and that avoids a vicious circularity in the notion of insight
or inner evidence.
Thirdly, Husserl's view is a static or logical one, and hence
stands in need of a description of just how we reach the Idea
of Truth, how we get to the point of being able to 'produce' ideal
objects, of being able to distinguish ideality from reality. All
these conceptions require an elucidation, which has been summarily
put as follows: that Husserl needs to show how this view is
necessary - as Hegel has put it - the form of necessity must get
(46)its due. The notion of 'the having got that far' of having
got to the point of being able to assert such epistemological
distinctions, of being able to assert such relations, is here taken
for granted. But the having got this far presupposes for its exact
(47)
sense the explication of that from which we have come.
Husserl must demonstrate the necessity of the view that the relations
obtaining between truth and inner evidence (or insight) are such as
he claims. It is not sufficient merely to erect an anti-psycholo-
gistic scaffolding unless one knows not just what it scaffolds, but
(^6) Hegel Encyclopedia Logic P.15-
(^7) Hegel puts it thus: "Thoroughness seems to require that the
beginning, as the foundation on which everything is built,
should be examined before anything else, in fact that we
should not go any further until it has been firmly
established and if, on the other hand, it is not, then we
should reject all that follows" Science of Logic P.41.
also upon what foundation it stands. In so far as he takes for
granted 1 the having got that far' just so far does he fail to
better the empiricistic and psychologistic logicians. For example,
the view that we 'have insight into the fact that no one's insight
can be at variance with our own', is just asserted, any necessity
it may have is merely a definitional one.
(48)
Again as Welch notes, Husserl fails to give any systematic
account of the problem of truth and error. As they are absolutely
pivotal conceptions it is encumbent on him to do so. Such state¬
ments as that inner evidence is the 'experience' of truth seem,
without this prior clarification, to be most ambiguous. How can
we experience the ideal (i.e. truth) in an act (the real) if these
are totally separate unbridgeable notions? How can a thing, or an
ideal object be grasped wholly and without residue - what does this
mean? What does the statement that inward evidence is 'the
experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself
meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given
state of affairs' mean? How can a state-of-affairs be self-given,
and in what ontological relation does it stand to the sense of the
assertion concerning the former? And surely the experience of an
agreement, any agreement, is open to misinterpretation or error,
for experiences are had by an experiencer? Is this agreement that
of the identity of thought and being?
(48) Welch op. cit. P.44 footnote. See also Q. Lauer's Intro¬
duction to Husserl's 'Phenomenology and the Crisis of
Philosophy' P.46.
A further prohlejn concerning Husserl's views in this section is
of the notion of 'general equivalence1. Just what does this
equivalence consist in? Are both the law and its self-evident
transformations ontologically equivalent as against the psycholo¬
gical facts - or is this purely an epistemological point? For
it becomes increasingly difficult to see exactly what this equiva¬
lence consists in - seeing Husserl explicitly states that they do
not state the same thing. This brings up again the general question
as to the standpoint from which these criticisms against the
empiricistic/psychologistic positions are being made. We shall
hold that what is absolutely necessary for a proper understanding
of the conceptions that have been referred to above is a system.
(49)
Indeed without such a system predication itself collapses.
The relating of any predicate to any subject presupposes for its
sense a system - a developing system, in which predication can be
related to a whole. Without a system it becomes increasingly
difficult to understand just what is being asserted, and to decide
exactly what sense we attach to such entities as logical objects
etc. To provide answers to the above questions, or to rule them
out as otiose presupposes a coherent point of view - a system.
To understand what Husserl means by experience, ideality, self
(or inner) evidence, the objectivity of ideality etc. we first
require the system. We shall return to these questions.
(49) See the article by Aquila (Kant-Studien 64, 1973) where he
shows the need for a system for predication to even be
possible. Hegel of course holds this as a sine qua non of
proper science itself.
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1] . Husserl's critique of the thought-economists.
Husserl turns his attention to another empiricistic theory of the
basis of logic. This is the view that sees biology as the basis
of logic. His prime concern is with the views of Mach and Avenarius
(and to a lesser extent Cornelius) - with Mach's principle of the
economy of thought, and with Avenarius1 principle of least action.
Husserl's argument is aimed at demonstrating that the acceptance of
a principle of either of the above type entails the corruption of
all genuine logic and epistemology, as well as of all psychology.
His main argument against the above view again involves the ideal/
real distinction.
In general terms, this empiricistic view conceives of science as
being the most advantageous form of thought for the continued exis¬
tence of the human species, because it is the most economical -
because it achieves as complete an orientation to, and comprehension
of a particular field as is possible. For Husserl, such 'principles'
are not so much principles in the sense of rational theory, but in
the sense of a 'valuable teleological viewpoint' which presides over
both the sphere of natural or blind thinking as well as the sphere
of logical and scientific thinking. Husserl does not completely
reject this notion - he sees it as having both a legitimate and an
i1legitimate sense.
It is legitimate to the extent that we are interested in the facts
of scientific or economical thinking; in the psychological, physio¬
logical, biological - in a word, real - mechanisms that lead to such
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facts, and this from the point of yiew of promoting the survival
of homo sapiens. Husserl sees the field of mind as being from
this perspective a sub-field of biology and hence capable of
pursuing both abstract psychological investigations aimed at pro¬
ducing elementary laws and also concrete researches leading to
teleological ones. Husserl so far agrees with the view that
notions such as 'the economy of thought' are most valuable in the
domain of the real, of facts. They yield an important practical
foundation for a technology of knowledge - for the methodology of
scientific research.
But Mach and Avenarius root epistemology in this economy of thought,
and this is illegitimate. By doing so they are open to the whole
gamut of arguments already enunciated against the psychologistic
position. For Husserl sees in this attempt to ground epistemology
on an economy of thought the attempt to ground it in psychology.
From the grouping together of a mass of facts concerning adaptation,
thought-economies, least action or facts of a biological nature,
nothing is obtained but more facts. From facts alone nothing can
be known except facts. But facts presuppose the knowledge of
certain non-factual truths. As Husserl expresses it:
"
.... we must know what science ideally aims at, what law
governed connections, what basic laws and derived laws etc.
ideally are and do, before we can discuss and assess the
thought - economical function of knowing them." (L.I.209).
For Husserl pure logic comes before all such thought-economies - hence
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it is absurd to try and reverse such a relationship. The thought-
economy view fails to appreciate that the validity of certain norms
that underpin it are presupposed by it and cannot therefore be made
the outcome of this view. Husserl puts the point nicely when he
says, "The possibility of science cannot be shown by the fact of
the sciences; since the fact itself is shown only be subsumption
under that possibility as an idea."
The primary importance for what follows is again Husserl's separation
of the ideal ('objectively ideal1) from the real. This leads him
to make the following statements:
"The question is not how experience whether naive or scientific
arises, but what must be its content if it is to have objec¬
tive validity: we must ask on what ideal elements and laws
such objective validity of knowledge is founded - more
generally, on what any knowledge is founded - and how the
performance involved in knowledge should be properly under¬
stood. We are, in other words, not interested in the origins
and changes of our world-presentation, but in the objective
right which the world-presentation of science claims against
any other world-presentation, which leads it to call its
world the objectively true one." (L.I.207).
It is again here that the general question of Husserl's own methodo-
(50) Formal and Transcendental Logic P.267.
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logical procedure arises. From what point of view is this separa¬
tion made and with what justification? Again he presupposes the
having got to the point where the particular world views are
possibilities for consciousness instead of describing it. In fact
he legislates directly against any investigation into the way
experience (scientific) arises. This is not acceptable. Without
the prior explication of one's own perspective, whether it be that
of those he chooses to discuss or not, no clear and complete
assessment of the force of his argumentation can be made. This
point can perhaps be indicated as follows: the human subject works
with a hotch-potch of concepts at many different levels. That is,
his language embodies meanings derived from many differing develop¬
ments of experience - some technically advanced, some poetic, some
scientific, some abstract etc. Unless all concepts are developed
in the necessary order - and this certainly does require a concern
with the 'origins and changes of our world presentation1 -
then when we assert, judge, etc. we jumble together concepts that
all have differing values - they involve many differing 'world
presentations'. We thus lack any notion of a world presentation
(52)
that is the whole or total standpoint. This reflects back on
the subject, who, in using these concepts, disintegrates himself
in the sense of holding an intelligible position - the subject
lacks a unity of self. There thus ensues, through this fog, an
endless debate concerning concepts, each subject compounding the
confusion by failing to offer the unity of a coherent point of view.
(51) It does of course involve much more, viz. that language can
signify proleptica11y - i.e. that meaning is a 1 ways in a process
of being given. And it also requires a conception of ex¬
perience that is Hegelian. More on this in Part II.
(52) Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind P.107 makes a similar point.
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Husserl is right to criticise the 'thought-economists' for failing
to clearly and correctly perceive the relation of the ideal to the
real„ Yet Husserl then instantiates his own separation of what
appears to be only distinguishable aspects of experience, viz.
origin and change of world-presentation and content of objectively
ideal knowledge. And he does this without providing the
grounds, ^
(5Z4)
Slichtly re-expressing Kemp Smith we can agree that knowledge
starts neither from individual facts nor from general principles,
but from the complex situation in which the human race finds itself
at the dawn of self-consciousness. It is this that provides the
ground for, and the meaning of, such advanced conceptions as 'the
objectively valid' etc. It is this process that requires
explication.
Note
Husserl sees his preceding arguments as pointing conclusively to
the fact that any form of empiricistic or psychologistic logic is
totally untenable. Logic, conceived of as a methodology of
science has its foundations outside of psychology.
Here it can be noted that this distinction between psychology seen
by Husserl as a factual and empirical science and pure logic,
(53) See B. Bosanquet. Implication and Linear Inference P.1A8
(5^) Cited by B. Bosanquet Op. Cit. P.IV.
(55) E. Levinas: Op. Cit. pp.97-101.
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is not a distinction that is shown to be a necessary outcome of a
fully coherent unitary perspective. That is, it illustrates the
relevance of the general criticism made already - the need to
demonstrate the having got to the point of being able to make such
an epistemologica1 distinction: the need to be properly, not
positively, scientific. The process of reaching such a distinc¬
tion is an integral and indispensable part of any epistemological
enterprise. Thus while it is agreed with Husserl that his arguments
up to the present lead undeniably to the view "... that a correct
grasp of the essence of pure logic, and of its unique position in
relation to all other sciences is one of the most important questions
in the whole of epistemology" (L.I. 221) - it is not agreed that
epistemology precedes all other disciplines. Here it is of especial
interest that while Husserl is pointing out his links with philoso¬
phers of the past - specifically Kant, Herbart, Leibniz, Bolzano
and Lange, he fai1s to draw his relation of Hegel. He merely dis¬
misses Hegel's philosophical system in contradistinction to Bolzano's
as having .... "hindered the progress of scientific philosophy so
badly with its unholy blend of discordant intentions" (L.I. 223) -
a criticism that is not backed up by any argumentation, thus he
fails to consider Hegel's arguments concerning a truly scientific
philosophy, in which phenomenology, as preceding epistemology, takes
consciousness up to the point where epistemology ceases to be a
possibility, but becomes actual - the position where knowledge is
grounded and where truth is absolute.
(56) One writer sees Husserl led by these arguments to a view very
similar to Hegel's - Kojeve Op. Cit. p0195o
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What then is Husserl's view of science - that is - what makes science
science? Husserl devotes the last chapter of his Prolegomena to
answering this question - of giving a provisional sketch of the idea
of Pure Logic.
Science
In his consideration of the nature of science, Husserl develops his
argument around three main questions - which we shall take in turn.
The first question is the one previously stated - viz. what makes
science science?
Husserl sees science as a unity of acts of thinking, in which a
'certain objective or ideal interconnection' of these acts confers
upon these 'a unitary objective relevance', and hence an 'ideal
validity'. Now by this objective or ideal interconnection two
things can be meant:
(a) "An interconnection of the things to which our thought-
experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally
directed."
(b) "An interconnection of truths,in which the unity of things
comes to count objectively as being what it is." (L.I.225)
These two interconnections are given together apriori in our acts,
they are inseparable though not identical for Husserl; whatever
exists exists in a determinate manner, and therefore that it is a
determinate existence is the truth - the necessary correlate - of
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its being. Now although both interconnections or 'sorts of unity1
are given together, it is possible to think of them apart. Husserl
states that it is by abstraction - the abstraction that occurs in
judgement or more precisely in knowledge - that the unity of
objectivity and the unity of truth can be thought apart.
He then gives the following specification of his use of the term
'object1 and 'thing': "I use the words 'objectivity', 'object',
'thing' etc., always in the widest sense, in accordance, therefore
with my preferred sense of the term 'knowledge'. An object of
knowledge may as readily be what is real as what is ideal, a thing
or an event or a species of a mathematical relation, a case of
being or of what ought to be".
What then is the relation between things and truths, for knowledge?
Husserl's answer is, that an act is a knowing act if our judgement
is inwardly evident. Given this latter, the object of such an act
is given in primal fashion.
"Otherwise put, its being thus is a truth actually realized, indivi¬
dualized in the experience of the inwardly evident judgement. If we
reflect on this individualization, we perform an ideational abstrac¬
tion, and the truth itself, instead of our former object, becomes our
apprehended object. We hereby apprehend the truth as the ideal
correlate of the transient subjective act of knowledge, as standing
(57) L.I. p.226. R. Ingarden takes up the two passages quoted above,
and argues that Husserl is here adopting a realist point of view -
a view which he later rejects. (Formal and Transcendental Logic).
'On The Motives which led- Husserl to Transcendental Idealism'.
P. 6-8.
opposed in its unity to the unlimited multitude of possible acts of
knowing, and of knowing individuals," (L,l, 226-7),
The process thus has three steps: first we judge X with inward evi¬
dence, this individualizes X's being. Second, we reflect upon this
judgement, this gives us the truth of the judging. By this reflec¬
tion, by 'ideational abstraction1 truth becomes our object. The
third step is achieved when we apprehend the truth as the 'ideal
correlate' of our many possible acts of judging X - a unity as
against a plurality. Now, given that we achieve such a process,
what gives truths a connection to some other truths and not to
others; or to put the question in another way as Husserl does in his
second question, 'what constitutes the unity of a science and there¬
with the unity of its field?'
To answer this question we require clarification of the notions of
scientific knowledge and truth. If we take scientific knowledge
first, we see that it is grounded knowledge. This is to say, we see
it as grounded in its necessity of being as it is. And this neces¬
sity arises from the fact that this knowledge or state of affairs
is law governed.
Secondly, with regard to the notion of truth, we find two types:
(l) Individual truths: These are assertions regarding the
actua1 existence of individual things, and are as such,
contingent. The necessity of these truths requires
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'certain presupposed circumstances'. These truths are
concerned with fact.
(2) General truths: These are assertions free of the above
existential claims. These allow only the possible exis¬
tence of individuals. Through the process of speciali¬
zation and deduction, general truths yield propositions
to be proved.
Husserl now proceeds to answer his own question concerning the unity
of science. If we require a proof of a general truth, we are referred
to certain general laws - the proof of these latter leading to a group
of laws which are not further provable - which Husserl calls basic
laws. Hence .... "the systematic unity of the ideally closed sum
total of laws resting on one basic legality, as their final ground,
and arising our of it through systematic deduction, is the unity of a
systematically complete theory. This basic legality may here either
consist of one basic law or a conjunction of homogeneous basic laws."
(L.I. 228).
But we still require an answer to the question of what makes truths
belong together in a single science. Here Husserl introduces another
important distinction - that of essential and extra-essential (i.e.
external) belonging. The unity is an essential one if there is a
unity of explanation in that science, viz. a theoretical unity. For
Husserl, all explanation points to a theory, therefore if we have
theoretical unity we eo ipso have unity of explanation and essential
unity of the truths in it. This type of unity gives us the so-called
abstract or nomological sciences. These sciences are complete in
that all their truths are deducible from the particular basic laws
that they embody„
This type of relationship contrasts with the second type of belonging
together - the external type. External criteria, such as the proxi¬
mity of truths to a particular domain - whether this be in relation
to an object, or an evaluative interest - give a unity to truths in
a science. These sciences are called descriptive or ontological -
and the unity evinced by them is not an essential one, not one that
is demanded by a unified theoretical perspective.
This immediately raises the question as to the relation between the
descriptive and the abstract sciences. Husserl's view here is that
the abstract sciences are the basic sciences from which the descrip¬
tive derive all their theoretical purchase. Thus the descriptive
sciences are really only sciences to the extent that they take
from nomological science theoretical elements - they are only
sciences by proxy.
In his final question Husserl addresses himself to the problem of
specifying "the conditions of the possibility of theory in
general". Having argued to the point that the theoretical (or
abstract) sciences are of superior importance we now require a
specification of the possibility of reaching such knowledge. Here
there are two groups of conditions - the subjective and the
objective.
The subjective conditions for the possibility of theory in general,
as was mentioned earlier (P„27), are of both a real and an ideal
kind. Husserl ignores the real conditions, which fall in the pro¬
vince of psychology - here the investigations are concerned with
the real conditions and causal relations necessary for the
possibility of theoretical knowledge - and focuses on the ideal,
or noetic conditions. These have their ground in the form of
subjectivity, or, in other words in 'the Idea of knowledge as such1.
In this area investigations are made into the process whereby we
see the truth of a judgement - into the processes of knowing,
judging etc. Knowledge is not something that merely claims to be
true, but a judgement that justifies itself in terms of inner
evidence. Without such subjective conditions, without inner
evidence, knowledge would lack that certainty that distinguishes
it from mere opinion. For Husserl it is 'evident apriori' that
we as thinking beings must be able to accomplish all the acts
required for the production of theoretical knowledge.
The objective conditions are the purely logical - they are grounded
purely in the content of our knowledge. Truth is not something
that requires for its possibility the insight into it: truths are
what they are quite apart from whether we grasp them or not. The
laws involved here have a content that is concerned with notions
such as truth, law, concept, syllogism etc. - there is no mention
of the acts by which subjects grasp such truths. As previously
pointed out, these laws can be transformed such that they achieve
a relation with the
ditions are in fact
/ c Q)
ledge process-
subject - Husserl claims that the noetic con-
such modified laws - they relate to the know-
Husserl's arguments lead to the point where certain abstract laws,
which, because they are rooted solely in the content of our know¬
ledge make no mention of the subject act of knowing, function as the
most basic conditions for the possibility of theory in general, (in
the objectively ideal sense).
Husserl wants to specify the essence of such a content in the most
basic or primitive concepts - and these, in the case of theory,
are the concepts and laws which are the ideal constituents of
theory in general. These control in apriori manner all development
of the Idea of Theory in all its possible varieties. Here we are
dealing with the theory of theory.
Therefore, given the above argumentation, Husserl lays down the task
of a pure logic as follows:
1. First the primitive concepts such as 'concept', 'proposition'
etc. which make theory possible, have to be unambiguously
and perspicuously laid down. These concepts are the basic
categories of meaning and constitute the Idea of unified
(58) This is the crux of the matter - exactly how do they relate to
the knowledge process, do they arise out of the knowledge
process or are they externally related?
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theory* Also involved in such a clarification will be the
second-order concepts - (the formal objective categories)
such as Object, State of Affairs, Unity, Relation etc.,
and the concepts of correlative forms will also need to
be specified here. Husserl argues that all these con¬
cepts are 'independent of the particularity of any
material of knowledge1, and must be phenomenologically
investigated so that we attain insight into their essence.
It is, for Husserl, absolutely fundamental that these
initial concepts be clear of any equivocation - though as
Husserl himself admits, this may be the most difficult
task lying before us.
2. Second, in relation to the above categories, we require the
laws grounded in them - such that the objective validity of
the formal structures is made evident, both in relation to
the truth or falsity of meanings per se, and also the being
or not being of the objects etc., and both on the basis
(59)
of categorial form alone.
3. Given the above two tasks as satisfactorily completed we
shall have an adequate notion of what Husserl calls 'the
Idea of a science of the conditions of the possibility of
theory in general'. Accordingly we require the completing
science - dealing in apriori fashion with the essential
forms of theories and the relevant laws of relation. This
(59) "We are here concerned with the Territory of those laws which
in formal universality span all possible meanings and objects,
under which every particular theory or science is ranged, which
it must obey if it is to be valid". L.I.239.
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will give the correct position and relation of any parti¬
cular theory to any and all other actual or possible
theories - which Husserl calls the pure theory of manifolds.
This idea of a theory of manifolds is that of a science
which clearly and explicitly details the form of the
necessary types of 'possible theories or fields of
theories' and investigates their relations with one
another. This view ^ remains unchanged throughout
Husserl's subsequent writings; and, in fact, in his Formal
and Transcendental Logic he quotes directly from this
section of the Prolegomena - stating that he is unable to
improve on its exact characterization of this idea of a
theory of manifolds.
These, then are the tasks of a pure logic and they bring to a close
Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic. The investigations that
follow it in the Logical Investigations are in part phenomenological
investigations into the basic or primitive concepts - the carrying
out of the first task specified above. We say 'in part' because
(62)
these investigations often move outwith this narrow province.
Husserl justifies this procedure on the grounds that the domain of
the logical or the idea of the logical is so cluttered up with
(63)
obscurities and confusions that such a procedure is inevitable.
(60) L.1. 241-2
(61) Formal and Transcendental Logic 28, p.90-92. Also see Ideas §
71-73, p.184-189
(62) See Q. Lauer's introduction in E. Husserl,Phenomenology and
the Crisis of Philosophy P.50-51.
(63) L.I. 260-261.
And secondly, it is also evident that at this point in his philoso¬
phical development Husserl had not explicitly stated nor suffi¬
ciently justified a phenomenological methodology, though it is in
use in these investigations with most significant results,,
Existence, Truth and Science
Before concluding this review of Husserl's Prolegomena, we must
first return to these final arguments of Husserl's concerning
existence, truth and science, for it will be in a sense somewhat
different from Husserl's that we shall be employing them in the
next part,
Husserl argues that being or existence (which i take here to be
synonymous) and truth are given together in our acts - they
are inseparable. For Husserl existence is determinate existence.
It is by the process of abstraction that we are able to apprehend
the one without the other - as outlined in the three stage process
above. But it is not at once evident that these two are given
together apriori in our acts of thinking. This at once necessi¬
tates a criterion by which the evident nature of such a state of
affairs is to be grasped. And this calls into question the whole
notion of evidence and truth - and many commentators on Husserl's
phenomenology point out this difficulty - point to the fact that
Husserl fails to provide such a cri terion. He assumes that
(64) L.I. 151.
(65) See Welch E.P.: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl P.214,
Levin, D.M. Reason S Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology
P.34.
Gibson, W.R. Boyce: "The Problem of Real and Ideal in the
Phenomenology of Husserl" Mind XXXLV 1925 P.311-333,,
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we already know what it is - i ,e, what self- or inner evidence is
instead of providing the necessary criteria.
This criticism is intimately related to the general criticism made
at points throughout our consideration of the arguments in the
Prolegomena, namely that Husserl fails to show how he has got to
the point of being able to assert such distinctions - such a group
of concepts. This is of critica1 importance in that if this is
not done, the concepts are not warranted necessary they are merely
arbitrary and await contradiction by any other arbitrary set that
one might wish to assert. How can Husserl show the necessity of
science's possibility when he fails to show the necessity of
having got to the point of science itself? Likewise, how can he
investigate the primitive concepts of science when he has been and
is already using them? Such an account makes a miracle of their
arrival. It is not a satisfactory procedure to begin at once at
the categorial level, for it makes the beginning, and the necessity
of it being the only beginning impossible to reach. Here we return
to the procedure adopted by the positive sciences, and this is
certainly not a view that Husserl is wont to countenance. Also, the
attempt to 'lay down' the primitive concepts presupposes a certain
view as to what a concept is - such that it can be 'laid down' like
'stamped coin'. This calls into question the three tasks set for
pure logic, for if (as shall be argued in Part II below), concepts
are not 'things' that can be just laid down but, in fact, develop
(i,e. are 'fluid') - then the possibility of performing Husserl's
three tasks becomes an impossibility. it is (pace Husserl) by
virtue of the initial concepts being equivocal and ambiguous that
progress toward Truth is achieved.
A further difficulty with Husserl's account is as follows: Scien¬
tific thought is, as we have seen (P.68), pervaded by a certain
objective or ideal interconnection which gives thought a "unitary
objective relevance" and thus an "ideal validity", Husserl then
points out that two meanings can be given to this objective inter¬
connection, (a) and (b) and that both are ".... given together
apriori, and are mutually inseparable. Nothing can be without being
thus or thus determined, and that it is, and that it is thus and
thus determined, is the self-subsistent truth which is the necessary
correlate of the self-subsistent being," (L.I. 225-6)
Now what makes science science - the objective or ideal interconnec¬
tion - seems to be a notion that joins together two quite different
ideas. For interconnection in sense (a) would seem to involve more
than the strictly ideal, unless 'things' is interpreted in a narrow
sense to mean ideal things. But Husserl expressly uses this term
in a wide sense, to include both real and ideal being. The inter¬
connection in sense (b) presupposes a higher order level of thought,
"ideational abstraction", where truth as an idea is given "in an
act of Ideation based upon an intuition (the act of insight)".
Here the content is purely ideal. Husserl states that both these
senses (both things) 'are given together apriori and are mutually
inseparable'. Thus if both are given.in such a manner and sense (a)
is not purely ideal, how can such totally separate constituents
abide in this inseparable relation? That is, from what point of
view does Husserl justify this inseparability? It would be consis-
(66) See Page 68 above.
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tent for Husserl to claim this if sense (a) referred only to ideal
objects, or objects as ideal unities of meaning, for they could be
given together with the truth gained through ideational abstraction
that they are as they are, but then knowledge would be constrained
around the purely ideal and real objects would remain outwith.
(We shall reconsider this point when we come to consider Hegel's
arguments for science in Part 11).
Added to this is Husserl's notion of determinate being. That is,
that everything is already determined, is in itself, and that it
is so determined is the truth science yields. Yet on what grounds
can he possible assert such a statement of the static nature of
what is? Husserl would claim that we would destroy the objecti¬
vity of both truth and being if either were relativized - truth
and being are correlative (L.I. 151). But to deny that the thing
is in itself, or self-given, or that it is determinate is not
necessarily to deny that truth is possible, it is simply to
recognize that the objective point, truth, is not given through
an abstractive process of thinking called ideational abstraction -
not by abstracting oneself from the real world but by grasping
the truth of things through the reality under consideration, a
reality that is not separated from a thinking subject. (See
Part II).
This is not to confuse Husserl's notion of what makes science science
with his distinction between the ideal and the real: the former is
a consequence of the latter. It is by questioning the basis on which
the latter distinction is made that one is led to question Husserl's
notion of the essence of science. As we have seen, the real is the
realm of the natural, empirical, factual, temporal and causal. It
implies transcendence, it is think-like, it is outwith the realm
of meaning (L.I. 323)- As we have said, psychology is seen by
Husserl as a natural science concerned with the real insofar as it
is mental or 'mentally lined through1 (L„I„ 192). It seeks the
natural conditions of our experience - i.e. the natural conditions
of our mathematical and logical activities and is not able to step
outside such a point of view. It is precluded from giving an
account of the meaning- of the content - of these activities.
Given this conception of psychology Husserl appears to be on
unchallengeable ground.
The ideal, on the other hand, is the realm of meaning. Ideal objects
exist " ..... in a detached ether of pure meanings, or ideal
unities, which wholly transcend the acts through which they come
before us, or are constituted objects for us." Sciences of the
ideal are apriori, normative, and achieve genuine generalizations.
The difficulty with the separation of these two realms is that it
is made by thinking. Thinking is the tertium quid that links the
two unbridgeable realms. It is thinking that makes the separation
and it is thinking that unites them. What is required is then a
specification of how thought can achieve such a situation without
collapsing one realm into the other". We shall take this point up
again in Part 111.
(67) J.N. Findlay, Introduction to E. Husserl, Logical
Investigations, P.16.
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One final point - Husserl seems to place precedence of importance
in the pure nomological sciences. Science is only science when it
is deductive theory - which thus restricts science to a narrow
domain. This restriction appears unjustified and in a later
(681
work Husserl realized this narrowness of perspective, but still
claims that the problem concerned - "the problem, namely, of what
characterizes the form of a province and, correlatively, the form
of a theory in the broadest sense", ^ - in some way justifies
this narrowness. More important is the problem of the status of
a phenomenological procedure such as is adopted in the Logical
Investigations. Is it science in the rigorous sense above
specified or is it merely a propaedeutic to any future nomolo¬
gical science? And if it is merely such a propaedeutic, what
claim does it have to justify its analysis and conceptual clari¬
fications that can seriously be considered by nomological science
itself? It is evident that Husserl understands proof of basic
laws to be limited to nomological science - but he has in no way
justified the exclusion of a 'proof1 of such basic laws by a
phenomenological procedure that precedes nomological science,
and which may perhaps provide the necess? ty of the points of view
and conceptions he holds. What then is this problem of how one
has got that far - of having got to the point where particular
points of view are seen as necessary, and where concepts do not
appear in arbitrary fashion but emerge in the explication of this




process? And secondly, what is this notion of phenomenology
as the justification of the necessity of pure science - and is




To criticise a philosophical theory is to adopt a philosophical
theory - criticism is not made from nowhere. It is made by one
who adopts a particular form of knowledge, either that which is
under investigation, or a different though necessarily related
form. It is however necessary in either case to know exactly
what such knowledge presupposes, or on what foundation it rests
if the truth of that knowledge is to be grasped. Any other pro¬
cedure fails to provide the ground for the possibility of under¬
standing the knowledge in question. It is therefore necessary to
show that grounded knowledge is possible and then to assess to
what extent Husserl's arguments against psychologism are based
on a secure foundation?
It is instructive to consider Hegel's position in relation to the
above in that Hegel's arguments in the Preface and Introduction to
the Phenomenology of Mind argue for, and the actual body of the text
describes the movement of consciousness to the point where it has
demonstrated the necessity of its point of view - to the point
where a science of logic is possible. Here also we find Hegel's
arguments concerning science and truth which will be contrasted with
those of Husserl - already reviewed. From this consideration we
shall hope to arrive at a position where the adequacy of certain
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Husserlian and Hegelian views can be assessed and suggest limita¬
tions in Husserl's arguments in the Prolegomena, before he ventured
into his full phenomenological investigat ions.
In an introductory fashion we can view philosophy as being in the
unique position of having to expound its method while following it-
This makes it impossible to fully understand the method until the
completion of its explication- This difficulty is well put by
Hegel as follows:
"What is demanded is thus the following: we should know the cog¬
nitive faculty before we know- It is like wanting to swim before
going in the water- The investigation of the faculty of knowledge
is itself knowledge, and cannot arrive at its goal because it is
this goal already." ^
This difficulty has led many philosophers to not bother themselves
with the explication of their own method and its presuppositions,
but to 'get on with the job1 - that is to _do philosophy; to provide
analyses and results which are not based in a systematical and
coherent fashion upon a method that has previously been laid out,
but which rests upon assumptions or presuppositions that fail of a
discursive elaboration in that system - i.e. they are surds-
Examples of these are common sense, the cogito, God, logic, etc.
Common sense is a presupposition that itself requires a ground, for
(l) Hegel: "Lectures in the Philosophy of History" - quoted in
Habermas J- Knowledge and Human Interests p.7- Also see
Hegel - Encyclopedia Logic P.17-
common sense is a totally relative and mediated concept. We thus
require the analysis of the concepts upon which this mediated con-
(2)
cept rests. It has been and will be maintained throughout this
thesis that the refusal to explicate and justify ones own method and
its presuppositions renders the subsequent analyses and philosophies
ultimately unintelligible. It is not sufficient to accept certain
statements as basic and then to proceed to employ them in the
illumination of human experience much as a physicist employs certain
axioms in the illumination of sub-atomic particles. This would be
to reduce the philosopher to the role of a technician - the onto-
logical to the ontic; Philosophy must enter upon the clarification
and justification of its own presuppositions if it is to become
scientific in the most solid sense.
Throughout part 1 repeated criticisms were made of Husserl's procedure
in both criticising psychologism and empiricism and in; the method of
assertion of his own point of view. It was said there that conscious¬
ness implicates itself in its own criticism of a point of view - that
the criticism or argument did not merely attach to the point of view
to which it was directed, but also pointed back to the position of the
(3)
person who made the criticism. To the extent that Husserl has not
(we argued) given his own position a prior clarification, to that extent
does the criticism fail in its full force. It was also pointed out that
(2) Kaufman W„ Hegel: "Texts and Commentary" makes similar point
see Note 2k, p.kS0
(3) More generally, consciousness implicates itself in any and all
its perspectives. For it to be capable of a perspective of
something necessitates both that the something be something for
consciousness and also that there is consciousness of something.
We shall shortly give examples of what happens when this is
ignored„
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this criticism points back to our own criticisms of Husserl's procedure*
How do we justify the criticism of failing to demonstrate the necessity
of having got to a particular point of view or criticism unless we
(4)
ourselves provide such? As Hegel has pointed out, it is necessary
to examine ones own foundations first, before anything else. This
means examining the foundation without prior structures or assumptions -
otherwise this will mean examining the foundation as it is not - for
it will be from a point of view in advance of and conditioned by it*
And this relates to the points made previously in connection with
Husserl's use of notions such as presupposition, experience, truth,
science, and consciousness. Only when it has been shown that a point of
view is necessary and absolute will it be possible to gain a complete
understanding of these notions and following from this of one's
being-in-the-world.
However it is unavoidable that use must be made of these conceptions
and others in the exposition of the process of arriving at this
coherent point of view. This will mean that their full import will
not be able to be assessed until the completion of such an exposition -
and this seems a most reasonable procedure. Who would expect at the
beginning of a philosophical investigation the exact rendering of
conceptions to which the investigations were themselves aimed at
clarifying. Likewise the full significance of events in a novel
cannot be fully appreciated until the novel is complete - they are
in part, grasped retrospectively. Here, as in phenomenology, we have
a dual perspective in operation - the one immersed in the events as
(4) Hegel: Science of Logic P.41.
they occur and the other viewing each event in its relation to the
evolving whole. Just as a novel is not understood by taking just
one of these perspectives just so with phenomenology. Therefore,
initially, the conceptions referred to above will be indicated in a
proleptic fashion much as a persons character and personality are
indicated at the beginning of a novel and become more clear and com¬
plete as the narrative proceeds.
But, from what point of view do we begin? Is it a matter of merely
propounding a definition that has the accent of common sense, and
then holding this as primary, claiming that it is apodictically
self-evident to all would-be doubters? Is it possible to escape the
charge that any starting point has its necessary presuppositions
even experience, to claim that there is but one road to truth, one
road to science? And further, what are the presuppositions of even
asking such a question? The question itself must be made from a
point of view. That is, we are already in mediation.
Implicit in these questions is the belief that those involved in
questioning and asserting have a clear and precise conception of
what is meant by such terms as science, presupposition, experience,
truth, etc. Yet all disputes turn on just this question - a nuance
is missed, an ambiguity revealed.
It is here held as a sine qua non for the possibility of coherent
and meaningful discourse, that the foundation upon which we, as
philosophers, assert any view be made unconditionally and explicitly
clear. Though this would appear to be a most reasonable, in fact
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obvious demand it is necessary to state it, as much contemporary
philosophy seems to have failed to take account of such a demand -
and this failure is not confined only to philosophy,, Let us cite a
few examples to illustrate this point,,
In the area of contemporary philosophy called the philosophy of mind
there is much discussion concerning such questions as: whether
consciousness is a brain process; whether a person who had a brain
transplant would still be the same person; whether robots could
campaign for civil rights; whether mentality is nothing but a
physical property; whether man can be understood purely in terms of
his behaviour as observed by another, etc.^ It is believed that
answers to these questions are possible given the correct rendering
of the sense of the terms used in the question itself. Yet the
correct rendering of the terms requires the prior clarification of
the point of view from which we are to understand the terms in the
given sense. This is never provided.^ At best, what is usually
offered in place of such a clarification is a hypothetical state¬
ment such as - if consciousness is conceived as being (for example)
an activity of the brain, or a state of an organism apt for the pro¬
duction of certain sorts of behaviour, certain consequences follow.
But then the original question becomes redundant, for attention is
now focused upon the new conception - which latter shows itself
as being both contradictory and arbitrary; contradictory because
(5) The above questions can be found in the works of J.J.C. Smart,
D.M. Armstrong, R.Puccetti, A.J. Ayer, G.Ryle.
(6) "There exists no coherent theoretical interpretation of the
foundations, or justification of the procedures, of ordinary
language analysis". S. Rosen Nihilism p.49.
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it embodies a duplicity of perspective while at the same time denying
it, hence the meaning of the conception falls apart, (We shall examine
this contradictory aspect in an example shortly). Secondly, it is an
arbitrary conception because the position from which such a conception
is to be viewed is just asserted - it is not shown how this conception
bares a rea1 relation to the conceiver - it is unscientific.
At worst, nothing is offered. There is a refusal to even consider
the foundation of such a point of view or question. We thus collapse
into the ambiguity and flux of meaning attendant to any unsystematic
point of view. Where do these concepts come from? What do they
mean? What does consciousness mean? Are the questions asked in this
area of philosophy meaningful, and if they are, are they capable of
being answered? The answer one receives to all such questions is
si1ence.
Let us take an even simpler example to drive home this point. It is
generally accepted that the statement 'red is a certain wavelength
of light' is true.^ Let us look a little more closely at this
truth. For a start one can say that red, the colour that one
experiences against a background that is not red - in our day-to-day
existence in this world-is not the same thing as a certain wave-length
of light. There is a fundamental ontological difference between them
for a starti For this latter stands for its intelligibility upon
(7) Hegel. Phenomenology of Mind P.109, makes similar criticism
of such views as that animals are nitrogen.
Also see S„ Rosen Nihilism P.70. He attacks the view, "that
all psychic or mental phenomena may be reduced to biochemical
processes and thereby to mathematically computable energy
distinotions".
91.
certain theoretical developments based upon certain axioms applied to
the phys i cai world., This is the point of view of the physicist. Here
then we have two points of view, that of the person experiencing red,
and that of the physicist and his theoretical structures. Yet the
statement requires for its truth the unification of these two diverse
points of view - points of view that appear to contradict each other,
for we can say that for the absolute physicist there is no experience
(i.e. red) and for the absolute savage - no wavelength. But if this
is a truth, for whom - or from what point of view - is it so? The
assertion of such a state of affairs presupposes for its intelligi¬
bility the prior unification of two quite different perspectives -
that of the experience of red, and that of the possibility of measuring
electro-magnetic waves in terms of wavelengths - in one perspective,
i.e. as a unity. We seek a unity of meaning. Hence we move from the
above statement to a consideration of the basis upon which the two
elements in it rest. We require to establish the relationship of
physics to experience and all the attendant relationships involved
(8)
in this concern. This is the point made repeatedly in our con¬
sideration of Husserl's arguments against psychologism - we need to
demonstrate the possibility of getting to the point where a grounded
science is possible and understand in what relation it stands to the
other possible and actual human perspectives. Failing this we are left
(8) Whitehead, A.N. "The criticism of principles must chiefly
take the form of determining the proper meanings to be assigned
to the fundamental notions of the various sciences, when these
sciences are considered in respect to their status relatively
to each other. The determination of this status requires a
generality transcending any special subject matter" Process and
Reality P.15. Also see Hegel - Phenomenology of Mind P.109
where he makes the point that we have merely a 'semblance of a
conceptual unity' in propositions like the above.
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(g)
with what Foucalt has nicely termed a 'discontinuity of planes'
in assertions such as 'that red is a certain wavelength of light'.
The same applied, mutatis mutandis, to the previous examples; they
merely indicate the lack of a system in which meanings held at
different levels of experience (or on different planes) can be
achieved by one person. From what point of view does the phrase
'brain process' have intelligibility? In the area of philosophy of
mind brain process usually engenders its partner mental process - a
mental process is usually seen as something that is in contra¬
distinction to a brain process. Vet what does the word 'process'
convey in each of its uses here? A physical process is something that
can be observed, measured, analysed etc., by an observer but a mental
process is not. Thus in what sense is it possible to assert a
statement equating the two, from the criterion of observation - from
what point of view do these two seemingly different processes become
the same? It is here that these statements can be seen to rest on
very flimsy support. As Hegel says "In such an exposition, therefore,
one does not know how to take either ground or phenomena".^^ For
the having got to the point of being able to assert the above state¬
ment is taken for granted - and taken for granted as intelligible.
It is here that, as Hegel says, the form of necessity fails to get
(9) Foucalt. The Archaeology of Knowledge P.5^. Foucalt sees
this discontinuity in the most simple and basic scientific
discourse though he denies the notion of unity.
(10) Hegel: Science of Logic P.A60. See also P.775 where he mentions
the inadequacy of the method adopted in physics.
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its duei Now this procedure may be satisfactory for a technician
who merely wants to apply methods, and follow rules, but it is not a
satisfactory procedure for a philosopher - it is not a properly
scientific procedure. It is, as we have said an indispensable pre¬
condition for the complete intelligibility of such statements that
the having got to the point where they can be made in a significant
manner is described. Then, and only then, will it be possible to
assess the truth of such. If this is not done the protagonist and
antagonist merely involve themselves in a search for truth built
upon a permanent vagueness. Such a procedure is philosophically
absurd.^ ^
Our procedure is therefore as follows: to examine Hegel's arguments
for the one road to truth, for a presuppositionless philosophy,
and for a philosophy that starts at the clarification of the diffi¬
culties above raised and only then proceeds to develop further. In
pursuing this intention we shall be concerned for the most part with
the Preface and Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind - just
as we were earlier concerned with Husserl's Prolegomena to his
Logical Investigations. It is in the Preface and Introduction that
the question of the aim, the method, and the goal of the Phenomeno-
(12)
logy are first specified. The position adopted by ourselves in
the consideration of Hegel's views (since we hold that consciousness
(11) As J. Ferrier says, the present state of philosophy " .... is a
war in which none of the combatants understands the grounds
either of his own opinion or of that of his adversary; or
sees the roots of the side of the question which he is either
attacking or defending" Institutes of Metaphysics pp.6-7.
(12) S. Rosen. Hegel P.123 sees the Preface as a Preface to his
entire forthcoming system.
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implicates itself in its own criticism) must be that of one who is
within the Hegelian perspective, for we have specified no other as
yet. This means, seeing that both the Preface and the Introduction
are written from the point of view of Absolute Knowledge (the
position one attains upon reaching the end of the Phenomenology),
that, to the extent that we have not traversed the road to Absolute
Knowledge, to that extent will the exact meaning of Hegel's argument
remain proleptic.
It will be of considerable advantage, instead of offering a commentary
on the Preface and Introduction, to consider them in so far as they
relate to the topics that have so far provided so much difficulty.
This will facilitate the explication of the Hegelian point of view




Hegel was well aware of the problems that have so far been raised.
His Phenomenology of Mind was concerned with describing the process
whereby consciousness attains to the perspective of Science - that
is - true knowledge. His first edition of this work also carried
the title "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" which serves
to drive home the point that Hegel considered the description of
consciousness' progression from ignorance to truth - a progression
(12)
that for Hegel occurred in a necessary manner - to be itself
scientific. What then does Hegel mean when he says that this pro¬
gression is itself science, for the Phenomenology certainly differs
in major ways from what would normally be considered a scientific
treatise? For example, it does not begin with a definition or set
of definitions, from which by the application of certain procedures
and on the basis of certain presuppositions, further propositions
follow. It does not begin with fixed and determinate categories
related in particular ways - nor does it lay down to begin with in
an unambiguous and perspicuous manner a set of primitive concepts -
a demand that Husserl argued to be of primary importance for the
(13)
possibility of science itself.
It is, finally, not concerned with generating a point of view, theory
or system in contrast to other views, theories or systems - nor
(12) Phenomenology of Mind P.137
(13) See p.7^-5 Part I above.
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with specifying the logical relations that hold in this 'true' theory
between all the objects contained.
We can best approach an answer to this question by considering what
Hegel has to say in the Preface, which is "On Scientific knowledge
(1 4)
in General". To lead into his idea of science he points out
what philosophy - as science - is not.
It is not a science like anatomy which latter Hegel sees as being
concerned solely with the particular. Secondly, it is not a
science that opposes itself to other forms of science - a philosophy
that cuts itself off from other philosophies by showing how its
particular aims and methods differ from the others. Philosophy ...
"has its being essentially in the element of that universality which
encloses the particular within it." ^ This means that philosophy
is not concerned with anything less than Totality - and not just the
totality of a temporal period, but total totality. As Kojeve has
pointed out .... "the principle of all or nothing is valid for know-
(l6)
ledge, either one knows everything or one knows nothinq." The
philosophers concern with truth is then for Hegel the concern with
achieving this totality. ^
Prima facie, this demand for the necessity for comprehending a totality,
(14) Phenomenology of Hind p„57.
(15) The Phenomenology of Mind p.67.
(16) Kojeve op. cit. p.i21.
(17) Hegel: Little Logic p„24 "Truth, then is only possible as a
universe or totality of thought". (Encyclopedia Logic;
Translation W. Wallace - here termed 'Little Logic').
Also See: Phenomenology of Mind P.8l.
97.
would appear to be in accordance with our expectations. For, if we
take the example previously cited, that of a character in a novel,
the exact nature of this character, the 'truth' of this character,
is not to be found in any one temporal perspective of this character,
but in his development over time. When we attempt to express the
nature of this character as present in a particular moment we find
that the understanding of this expression or set of expression leads
us beyond the de facto presence of the character at a particular moment.
The expression or expressions serve to mediate the particular nature of
the present characterisation with the context or universe of expression.
Expression i$ itself mediation, or, to use more Hegelian terminology,
(13)
an expression contains the essential moment of negativity. Any
particular temporal aspect of this character would from the perspective
of the novel as a whole, if seen in isolation from this whole, be false.
The particular is enclosed within, not set in opposition to the
(19)
universal. A persons character is not an isolated series of
particular separate moments related in merely temporal fashion -
this would be the death of character - it is the progressive develop¬
ment of what the character has it in him to be, of each moment as it
is held _i_n the subject as seen and revealed the subject.
(18) A.N. Whitehead puts this point nicely as follows: "Whenever
we try to express the matter of immediate experience, we find
that understanding leads us beyond itself to its contemporaries,
to its past, to its future, and to the universe in terms of
which its definiteness is exhibited." Process and Reality
P.21-2).
(19) Husserl, as we have seen (Part I, p.37) held the complete
opposite of this. For him there is a 'never-to-be-bridged
gulf' between the ideal (or universal object) and the real
(or particular object). Cf. L.I. p. 1^9.
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We can also add here that Hegel's philosophy is related to past
philosophies in a similar manner; that is, it is not related in an
external fashion to previous philosophies, but in a more intimate
dialectical fashion. Different philosophies do not drop out of a
particular historical situation with no connection to those that
went before, they represent progressive realizations of the goal
implicit in all philosophizing - namely 'the systematic development
of truth in scientific form' . The latest philosophy should
therefore be the result of all the systems that have preceded it
and must include their contributions, it should be the fullest,
(21)
most comprehensive and adequate system of all.
For it to be possible for consciousness to reach the level of
science, the possibility of conscousness reaching this level must
be already implicit in consciousness' prescientific state - for it
to be possible for a seed to grow into a plant, the possibility of
the plants actuality must be, in some sense, already implicit,
immanent, or prefigured in the seed. Therefore Hegel can say that
true reality is the process of its own becoming. The true reality
of a plant is not the plant by itself, nor the seed from which it
developed, but the process of its own development from the seed
into the plant - i.e. its life cycle. Likewise for consciousness,
the description of the process of its own becoming, elaborated
conceptually in its necessary development - necessary both in the
sense of a progression to a new perspective as seen by the con-
(20) Phenomenology of Mind P.71
(21) Hegel. Little Logic P.23.
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sciousness involved in the particular process ( the necessity in
experience); and secondly, necessary in the sense of leading to the
complete system, of Absolute knowledge (the necessity of experience)-
(22)
is Science- This development is - 'the science of the experience
of consciousness' and this includes the positive sciences as a necessary
part, albeit a part that is sublated in the complete description. And,
finally, if we accept that the whole - the description of the develop¬
ment of consciousness to the level of science - is a process, we can
also view this process as a whole, this being the truth of the whole.
But, we have already far outpaced ourselves with the introduction of
a host of concepts - such as those of 'becoming', 'process1, 'concept'
etc., without providing justification for doing so. The difficulty
is that from any particular point of view, from any finite form of
knowledge, any working out of the concepts will be limited or one
sided - that is, provisional, leading through contradiction - the
contradiction that is engendered through trying to give a true des¬
cription or elaboration of a concept while that same concept is still
in the process of being given - to the explication of the system.
(23)
We might add here a point that Cook develops at some length -
(22) K.R. Dove. Hegel's Phenomenological Method P.50 (In Steinkraus
(ed.) New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy).
Also J. Hyppolite. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomeno¬
logy of Mind P.25 makes the same distinction with regard to
the necessity involved here.
H.P. Kainz: Hegel's Phenomenology, Part 1: Analysis and
Commentary provides a five fold breakdown of the types of
necessity present in the Phenomenology - see p.36f.
(23) D. J. Cook: Language in the thought of Hegel.
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namely, that language itself is through and through dialectical. It
expresses the dialectic of experience itself. The failure of our
knowledge to comprehend in a complete fashion, i.e. its incompleteness,
is reflected in our failure to say what we mean. We say what we mean
then realise that we do not mean what we say,
Hegel argues that it is necessary for science to come on the scene.
For, in the detailed working out of consciousness1 relation to its
object - in its search for truth - it must, through the desire to
know, proceed from any state of affairs that is contradictory to a
resolution of this contradiction. This resolution can only be
(2k)
carried out in terms of the previous state of affairs, hence
each state of affairs has a positive va1ue in terms of the complete
science. Hegel thus points out that there is a development, the
description of which will of itself be scientific - but it will not
be seen as scientific by the consciousness immersed in the particular
(25)
temporal state of affairs itself.
What, then, does Hegel mean when he argues that the true form of
truth is its scientific character and - what is the same - that truth
(26)
finds the element of its existence in the Concept?
First, he means that the very nature of knowledge (in its true form)
consists in its being science. Second, he means that truth is the
(2k) Also in relation to this point see Kojeve op. cit. P.82 " ....
negation is always determinate negation." J.Hyppolite op.cit.p.14
(25) M. Greene: Hegel on the Soul P.29. (Also Hyppolite op. cit.
P.26 Note 27)
(26) W. Kaufmann's translation of Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology
of Mind P.14.
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Concept, Hence science, for Hegel, is concerned solely with the
Concept.
Kojeve points out that for Hegel, Concept is " .... the coherent
whole of conceptual understanding that lays claim to truth," it is
".... the integration of all concepts, the complete system of
(27)
concepts. it is the result we reach on completing the journey
of experience through the variety of its dialectical stages, and it
is the 'element of existence of philosophy'. It is not, then in the
generally accepted sense that we are to understand the word 'concept'.
It is not to be taken as a purely universal form of thought which we
then apply to our sensuous experiences. For Hegel, such a dualist
position inevitably runs into contradiction through its inability to
grasp reality as it truly is. Philosophy does not operate with any
bare sensuous content (an abstraction) nor with some other universal
form (also an abstraction); but with their concrete synthesis. The
level of analysis Hegel is indicating is one which has transcended
the oppositions of such comprehension - that is the oppositions of
subject/object, form/content, ideal/real, finite/infinite, abstract/
concrete, universa 1/particular etc. The Phenomenology of Mind is
the demonstration that such dualist accounts give of necessity a
contradictory account of reality. It is only in the Concept that true
reality is achieved. Hegel's philosophy is then, as A Sarlemijn
points out a " .... univocal monism: everything exists and lives but
(28)
in the all-embracing absolute."
(27) Kojeve op. cit. P. 100-101.
(28) A. Sarlemijn: Hegel's Dialectic p.124.
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Hegel is quite explicit as to the nature of the concept. For example,
in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel stresses time and
(29)
again the necessity of thinking in terms of the Concept. When
we think in this way we "comprehend and express the true not as sub¬
stance but just as much as subject". And secondly, the Concept is
self-moving and self developing in time - we thus need to abandon
ourselves to the Concept once we have reached this particular level
of thought.
In the Science of Logic, Hegel gives the following elaboration of
this term:
_a Concept is, first, in its own self the Concept, and this is
only one and is the substantial foundation; secondly, a Concept is
determinate and it is this determinateness in it which appears as
content: but the determinateness of the Concept is a specific form
of this substantial oneness, a moment of the form as totality, of the
same Concept which is the foundation of the specific Concept. This
Concept is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an
object (Sache), the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of
what we call things; it is least of all the logos which should be
left outside the science of logic."
(29) Hegel: Preface (Kaufmann's Translation) pp.12, 14, 28, 38,
50-5^, 70, 88, 98-100.
"True thoughts and scientific insights are to be won only
through the work of the Concept". P.106
(30) Hegel's Science of Logic (Miller) P.39° (Miller translates
Begriff as Notion instead of the more exact word Concept, which
we have used throughout).
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A concept is for Hegel the determinate presentation of the Concept,
The former has both a real spatio-temporal and an ideal-logica1
existence. The Concept itself is seen as a self-determining and self-
(31)
realizing movement - an absolute activity. All reality, all
objectivity issues from the self-movement of the Concept. As C.Taylor
puts it: "The absolute, as Concept ... must go over into existence.
For the Concept, properly understood, is a self-subsistent conceptual
(32)
necessity and this requires instantiation in reality." The Concept
as Totality or the Whole is that which determines itself. But it does
not determine itself as the Concept. The very nature of determination
counts against the Concept being able to appear as the Concept - it
thus appears in a manner at odds with its essence, it appears as only
(33)
a moment of the form.
It is the contradiction in the way the Concept presents itself that is
documented in Hegel's Science of Logic; contradiction leading con¬
tinually to further self-determinations of the Concept(of itself) a
process, terminating in the Concept grasping itself through the
complete structure of self-generated concepts.
(31) Science of Logic p.826
(32) C. Taylor. Hegel p.316.
(33) My emphasis. Hegel puts this idea in another way in relation
to Spirit. ".... the finitude of spirit consists of the
failure of knowledge to apprehend its reason as that which is
in and for itself, or to the same extent, of its reasons
failure to make itself fully manifest in knowledge." Hegel's
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol.3, p.85.
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A Concept is then determinate in that it is a determination of thought
initially an individuals thought, finally of absolute thought. But it
(34)
is also an "object in its own self", A concept is also qua object
'instantiated in reality1, though always in a contradictory manner.
For Hegel sees any determinate finite reality as contradictory, sub-
lating itself in the urge to find the adequate or true reality, which
is only the Concept. The Concept is the only true self-subsistent
object. For Hegel, the real is the rational, the rational is the
Concept, hence the real is the conceptual whole - all else, all other
'realities' are illusions.
Now the Concept can only be scientifically developed once we have
reached a particular level of thought - a level which has resolved or
synthesized the previously mentioned dualities. Hegel puts it as
fo11ows:
"Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of con¬
sciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the
object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it
is equally pure thought. As science, truth is pure self-consciousness
in its self-development and has the shape of the self, so that the
absolute truth of being is the known Concept and the Concept as such
(35)
is the absolute truth of being."
(3M Science of Logic p.49. Hegel also puts it as follows:
"
.... the determinations of thought equally have objective
value and existence." Ibid p.51.
(35) Ibid p.49.
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The Concept is then that 'universality that encloses the particular
within it'. Hegel means by this that the Concept is that ground
within which the Concept determines itself. Hegel later was to put
it as follows: "The universality is, so to speak, the foundation,
within which the determinations or differences of form gain subsis-
(36)
tence. It is not until the conceptual level is reached that
such proper scientific comprehension can occur. Prior to this level
we see universals as being abstract and separate from particulars;
also we tend to regard particulars as given first and universals
as arising second. Hegel puts it nicely as follows: "At this juncture
(i.e. the level of 'comprehension proper') the universal is cognized
as self-particularizing and as gathering itself together out of the
particularization into singularity, which is as much as to say that
the particular is reduced from the state of independence to being a
moment of the Concept. Here, therefore, the universal is no longer a
form external to the content, but is the true form which brings the
content forth from itself, the self-developing Concept of the matter.
At this standpoint therefore, thought has no other content than itself,
than its own determinations, which constitute the immanent content of
the form."^37^
Each concept is then as a specific form of this universality a unity of
substance and subject. Kojeve puts it that each concept is "a real
(36) Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol.3, p.3^9 (first footnote).
(37) Ibid p.227. (My addition in brackets) 'Notion' replaced by 'Concept'.
See also A. Sarlemijn. Hegels Dialectic. "The Hegelian Universal
is not present J_n things and phenomena; rather, the latter exist
as moments in the universal" p.21.
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thought of a real entity and a real entity really thought,," And
truth - what science aims at - j_s the Concept, the complete development
of all the particularizations of the Concept (i.e. as concepts) as the
Concept.
Science, as the self-development of the Concept, is what the Science
of Logic deals with. The Phenomenology brings consciousness from
various inadequate levels of knowledge to the level where this is a
possibility for it. No longer can consciousness be content with
individual opinion or vague notion. Truth is only possible as the
systematic development of concepts. However, this latter does not
take place through the agency of a self or subject detached from the
concepts it is describing - it describes them truly by its very
abandonment to these concepts. We need, then, to understand what is
meant by 'subject1, and how the latter can 'abandon1 itself to con¬
cepts .
Hegel says of the subject or 'living substance1 that is 'pure simple
negativity', that it is 11 .... actual only insofar as it is the move¬
ment of positing itself, or the mediation between a self and its
(39)
development into something different". It is 'its own becoming,
the circle that presupposes its end as its aim and thus has it for
its beginning - that which is actual only through its execution and
and". ^
(38) Kojeve. Op. cit. P.174-5
(39) Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind. Text and
Commentary by W„ Kaufmann P.28.
(40) Ibid P.30
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The subject is, then, something differing toto caelo from what is
understood as an object. An object does not become what it is, it
_i_s_ what it is, or better, it is being in itself. The subject, on
the other hand, is the negation of this 'is' of the object. It is
the negation of all objects, it is that by which objects can be
revealed as objects. The subject, as consciousness, is always out¬
side itself, it is always outside its own time; it is a becoming -
something that cannot be captured in the present, because the present
receives its meaning simply through the ability of the subject to
transcend it. The subject is then always beyond itself - i.e. is
infinite, yet is also finite. The 'negativity' that Hegel speaks of
is the driving principle behind the whole development to Absolute
knowledge as it is the differentiation process itself - the attempt
to know the object as it really is which of necessity entails the
support of a form of knowledge such that the subject is also 'formed'
through this form of knowledge. As the subject is beyond any such
temporal instantiation we get the collapse of the particular form of
knowledge into a more adequate form and eo ipso the collapse of both
the object and the subject as given in it. Thus the differentiation
into the subject and object once started or made is a differentiation
process due to the nature of this 'living substance' - the 'nega¬
tivity' or 'moving spirit1 which it is. The subject is then not
locatable as a thing capable of standing in or subtending various
relationships with objects. The subject as a living acting intend¬
ing negativity is itself no ordinary objectl
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(41)
Kosok develops a two fold point of view on Hegel s Phenomenology
of Mind which can be usefully applied to this notion of the subject.
His first point of view is that of conceiving of the whole as a
process - as a series of temporal events that give the becoming of
this whole. The second point of view is that of the process as a
whole - the being of becoming or the state of becoming of this whole.
Applying this to the notion of the subject we can say that the sub¬
ject can be viewed both as a subject in the process of revealing
objects (and hence also itself) and as a 'being of becoming1 an
atemporal view of the being that becomes through time. The former
focuses on the diversity that is the subject, the latter focuses on
the unity of this diversity.
One further point concerning the distinction between subject and
object need here be stressed: in Hegel's Phenomenology the notion
of a pure subject in separation from a pure object is quite foreign.
Subject and object receive their meaning through each other in the
sense that for the subject to know the object as its limit is also
(42)
to understand itself. As Baillie points out in his introduction
"The distinction of subject and object, within which human conscious
experience exists, is held to be a distinction within a single
unity." The subject can only become what it is by interaction with
(.41) M. Kosok. The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomeno¬
logy of Spirit (Ph.D. Thesis 1964 Columbia University) pp„219f.
Also A. N. Whitehead in Process and Reality P.34-5 makes similar
points viz. "(IX) That how an actual entity becomes constitutes
what that actual entity j_s; so that the two descriptions of an
actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted
by its 'becoming'. This is the principle of process."
(42) Phenomenology of Mind. Introduction p.38.
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what stands opposed to or what stands over against it and overcoming
it. The subject is always a subject revealing objects and objects
are aIways objects for a subject or consciousness - negativity
u- (^3)
requires this.
The above brief outline should suffice as a provisional statement of
Hegel's conception of the subject allowing these further points to
be made. The subject reveals its objects through concepts, (it is
(44)
through the concept that the present survives in memory). The
plurality of events, objects, states etc., would be mere unrelated
groups of meaningless atomic units without the subjects conceptua¬
lization through language. By revealing its objects it of necessity
reveals its own 'relation' to its objects and hence reveals itself.
This is why Hegel says that "True reality is merely the process of
reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self in and
(iiC)
from its other."
Hegel's demand that we abandon ourselves to the object, content, or
concept is just the demand that we describe the process of experience
- the subject (the activity of thinking) revealing objects and hence
itself - without adopting an external or detached point of view. As
Gadamer says, Hegel's own dialectical procedure " .... is an immanent
(43) Kojeve treats of this point, op. cit. pp. 221-3
(44) "The being which negates the given real dia 1ectica1ly also pre¬
serves it as negated - that is, as unreal or "ideal": it pre¬
serves what is negated as the "meaning" of the discourse by
which it reveals. Hence it is "conscious" of what it negates."
Kojeve op. cit. P.201.
(45) Phenomenology of Mind P.8l.
progression from one logical determination to another which, it is
claimed, does not begin with any hypothetical assumptions but rather
which, in following the self-movement of the concepts, presents the
immanent consequences of thought in its progressive unfolding of
itself. Here no transitions are determined external ly." Given
the nature of the subject and of the concept, such a procedure is the
only one capable of reaching Truth; for it is only by abandoning
ourselves to the concept that we are able to express the immanent
necessity of development that is 'part' of every concept - an
immanent necessity culminating in complete knowledge of the Absolute
Concept.
The 'immanent necessity1 referred to above can perhaps be explained
in the following manner. A concept, as we have seen is determinate.
As such it portrays a particular reality. As Sarlemijn points out:
(47)
"Hegel's conceptua1ism is objective". As issuing from the
Concept they express in a determinate - hence finite - manner a
seemingly necessary property of reality (i.e. the Absolute). But
by being determinate they exhibit a particular finite reality, not
the Concept (the true or objective actuality). Thus in character¬
izing reality as determinate they ipso facto characterize it as it
is not. This entails that reality is in contradiction as depicted by
any particular finite concept. Each particular concept will thus
reveal its inadequacy in depicting reality by its mere instantiation.
This contradiction in the concept qua objective is also a contra¬
diction in itself, a contradiction which leads to the negation and
(46) H-G Gadamer. Hegel's Dialectic p.5
(47) A. Sarlemijn Op. Cit. P.21.
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transformation of it, in both the thought of reality and the thought
of reality, both in the real and the rational. Taylor puts
the point as follows: "A given categorial concept is indispensable
yet incoherent. This means that the partial reality it designates
both must exist and yet destroy itself. But this can only be
because a higher reality, designated by the higher category which
resolves the contradiction at this level, also exists, and this
partial reality is kept in being by its inherence in this higher
reality. A partial reality which continually destroys itself can
only go on existing if it is continually posited by the larger order
(4q)
of which it is a part."
This 'larger order' is the Concept coming to knowledge of itself
through the conceptually developing process. The immanent necessity
is then this necessity of the Concept to realize itself, and it is
thus the force that drives the conceptual process; this 'force'
is the negation that each concept contains within itself and that
leads to its transformation.
Science, or system is therefore this completed conceptualization of
the becoming of the whole - the whole together with the process of
arriving at it. Hegel makes plain his disagreement with philosophers
(48) "The whole development of the Concept of Spirit simply exhibits
the manner in which spirit frees itself from all forms of its
determinate being which do not correspond to its Concept. The
liberation is accomplished in that these forms are transformed
into an actuality entirely adequate to the Concept of spirit."
Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vo.l, p.53°
(49) C. Taylor. Op. Cit. p.230.
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who attempt to start from absolute knowledge, from science, from the
result, without providing the process of arriving at it. This bald
result must be unintelligible as a result (as must a character's
actions at the end of a novel) without the explication of the
process that led up to or produced such a result. For we are given
no account of how we are to understand or assess such a result. A
science of this sort must be unscientific in itself. A proper
science is one that leaves nothing, not even its own arrival
unexplained„
Again Hegel criticises those who attempt to seek knowledge of objective
things in opposition to, or in exclusion from the subject; and
likewise, those who attempt the reverse. Either of these attempts
must give rise to unintel1igibi1ity for in both cases we have to
presuppose the opposite of what we attempt in even specifying a
separation - we have to presuppose the notion of experience, of a
subject revealing objects and revealing itself to even give an
account of either subject or object while at the same time main¬
taining that such a notion is false. Finally, Hegel attacks those
who are deceived through familiarity into holding something as known -
knowledge comes only from a thought contemplated in a self-conscious
way. It is therefore wrong to assume that everyday notions such as
subject, object, concept, etc. are, because they are everyday
notions, known truly or scientifically. Science, in Hegel's sense,
makes no assumptions and rests upon no presuppositions. Presupposi¬
tions are the antithesis of science for they make of the foundation
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something mysterious - something outside the domain of that science.
Any science that bases itself on presuppositions must of necessity
fail in its attempt to comprehend totality, for it is unable to grasp
itself in a truly scientific manner. And any science that argues for
or accepts such a limitation upon its own comprehension merely erects
the negation of science into a principle which it cannot justify.
This is a most important argument, and one that we have advanced
against Husserl by arguing that he fails to give an account of how
he got to the point of being able to assert such epistemological
distinctions as he does - and hence fails to warrant them necessary.
However, it is not just Husserl who fails to take account of or
challenge Hegel's argument at this point. Common is it today for
many disciplines to directly assert the presuppositions of their
disciplines - and presuppositions often far from 1apodictically
self-evident1 - as though it were some kind of merit. Ground¬
ing a science in non-science, or accepting certain presuppositions
as beyond the scope of that science seems to us in accepting Hegel's
argument to be the antithesis of any science that would show that
its account was true and necessary.
Husserl, while failing to justify his arrival at science in an accept¬
able manner, also argued vigorously against any science that based
(50) That such an argument can be scientifically challenged - see
M. Kosok. The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic.
I.P.Q. Dec. 1966, P,6l5o
(Also A. Kojeve, op. cit. p.177)
(51) Psychology being a case in point, cf. D.E. Broadbent. In
Defence of Empirical Psychology, 1973. P.206.
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itself upon presuppositions. As we noted earlier, for an epistemo-
loqical investigation to be scientific, it must ..... "satisfy the
principle of freedom from presupposition" (L.I. 263) Phenomenology,
in Husserl's view would provide the epistemological investigation
with its scientific form. But can phenomenology itself be a science
for Husserl? Can it be free from presupposition, for if not we are
again caught by the Hegelian arguments?
Hegel obviously claims that phenomenology as the road to science is
also itself scientific. We will therefore need to examine just what
Husserl and Hegel understood by phenomenology and its relation to
science. However, we need to complete the explication of Hegel's
notion of science before such questions can be discussed.
Hegel continues his explication of the nature of science by pointing
out that what usually occurs in the process of understanding an
object is the separation of the aspects or parts of such an object.
Physics, for example, takes our familiar object (say) a table, and
through its particular mode of analysis (i.e. given its particular
form of knowledge), gives us the truth that it is a collection of
particles, arranged in a particular conformation, emitting a parti¬
cular wavelength and qua collection, possessing certain physical
characteristics and conforming to certain physical laws. Gone is
the table as a stable unit of experience - as a concrete existent.
Physics looses the table but gains a set of particular determinations
'of' the table. Hegel calls this process 'the force of the Understand¬
ing1,^^ which separates out the particulars previously embodied
(51) Phenomenology of Mind P.93.
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as one - previously taken as a totality0 This process can be seen
then as a negative one, a delineation of an object into a plurality
of particulars - but negative because this process fails to reveal
the table in its 'true' or adequate conceptualization. The table, as
the totality we seek to conceptualize has vanished. To put it in a
Hegelian way - this 'force of the Understanding' signals the death
of the table, we are left with a group of separate particulars.
And this second group of particulars is then open to the same 'force'
- hence an infinite process leads away from the initial attempt at
(52)
comprehension. Therefore a process such as this cannot be 'true'
science, in the sense of the completed conceptualization that was
spoken of earlier, though Hegel argues, it is a necessary part. To
stay at this level of analysis is to remain in contradiction, the
more the process is continued the greater the number of contradic¬
tions, and the further we move away from the table - the whole we are
attempting to grasp.
The problem with this sort of analysis is that it separates conscious¬
ness from its object - the position of external reflection. It then
proceeds to do damage to the object by splitting it up into a collec¬
tion of determinations. It thus abstracts from the object in con¬
sidering the determinations. This entails the result that this sort
of analysis can never attain to the true conceptualization of the
concrete object - it deals abstractly with an abstraction. The
(52) Sartre J.P. points out that "Man is a totality not a
collection" (Being and Nothingness P.568) - we might
add that a table is a totality not a collection of
particulars.
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presuppositions of the understanding have pre-ordained the result -
the mutilation of the object in an attempt to characterise it as it
really is. Hegel claims that .... "To see that thought in its very
nature is dialectical, and that as understanding, it must fall into
contradiction - the negative of itself, will form one of the main
lessons of logic.
We might add that any method, being the application of procedures
or criteria _to an object must of necessity fail in its goal of
characterizing such an object as it really is; for a method applied
by a subject _to the object is the denial of the initial state in
which both subject and object existed - it is a refutation of
experience. This is why Hegel emphasises the abandonment spoken of
earlier. For him "the method is nothing else than the structure of
the whole in its pure and essential form." Phenomenology, must
therefore make no presuppositions such as the use of methods or pro¬
cedures in attempting to comprehend the object at hand but must rest
content with the pure description of experience. "When all is said
and done the "method" of the Hegelian Scientist consists in having
no method or way of thinking peculiar to his Science."^5)
But Hegel sees a positive as well as a negative significance in the
understanding's analysis. Understanding, in attempting to characterize
the object, introduces mediation. It makes of the immediate a set of
determinations; jjt separates what was previously a unity. Hegel
(53) Little Logic P.19
(5A) The Phenomenology of Mind P.106
(55) A Kojeve op. cit. P.176. See also S. Rosen Hegel P.257.
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sees this as being a necessary prelude to the subject being able to
grasp reality as it really is. For the determinations made are
determinations of consciousness. Consciousness makes the object
determinations, therefore these fall within consciousness. And in
making such determinations consciousness spells out to a greater
extent its concrete relations to its object and it does so in
universal terms. Consciousness, as understanding has therefore pro¬
duced as a result of its analysis a set of universals, albeit
abstract universals. These universals are abstract determinations
of consciousness because as Heidegger points out " .... they are the
result of a scrutiny of consciousness which disregards the full
nature and the unity, of the constitution of consciousness."
For Hegel, concrete means interrelatedness, and he sees the process
of experience as being one that starts with abstract, unmediated
undifferentiatedness and ends with the complete self mediation of
the Absolute, with the concrete rational real. So it is a process
of making more concrete through the process of experience the
initial abstract beginning.
Against this can be contrasted the empiricist and idealist meaning
which takes concrete to mean the immediate sense particular. The
process of assimilating such immediate 'data' under categories is
seen here as being one of abstraction. The empiricist/idea1ist
abstracts from the 'concrete process of experience1, and attempts to
(56) M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, P.89. (On the
faults of 'the Understanding' see also Gadamer op. cit.
P.23-4).
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account for a part of the latter through categories derived from
other realms. (As Kline has pointed out etymology tends to favour
the Hegelian over the empirical conception of concrete 11 .....
'concretum', the result of a process of 'concrescence' or growing
together, cannot be anything simple or immediate, but (must be)
something mediated, a living unity of what is differentia ted."
To return to Hegel's criticism of the understanding, we find that
the understanding has produced a set of abstract, because independent
(or not interrelated) universals. The problem now " .... consists in
actualizing the universal, of giving it spiritual vitality by the
process of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate
/rO\
thoughts.' We do not stop at the static negative of the
understanding which sees the object collapse into a set of indepen¬
dent universal determinations. Consciousness transcends this inade¬
quate posture. Consciousness .... "is this mighty power not by
being a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say
of anything it is nothing or it is false and being then done with it,
pass off to something else: on the contrary, mind is this power
(59)
only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it.
Prior to the process whereby consciousness - (as understanding) -
determines the object there is neither determination nor object for a
(57) G. Kline, 'Some Recent Re-interpretations of Hegel' quoted by
M. Kosok in The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's
Phenomenology of the Spirit. P.209. Kosok goes on to point
out how both empiricists and idealists fail to correctly under¬
stand Hegel's conception of 'concrete', see pp.209 f.
(58) Phenomenology of Mind 9^.
(59) Ibid 93.
subject. It is only by the subject negating the immediacy by attempt!
to determine it that it becomes - that there is something for con¬
sciousness and correlatively consciousness of this something. It is
impossible to ask of consciousness before it has progressed what it
is, for even to broach the question presupposes having got to a point
of view, having become - having implicitly stated the nature of
one's own being. Prior to the first determination there is nothing
that can be said.
This appears to be a very significant point. One cannot demand of
a particular stage or level of development of consciousness answers
to questions that are generated from a more advanced level, for each
level or stage in the process has its own structure, its own mean¬
ing - one for the consciousness immersed in the experience at the
particular level, and another for consciousness which has surpassed
it. As one does not seek to judge the merit of a painting before
the artist has put brush to canvas likewise one cannot expect of con¬
sciousness answers to questions which for it cannot be posed. This
point again turns on the nature of consciousness, i,e, that it is
not a static thing that remains constant through a series of
experiences. It does not remain nor ever is an identity, for
negativity is just the perpetual cancelling of identity. This whole
question demands a clarification of the relation of the logic of
identity to the logic of negativity (dialectical logic) which is
provided in the following section. Here we can perhaps prefigure
this latter by saying - following Kojeve that " .... its (conscious¬
ness1) continuation in existence will signify for this I "not to be
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what it is (as static and given being, as natural being, as 'innate
character') and to be (that is, to become) what it is not .... it is
the act of transcending the given that is given to it and that it is
itself." Obviously this assertion as to the nature of con¬
sciousness is, from the point of view of traditional logic con-
tradictory.
If (per impossible) consciousness is what it is and not another thing,
then it would of necessity conform to, or be governed by the logic of
identity, and it would then be merely a matter of expressing the pre¬
cise relations that hold between itself and the other objects in the
world. But it is extremely difficult to envisage how such an 'expres¬
sing' could be achieved, for by robbing consciousness of its nega¬
tivity we would, ipso facto rob it of the possibility of expression -
that is, of transcending the given through language. Without
language there would be no mediation. We would be reduced to the
muteness of the in-itself. There would be total silence.
This point is important for the following reason; if a beginning is
made with concepts that are merely taken over as complete, then it
will be impossible to comprehend them in a real and adequate manner,
for the process whereby these concepts came to be given is not
retained - part of their meaning is missing. Hence they will per¬
force be taken abstractly. A concept is not a fixed and independent
entity, it is continually in a process of being given through
experience. The meaning of a concept is not separable from the
(60) A. Kojeve Op. Cit. p.5.
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process of experience, it can only be adequately grasped through the
adequate grasp of experience itself.
This criticism of failing to correctly comprehend concepts is made
by Hegel when he argues that Modern philosophy fails to grasp the
universal as it has arisen " out of the manifold detail of con¬
crete experience"., ^ It takes the universal as already present,
as result, through the process of mediation, from sensuous immediacy.
It is therefore unable to show the necessity of the universal's
existence in the process of understanding the real world. It is
unable to be properly scientific.
This is the criticism that was levelled at contemporary philosophy
of mind in its attempts to explicate notions such as 'the mental1,
'the physical', 'brain process', 'mental process' etc. They were
taken over as already substantial concepts without prior explica¬
tion of the process that resulted in the product ion of such concepts.
Likewise the criticism advanced against Husserl of failing to provide
the account of how he got to the point of being able to assert the
epistemological categories he uses (i,e, the real, the ideal etc.),
Husserl expressly rejects the necessity of providing such an account
i.e, "The question is not how experience whether naive or scientific
arises, but what must be its content if it is to be objectively
valid. We are, in other words, not interested in the origin and
changes of our world presentations „,,, "
(61)
(62)
Phenomenology of Mind P,9*+
Logical Investigations P,207,
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Now, while Husserl is correct to criticise those who seek to explain
the ideal content of our knowledge in a natural psychological manner,
he fails to correctly grasp the va1ue of such an erroneous procedure.
For Hegel is at one with Husserl in denying that such a psychological
account can do justice to what Husserl calls the 'objectively ideal1.
In The Phenomenology of Mind Hegel shows the inadequacies that occur
in this account while describing the form of knowledge adopted by
the scientist (i.e. in the description of Reason as Observation. ) .
But Hegel has shown, as against Husserl two fundamental things. He
has shown firstly, that the position of the (psychological) scientist
arose dialectically out of the failure of an earlier form of know¬
ledge (self-consciousness in its various modes) to adequately grasp
reality. It is through the negation of this earlier form that Reason
. (64)
can arise.
Secondly, he has shown that the level of Reason is inadequate as well,
resolving itself into Spirit, Spirit into Religion and Religion into
Absolute Knowledge. It is only at the level of Absolute knowledge
that the 'objectively ideal' can find is adequate - pure - expression.
Husserl fails to show how the limitations in the psychological point
of view necessarily lead to the position he is adopting. It is this
requirement that is referred to when we claim that Husserl fails to
adequately account for his own point of view.
Hegel's demand that we 'actualize the universal1 is just the demand
(63) Phenomenology of Mind. P.329 ff.
(64) Ibid p.267
(65) We shall discuss the particular conceptions of psychology
held by Hegel and Husserl in Part III.
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that we grasp the universal, not as a fixed, abstract and inert
thing - not as a result, but as issuing from human sensuous exis¬
tence. The description (not a psychological one) of the process
whereby this sensuous existence yields up a universal will enable
the proper meaning of this universal to be grasped and hence con¬
tribute to the understanding of this human world. This is a sine
qua non of philosophical science.
Hegel sees concepts as being " ... in truth, self-moving functions,
circles", because the process that the subject passes through
on its way from sensuous certainty to the Concept requires of con¬
cepts that they be fluid, that they develop - it is a conceptua1
process. Understanding, which holds these concepts apart from what
is being conceptualized (i.e. being), apart from each other, and as
fixed does violence to the very nature of the concepts - again a
reason why Hegel demands an abandonment to the concept - and does
violence to the nature of consciousness and object. Hegel states
that if we break down, or better transcend the limitations of such
a point of view, and see concepts as self moving, as "spiritual
entities", then we are on the road to science. Hegel puts it as
fo11ows:
"This movement of the spiritual entities constitutes the nature of
scientific procedure in general. Looked at as the concatenation of
their content, this movement is the necessitated development and
(66) Phenomenology of Mind p.95.
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expansion of that content into an organic systematic whole. By
this movement, too, the road, which leads to the concept of know¬
ledge, becomes itself a necessary and completely evolving process ...
The road to science, by the very movement of the concept itself,
will compass the entire objective world of conscious life in its
' f ~7 \
rational necessity."
We have then, in the proper science a self-developing process, and
one which continually returns upon itself. This is why Hegel terms
the concepts as being circular. We are continually returning to an
ever enriched (because more differentiated and interrelated), and
ever developing Whole - Spirit - Absolute - Concept. We return
again and again because of the contradictions engendered by
our initial, (and all subsequent), attempts at knowing (in the
Phenomenology of Hind). We try to say what we mean and immediately
introduce more meaning than we were aware of - hence the need again
to say what more we mean, etc. etc. We get no nearer to saying what
we mean unless the mode of expression changes and ipso facto the
(68)
component of this mode - the knowledge and the object known.
(67) Ibid P.95. Here we can note the mistaken critique of Habermas
(Knowledge and Human Interests P.24) where he states that Hegel
does not proceed logically, nor if it is science can it do any¬
thing except confuse the legitimacy of the positive sciences.
Here, Habermas seems to be taking both 'science' and 'logical'
from the point of view of the Understanding - without demon¬
strating how this position can provide an intelligible account
of itself. Naturally from the point of view of positive
science (or understanding) Hegel's views would appear to be the
antithesis of science. But Hegel shows that the Understand¬
ing's position collapses under scrutiny.
(68) For an explication of Hegel's notion of circulatity see Gadamer
op. cit. pp. 5-35.
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To further spell out the Hegelian notion of the development of con¬
cepts we can perhaps gain in perspicuity by considering the example
previously considered - that of a character in a novel. Suppose we
say of X that he is an angry man. We do not mean that he is exhausted
by such a characterization. For in further consideration of X we
may also make many more such pronouncement concerning his character,
motives, actions etc. These further characterizations are not made
in a merely additional manner but condition or modify the initial
typification, i.e. we are evolv?ng a picture of X. The concept
'angry1 thus ceases in itself to be an adequate concept in its
application to X - the essence of X is not exhausted by such a
characterization but seeks a more adequate and complete typificat ion.
In this latter endeavour we find that concepts applied to X at
various times take on a differing meaning depending upon the com¬
pleteness of the characterization; depending upon what point in
the adequate typification of X has been reached - and this depends
both upon our own developing point of view and how this 'makes' us
see X. Concepts - even in this example - are not separate isolated
labels that we variously apply to other separate isolated existents
in a fixed and atemporal universe. They are the way we grasp the
significance of our experience. To make concepts separate, static
existents would be to make experience unintelligible - for we would
be continually asserting the negation of each preceding assertion,
we would be continually producing a "new" X as against the "old" X
by making each assertion - there would be no development of X. If
we view the character X in Hegelian fashion then X would appear as
a whole whose content was given through the gradual evolving of a
coherent system of concepts - a being becoming what it is.
Now, given the briefly stated nature of subjectivity to be that of
negativity or negative activity it follows that the Concept must be
expressive in part of such a state. It must therefore reflect in
some fashion the principle underlying its production, the attempt by
the subject to grasp (through rational discourse) the truth. Hegel
calls it the mediation of thought and being - which because thought
is activity and being is being determined through this activity, the
concept (as mediation) will of necessity embody not just the 'being'
side of experience but also the 'life pulse' of the thinking. It will
express the dissimilarity which obtains between these two in its very
nature, in its unity. This dissimilarity is just the factor of
negativity. Hegel says that such thoughts are .... 'charged with
the difference of a soul and a body,"^^ so such thoughts or concepts
are not a differenceless unity, nor a mere conglomerate of two aspects
they are unities of opposites, they are 'charged'.
Hegel thus typifies concepts as self-moving functions, which lead
through their own development to the discursive elaboration of .....
"an organic systematic whole.They develop through their own
inadequacy in revealing being, just as the typification of X as
angry immediately leads to a further typification in an attempt to
(69) Science of Logic P.37 (Also see Baillie's Introduction to the
Phenomenology of Hind P.3*0.
(70) Phenomenology of Mind P.95.
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typify X in a less inadequate manner. And because X is not just a
thing but negativity the typification has, as it were, to try and
1 keep up1 wi th X, to typ i fy X both as X j_s now and as X wi 11 become -
that is as finite and infinite at the same time, Hegel makes the
point that mathematics or mathematical methods degrade this process,
for they are unable to cope with the 'sheer restlessness of life and
its absolute and inherent process of differentiation'.^^ It is not
possible within the ambit of traditional logic to typify this process
as it is, for the presuppositions of this logic have preordained the
(72)
result, this understanding must destroy negativity, (Recourse
to any introduction to traditional logic will validate this point.
(73)
For example, Copi in his introduction to Logic is concerned ....
"only with the correctness of the completed process", and not with
the process itself.) Again, in this passage, Hegel shows the inade-
quqcy of staying within this domain, an inadequacy we observe as
still rampantly evident in such areas as psychology today. The experi¬
mental method followed by psychology does just this, it degrades what
is 'self-moving' to the level of matter (given being), and is then
surprised that it arrives at contradictions. This method merely
repeats endlessly the process of reducing the subject to an object and
hence obliterating the essence it was attempting to know. We find a
lack of any internal necessity, in the development of this process,
because we find a lack of any 'abandonment' to the process itself -
(71) ibid P.104.
(72) Rosen puts it as follows: "That is, the real obstacle to self-
knowledge lies rather in the definitions of knowledge and form,
or as Hegel would put it, in limiting oneself to the "logic of
the understanding" ". Self-consciousness and self-knowledge
Hegel-Studien 1974, Vol.9, P.112.
(73) I. Copi. Introduction to Logic P.6.
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the abandonment is rather to the methodological procedures that pro-
(7k)
duce such a result. This method is applied by psychology to a
subject matter wholly detached from it, instead of arising through
the discursive elaboration of the subject itself. The urgency to
'get on with the job', to generate results that justify the method¬
ology is a self-stultifying procedure, for the method is already taken
as an absolute which itself 'fashions' the subject matter, and pro¬
duces the results. This is just an extended tautology - and a
tautology that fails to comprehend itself. Hegel sees this sort of
procedure as unreal and unscientif? c, and therefore giving rise to
only unreal truth.
( 7k)
Hegel contrasts these 'pseudo-philosophical' J methods with the
scientific (properly scientific) method in an effort to spell out in
greater detail the differences between them. The first of these
pseudo-philosophical methods is the process of raisonnement (ratioci¬
nation). This is the view from outside, the view briefly mentioned
above. The self stands apart from the content it apprehends, and
seeks the essence of this content. But by so detaching itself from
the content it makes of itself an inessential moment. Hence it is
unable to progress, it merely makes negative determinations of the
content without seeing its own negativity in the process. It makes
of itself the opposite pole in this process - what Hegel calls 'the
ideally presented subject', to which such content is related in a
merely accidental or fortuitous manner - it is an alien. Conceptual
(7^) B„ Bosanquet puts it as follows: "What has happened here is that
a very limited but apparently self-contained system has been
erected ad hoc by a practical interest or an arbitrary intellec¬
tual objective." Implication and Linear Inference P.159.
(75) Kojeve's term - op. cit. p.26k.
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thinking, on the other hand is concerned both with the content as
apprehended and the subject as apprehender, in their unity. It is
not the view from outside. As we have already pointed out, the con¬
cept is just this recognition of being and negativity in unity.
Hegel expresses this in the form 'Being is Thought1 and 'substance is
implicitly and in itself subject'. Experience is not the inter¬
nal registering of an external impression but the continual reinstat¬
ing of the unity of subject and object through their mutual determin¬
ation. Raisonnement therefore in its elaboration of the content is
forced to adopt an inadequate means of expression because it adopts
an inadequate form of knowledge - the meaning as expressed here will
be one-sided.
We can express the difficulty that Hegel sees here through the
doctrine of relations. The debate over whether relations were inter¬
nal or external is a way of expressing the problem Hegel was trying
to show as the essence of ratiocination. If the terms and their
relations are taken as mutually exclusive then the proposition
collapses for want of a relation. If this is not the case the pro¬
positions collapses into identity - either position entails the
collapse of discursive elaboration. But this way of conceiving the
problem is not the only one. Earlier, the nature of the self or
subject was seen as a becoming, not as static. Likewise the pre¬
dicate is not a merely abstract determination attached in a particular
way to this, subject. The difference is nicely put by Hegel when he
says by way of an analogy that "Rhythm is the result of what hovers
(76) Phenomenology of Hind P.113.
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between and unites both", (accent and metre). The doctrine of
relations as being the view that relations were either internal or
external to their terms, or the view of ratiocination are both
wedded to the form of propositional truth, in the sense that the
proposition can serve to express the truth.
In our consideration of the examples mentioned earlier (red is a
certain wavelength of light; a table is a particular structure of
atoms; a mental process is a brain process; X is angry) we
repeatedly emphasised the point Hegel makes. The unity required for
such assertions to even be made is absent, hence the meaning of its
content falls apart into bare subject and abstract universal (pre¬
dicate) - we are back to accent and metre.
Secondly, because the conceiver of such a point of view (or proposi¬
tion) is an external agent the proposition itself must reveal mere
(78
external elements. A unity of meaning is thus impossible to obtain.
With each further statement concerning the subject we get a continual
negation of each preceding one - both in the sense we attribute to the
subject and the sense we attribute to the predicate. From this point
of view any notion of the whole, or the Concept is impossible to
(77) Ibid. P.12Q.
(78) R„ Musil puts the point generally as follows ...."in mathematics
is the source of a wicked intellect that while making man the
lord of the earth, also makes him the slave of the machine. The
inner drought, the montrous mixture of acuity in matters of detail
and indifference as regards the whole, man's immense loneliness in
a desert of detail, his restlessness, malice, incomparable
collousness, his greed for money, his coldness and violence, which
are characteristic of our time, are according to such surveys,
simply and solely the result of the losses that logical and accu¬
rate thinking has inflicted on the soul" The Man without Qualities
P.40-41.
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obtain. In each of the examples, the predicate has substantive
significance, and thus absorbs the meaning of the subject within it -
being invades the subject. Hence the subject ceases to stand as a
fixed and objective self, and the predicate ceases to be a discrete
and separate item, it throws itself into the subject - X is angry.
Hegel sees this view as leading to speculative thought where the
contradictory character of the proposition - and the process of
ratiocination itself- is sublated. The proposition attempts to
express the truth (the substance), but the truth is, in its essence
subject - finding its content in itself and itself in its content.
Hegel concludes: "There is to be found, therefore, no sort of con¬
tent standing in a relation, as it were, to an underlying subject,
and getting its significance by being attached to this as a predicate.
(79)
The proposition as it appears is a mere empty form.
To be science, philosophical exposition must eschew the ratiocinative
procedure in and through its knowledge of this procedure, and grasp
its content only in pure concepts, which because they embody negati-
tivity, will lead to the systematic elaboration of the whole - they
will provide the rhythm of the whole. In ratiocination, the concepts
are not pure, are not taken as they really are, but as this view
requires - as static, formal and still embodying sense elements.
The second pseudo philosophical method is that of common sense. Hegel
attacks those who think that philosophizing 'by the light of nature1
C79I Phenomenology of Mind. P.124. On this point see also Gadamer,
op. cit. p. 16-19. There is also a good discussion of the role
of the proposition in expressing the truth by Aquila, Kant-
Studien 64, 1973.
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by common-sense, and by 'intuition is sufficient to lead us to truth'.
This point is important in that if appeal is made to any of these in
the case of a dispute there is no way of knowing what is meant by
such an appeal - it of necessity fails of a discursive elaboration,
it lacks a criterion. Science cannot rest content on a foundation
supported by an intuition, or feeling of the Tightness of the proced¬
ure and support. And this means that the positive sciences are not
sciences in the Hegelian sense, unless philosophy has 'had a hand in
their production', unless philosophy has shown the necessity of the
presuppositions and axioms that form the foundation of these sciences
(i.e. how physics arose from and is related to experience). The
same applies to logic itself. We cannot start at the purely con¬
ceptual level and elaborate a logic unless we have demonstrated the
necessity of the concepts we adopt, that is, how they came about -
what they mean. Or, in other words, until we have reached a point
where the truth has been grasped as absolute, we are in no position
to assert the necessity of particular concepts nor their inter¬
relationships. As Hegel says, the form of necessity must get its
due. To show certain positions as necessary to the comprehension of
the whole is to show that they are not presuppositions. The true
(because Hegelian) scientist must demonstrate the necessity of every
position adopted.
Therefore given the Hegelian notion of the truth as the whole, and
secondly the nature of the proposition, it is only possible to grasp
the truth.of a process of explication at the end of that explication.
The ascription of a predicate to a subject collapses into nonsense
unless we see this process as being within a whole. (The subject,
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we might say, is the process as a whole, and the predicate the whole
in process). The understanding of having got to a particular point
of view, of being able to assert certain propositions can only be
adequately assessed on completion of the point of view, that is, the
understanding of the whole. Therefore we must begin by showing how
science comes about, how it 'comes on the scene', and why it needs
to come on the scene - how it is an improvement on that which went
before.
Hegel's phenomenology is just this description of the development of
knowledge from untruth to truth, the education of consciousness from
the natural to the scientific standpoint. Now another important
point made by Hegel in these (still) introductory remarks, is
that true knowledge does not come on the scene merely in opposition
to untrue knowledge. It arises dialectically, out of the untruth of
that untrue knowledge. Therefore each account of knowledge, whether
untrue or not, has its value in the phenomenology - each account or
stage has a positive value in that through it the whole is reached.
Now, in seeking to know, consciousness negates the untruth of its
knowledge, but it does not stop at this point. Hegel argues that
to stop at this point - to take this negation as leaving us with
nothing (scepticism) - is to see only the negative side of negation.
The positive significance of the process is that it is determinate
negation, giving rise to a new form - the content negated but
retained as negated. (We might add here that memory is a good
example of the positive side of negation. A memory is the present
negated as present yet retained in the present as a memory or
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'negative presence.') To stop at scepticism is to make discursive
knowledge impossible - we end only in silence. But given the nega¬
tive and positive significance of this process, a transition is made
from each form of knowledge that is inadequate, culminating in the
form that is complete - the point where knowledge no longer finds
contradiction in its form (and ipso facto in its language), and where
the 'concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept'.
At this point consciousness has attained to science - Absolute
Knowledge. Only at this point is it possible to elaborate a logic
that is scientific - that is, not tainted by relativity of truth nor
inadequacies of content.
A problem, previously thought insuperable, now makes its appearance.
How is it possible for us to perform such a description of this
process, for if we are seeking to describe the process as it is,
surely our own knowledge, our own language will make it impossible
in principle to do just this? This seems to be one of the lessons
of Kant's philosophy. How it is possible to know the untruth of our
phenomenal knowledge except phenomenally, that is unscientifically?
Hegel puts the difficulty as follows:
"This exposition, viewed as a process of relating science to pheno¬
menal knowledge, and as an inquiry and critical examination into the
reality of knowing, does not seem able to be effected without some
presupposition which is laid down as an ultimate criterion ....
But, here, where science first appears on the scene, neither science
nor any sort of standard has justified itself as the essence or




We have already considered the problem of presupposition both in
Husserl and Hegel. It has been said that a science built on pre¬
suppositions is not properly scientific unless the necessity or
truth of these presuppositions is made evident in discursive fashion.
Plainly we have an infinite regress here. Hegel attempts to avoid
the force of this argument as follows. We seek truth. Truth is the
knowledge of what a thing is in itself. Our knowledge of this thing
is through concepts; that is, as the thing is in itself, for us. It
would seem that for knowledge to gain truth it would have to jump
from one side of the relation to the other, it would need to be this
thing in itself. This is evidently impossible. But consciousness is
not a thing, it is essentially negativity. Consciousness is both
consciousness of the object, and consciousness of itself -
"consciousness of what to it is true, and consciousness of its know-
/Oj\
ledge of that truth." The problem of knowing before we know is
a problem only when consciousness is conceived in isolation - in
separation - from its object, and in conceiving this relation of con¬
sciousness to its object abstractly. Consciousness does not suddenly
decide to characterize or know an object. Consciousness is essentially
consciousness only through its object. It is both a distinguishing
from and a relating to. It is the process of this dua1 movement
(82)that we call knowledge. Hence any consideration of knowledge
(_8o) Phenomenology of Mind P. 139.
(81) Ibid P.141
(82) See W. T. Harris, On Hegel's Philosophic Method. Journal of
Speculative Philosophy Vol. VIII 1874 pp. 35-48, 91-92.
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is ipso facto a consideration of both the distinguishing and the
relating aspects. Both these aspects are for the same consciousness,
hence Hegel can say that 'it is itself their comparison.' Heidegger
puts it aptly thus: "The decisive point of this explanation is this;
every time we represent phenomena in their appearance, both the thing
we measure, and that with which we measure fall within consciousness
(88)
itself." When both the object as it is in itself for conscious¬
ness, and our knowledge of this object do not correspond, conscious¬
ness attempts to rectify this state of affairs by claiming for itself
a 'new' object and then proceding to examine it in more detail, but
there is also a second movement involved here. Consciousness comes
to see that in fact the 'new' object that appeared was due to the
negation of the preceding experience - a negation both of the object
i
of consciousness and of consciousness knowledge of it. Consciousness
is from this perspective in the process of continually examining it¬
self - both its knowledge and its object - because both are wholly
i
implicated in consciousness experience. This latter perspective is
that of the philosopher or reflecting consciousness that is able to
see more than the object at hand. The object here is more the pre¬
vious experience and how it offers up a new experience - a new con¬
sciousness of an object and a new object of consciousness - for
consciousness. Again we need to remember that consciousness is not
a thing but negativity - it is always 'outside' itself such that it
can subtend the peculiar 'relationship' to its experience that has
been spelt out above. The criterion by which we decide on the truth
or falsity of our knowledge is consciousness itself. And conscious¬
ness, being (as we have said) a being of becoming, entails a
(83) M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience P.97.
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dialectical interplay between these two aspects of its experience, an
interplay that resolves through the process of negation and the
negation of this negation the inadequacies in both respects. By
developing its own content consciousness resolves the inadequacies
that if finds in itself. This investigation or examination is thus
interna1 to consciousness itself, the development of the immanent
content contained therein. So while consciousness can be typified as
always outside itself it is not outside itself in an external fashion.
There are no transcendents guiding the experential process itself -
no thing in itself.
The object is then not object simpliciter and the subject is not sub¬
ject simpliciter. if the object is in the process of being determined
by consciousness, and consciousness is at the same time being deter¬
mined through its object, either of these typifications would fail to
account for the dua1 process involved. It would be merely an attempt
to reinstate the notion of separation, and the inseparable problem of
foundation associated with it.
Now prior to an exposition of the dialectic (which is provided in the
next section) we can say proleptically that this dialectical procedure
- where "consciousness tests and examines itself" - is not the merely
subjective determining the objective. This would be to view the matter
abstractly. Hegel's point is that the determinations themselves -
subjective and objective - are determinations that have arisen from a
particular attempt to characterize the object of consciousness and
eo ipso the relationship between consciousness and its object - an
attempt which _i_n its attempt, loses its own truth. Subjective
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idealism is the outcome of the view that consciousness, being sub¬
jective, determines its objects or the world (as the objective), an
outcome which entails the negation of the distinction itself.. For
Hegel, the object, has as much agency in the process of knowledge
as has consciousness; there is a mutual reciprocal determining, not
(84) f . . . .a one way process. Hence our way of conceiving the situation is
not just the active meeting the passive, the subjective meeting the
objective, the agency meeting the agent. We have a dynamic meta-
stability of consciousness and its object, of both the object of
knowledge and the knowledge of the object.
On completion of the process, consciousness can see that each mode of
the relationship between consciousness and its object and their sub-
lation give rise to what Hegel calls a "scientifically constituted
sequence". Each mode thus has a positive value in its expression of
what it takes the truth to be - and is necessary in providing its
accent to the 'rhythm' of the Whole. Hegel is able to delineate the
entire blueprint for the education of consciousness to the point of
science only because he has already reached such a point. And as we
have already mentioned, the Preface and Introduction to the Pheno¬
menology of Mind are written from the point of view Absolute Know¬
ledge - from the Scientific point of view.
(84) Bail lie in his Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind P.39
makes this point as follows: "We cannot say that the subject
dominates the object any more than that the object directs the
activity of the subject: they are inseparable elements and
develop pari passu."
Merleau Ponty in his discussion of Hegel's Introduction to the
Phenomenology also emphasises this point Cf. "Philosophy and
Non-Philosophy Since Hegel". Telos No„29 1976, p„58. (This
point is further generalized in a footnote by H.J. Silverman
(Trans, p.58 No.31).
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In saying this Hegel does not mean to place Absolute Knowledge on a
scale with all the other forms of knowledge,. For in reaching Absolute
Knowledge we have transcended experience (as the subject - object
complex) itself. This means that we, qua finite subjects, cease
to exist as such, and become moments of the absolute. As Sarlemijn
puts it'. "While the process of human knowledge partly overcomes the
subject-object opposition by resolving what is given into pure
determinations; while the human individual attempts to realize in
his own way the good known to him; his freedom can never influence
absolute freedom, because it is finite like its subject and cannot
escape the negative dialectic of the finite. This is why the human
individual cannot offer resistance to what is historically necessary.
Here, as in every dialectical analysis, the subject of determinations
passes from the finite to the absolute individual. It is for this
reason that the human conquest of the object is that of the absolute,
that human freedom is that of the logos, not because the latter
restricts the former, but because the former is lowered and raised
/Or]
to a moment". Absolute knowledge is thus not a point of view
because there is no 'we' (in the usual sense) to be subject of
u.<86>
To criticise such a procedure, to argue that Hegel has not attained
to such a 'grand conception' is of necessity to have shown that
(85) A. Sarlemijn op. cit. p.152-3.
(86) This raises the problem as to what sense Hegel is giving to
the "we" in the Phenomenology of Mind generally. On this see
K. R. Dove: Hegel's Phenomenologica1 Method p.45-56. Dove
discusses the various explanations offered by commentators
on Hegel's Phenomenology on Hegel use of the term "we", as
well as suggesting his own solution.
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Hegel's description is in itself subsumable within a more comprehen¬
sive system - the one from which the criticism is made! There is no
other way philosophically - scientifically - to perform such a
(87)
critique. (One can, of course, argue that the whole philoso¬
phical enterprise is absurd - but this is still an argument and hence
based upon a particular form of knowledge or point of view which itself
needs to be explicated so that the argument can be grasped in its
full significance - and this would transform the argument into a
scientific (and also self-contradictory) one).
This is why the emphasis upon the implication of consciousness in
its own procedure has been continually expressed throughout our
argument. Without a systematic grasp of the whole, any criticism
will lack complete truth and intelligibility for we will be unable
to fully comprehend the sense of the concepts used in such a critique,
because we fail to fully comprehend both our own consciousness and
its object - we lapse of necessity into the mere haphazard and
arbitrary. This is just the point of view Hegel demonstrates as
being continually sublated in his phenomenologica1 description. Each
mode of experience (and the consciousness that is immersed in it) by
itself cannot know that it is part of a "scientifically constituted
sequence". Thus a criticism from such a point of view - from any of
these intermediary modes of experience - of the whole discourse would
be both impossible, because it would have to know that there was
such a 'whole' discourse of Science to be able to criticise it; and,
(87) "To refute a philosophy is to exhibit the dialectical movement
in its principle, and thus reduce it to a constituent member
of a higher concrete form of the Idea". Hegel, Little Logic
P.168.
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secondly, it would be irrelevant because it would only be able to
view the system, as it is not, it would not be able to understand
what was being expressed in full. This is the reason why criticism
was made by us from the Hegelian perspective, of statements from
the philosophy of mind, and the example from physics. They fail to
show how they are fully intelligible - they fail to show the
necessity of their foundations - and then, upon the mere presumption
that they are, assert with indignation the inadequacy of fallacious
nature of views falling outwith their domain. Rosen puts the point
nicely as follows: "It is therefore nonsense to judge philosophy
in terms of art, science, political ideology, or any other secondary
(because detached) form of speech, which itself implies prior philoso¬
phical decisions, whether known to the speaker or not. Philosophy
(88)
can submit to no judge but itself ,..."
For Hegel, any empirical science is defective because its general
principle is indeterminate and vague, hence not connected to the
cases for which it is the principle; and, secondly, that the point
from which these sciences begin, their axioms and assumptions are
neither able to be accounted for nor deduced in that science. "In
both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due."
This is, of course, not to say that these sciences are unnecessary
or contain nothing of value - on the contrary, they are a necessary
part of philosophical science (or speculative science), providing
(88) S0 Rosen, Nihilism P.218,
(89) Hegel, Little Logic, P.15 (my emphaises).
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this latter with concepts obtained in their respective analytic
procedures* But these sciences, what Hegel called positive sciences
have the following three features:
"1. Their commencement, though rational at bottom yields
to the influence of fortuitousness, when they have to
bring their universal truth into contact with actual
facts and the single phenomena of experience"*
2. "These sciences are positive also in failing to recog¬
nize the finite nature of what they predicate, and to
point out how these categories and their whole sphere
pass into a higher* They assume their statements to
possess an authority beyond appeal"
3. They are positive " ...* in consequence of the inadequate
grounds on which their conclusions rest* "
These three features make it impossible for positive science to
satisfy reason, to be properly scientific* And, finally because of
the mode of investigation adopted by such sciences - analysis - they
are only able to produce abstract results* In the example of the
table we found the concrete object of our experience being replaced
by a set of abstract attributes - attributes, which it should be
pointed out, are agreed to be what the table really is, and attributes
(90) Hegel. Little Logic, p.26-27*
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that form no part of our normal experience - but no way of returning
to the concrete object was then possible. There eventuated the con¬
tradiction of taking the table as a unity, as well as taking it as a
collection of attributes,
"All this was the well-known incoherency of ideas, with their
way of spreading out without a central point, an incoherency that is
characteristic of the present era and constitutes its peculiar
arithmetic, rambling about in a multitude of things, from a hundred
possibilities to yet a thousand others, and always without a basic




Briefly, we can say that science must first be arrived at. It is
not sufficient to start at the purely scientific level unless it
has been demonstrated how we are able to reach such a standpoint,.
Therefore it is requisite for a complete understanding of science
that the description of the process from the prescientific to the
scientific standpoint be completed. This is the role of phenomeno¬
logy. As Hegel has pointed out, "the form of necessity must get its
due', it is phenomenology that provides this form of necessity.
Now, because of the nature of experience - its being dialectical -
the description will take the form of a discursive elaboration of
experience - the process of consciousness attempting to grasp
and express the Whole. And because experience embodies the nega¬
tivity of consciousness, the concepts themselves will not be mere
separate atoms available for analysis - they will not be just static
nor abstract being but will be in their essential nature becoming.
They will not be given being but being given.
Science, for Hegel, is then the completed description of the being
of becoming in purely conceptual terms. Science is thus concerned
not with abstractions but with the concrete, with completeness
and consistency. It always deals with a unity which while given
in an incomplete fashion is always in the process of coming to
terms with and transcending its incompleteness.
Finally, science is presuppositionless. It does not bring in
1 ^5 o
from outside axioms or assumptions with which to begin. It remains
within its own content, returning upon itself with each discursive
elaboration. Science in its completion is cirular; it is the truth
of the Whole and the unity of thought and being in its entirety. It
(92)
is "Absolute or completely coherent knowledge".





It has been argued that science is not something that can be
straightway plunged into, that it must first be shown how it
is possible to attain to such a scientific perspective, and of
how such scientific concepts are formed.
Logic itself has as science, to be reached. It is not a satis¬
factory procedure to begin one's logical studies with a definition
or set of definitions that have the accent of common sense, and to
then proceed at the whim of individual inclination to the elabora¬
tion of various rules and logical procedures. Yet logic today,
as much as when Hegel made his criticisms of its unscientific
method, still exhibits this unscientific aspect. To take just a
few examples by way of illustration.
Copi, in his Introduction to Logic, lays down the following
definition of logic: "The study of logic is the study of the
methods and principles used in distinguishing correct from in¬
correct reasoning". ^ Now, because there are other definitions
of logic available, Copi is obliged to counter them. He takes
only two other specimens:
(I) I . Copi: Introduction to Logic P. 3-
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1. Logic is the science of the laws of thought.
2. Logic is the science of reasoning.
The first specimen is rejected, for two reasons. These are, that,
psychology studies thinking and hence is the science of the laws of
thought. Because logic is not a part of psychology it cannot be
this science as well. Secondly, this definition is rejected
because it is too inclusive - not all thought is the object of
study for the logician.
The second definition is rejected for similar reasons. Reasoning
is still thought and is therefore still part of the psychologists
subject matter. Thus we are left with the initial definition.
But Copi does not consider whether the process of actually pro¬
pounding a definition of logic is itself a satisfactory procedure
for logic. Nowhere is there a development from the ordinary to
the logical point of view; and, in fact, Copi expressly repudiates
the whole idea of providing such a development. Thus his intro¬
ductory remarks have an ambiguous ring about them - take for
example the following:
"But the logician is not concerned in the least with the
dark ways by which the mind arrives at its conclusions
during the actual process of reasoning. He is concerned
only with the correctness of the completed process".
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"The logician is not concerned with the process of inference
but with the propositions which constitute the initial
and end point of that process and the relationship
(2)
between them".
It is with the argument that results from the process of inference
that the logician is chiefly concerned. Yet the notion of argument
is itself used in an ambiguous manner. It is taken as 'any group
of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others
which are regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one1;
and it is also taken to refer to the process itself. Logic must
therefore study the completed product - the argument as completed -
with a view to determining its correctness while recognizing that
this is, in effect to study the process as it is not. One is thus
tempted to ask: how can the relationship between propositions be
fully grasped if the process of inference is ignored?
In terms of the notion of science previously outlined, we can list
the following basic mistakes in this professedly introductory text:
1. There is an arbitrariness both in the conception of
logic itself and in the procedure of developing its
subject matter. That is, from the initial definition
that is merely asserted, to the nature of the process
to be considered (or not to be considered). This act of
(2) Ibid P.6.
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definition merely instantiates identity by fiat and
entails the complete denial of reflection as a con¬
ditioning process. (We shall argue that identity is
not something given - but that the proposition already
embodies both identity and difference. And, that it
is not intelligible if it is taken as a result or
identity).
2. It presupposes the intelligibility of its initial
categories, i.e. the separation of certainty from
truth; the separation of process from result; the
separation of method from content; and the
separation of identity from difference.
3. It begins with the result - the completed process -
without any justification for doing so.
(3)4. There is a complete lack of system (in the
Hegelian sense).
To take another example, from a viewpoint more in sympathy with the
(4)
Hegelian perspective, Bradley in his Principles of Logic begins
immediately with judgement, baldly stating that it is impossible
(3) What Hegel said about this logic still remains true. "In the
present state of logic, one can scarcely recognise even a trace
of scientific method. It has roughly the form of an empirical
science". Science of LogicP052.
(4) F.H. Bradley: The Principles of Logic.
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before we begin logic to know where to begin. Secondly, he admits
that his arrangement is arbitrary. Yet, if it has been shown how
it is possible to delineate the logical sphere, the difficulty of
the beginning will at least have a possibi1ity of solution instead
of being ruled out by fiat. And we can certainly question a
science that points out its own arbitrariness as though it were
some kind of merit.
Again, Bosanquet in his Logic, shows a basically confused point of
view. On the one hand he argues "... that there is no more reason
in asking what evolution of thought we are studying than in asking
what laws of motion are studied by mechanical science .... It is no
more necessary to specify in what particular cases you find know¬
ledge than to specify in what particular cases you find motion".^
This view fails to recognize that while the laws of motion are not
themselves motions, the laws of thought are themselves thought, that
is - they are thoughts for a form of knowledge. Thus we see the
reduction of speculative science to empirical science. The
reduction of logic to just another science that is in need of a
principle which it itself cannot provide. Again this view fails to
offer a point of view from which the reader can judge or assess (or
even understand) the meaning and truth of what is being said. A
host of concepts are brought in (from where?) and then it is
asserted (by what right, and from what point of view?) that 'such
and such1 is the case or 'that so and so obtains'. One bare
(5) B. Bosanquet: Logic, P. 6 - 7.
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assertion is as good as another,, Bosanquet repudiates the notion
of requiring the necess ? ty of the determinations he makes - he
(6)
sees this as being superfluous. But to merely claim that
this demand is superfluous is not to refute the argument for its
need.
On the other hand, Bosanquet does recognize the notion of development
as being vital to his whole logic. His logic is based on the con¬
ception that 11 judgement develops in accordance with its proper
interests and purpose", ^ giving the idea of a germ unfolding
differences as a way of indicating what he means by development.
But the notion of development would seem to contain the notion of
necessity which, it is claimed, is irrelevant. This seems to be
a major difficulty for Bosanquet,
We may also note here that Husserl is not concerned with how naive
or scientific experience arises, but with the completed product
itself,wi th the result. His concern is over what content it must
/ o\
have to be objectively valid.
It is evident from this very brief consideration, that these philo¬
sophers are not particularly concerned with meeting the demands set
down for logic to be properly scientific, hence it is not surprising
(6) On this point see Hegel: Science of Logic P,6l3» (Also see
Preface to second edition of this work),
(7) B, Bosanquet: op, cit, P,22„
(8) Husserl: Logical Investigations P,207»
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that such ambiguities are revealed at their point of embarking
into the domain of the logical. Secondly, it is clear that logic
is not considered by everyone to be a homogeneous domain. For
example, it appears that there is one logic for the science of the
process of reasoning, while there is another for the science of
reasoninq. Is there a beginning to logic which is not arbitrary,
but which is of necessity the only beginning, and if so why is it
that so few philosophers appear to agree with it? Is there one
logic or many logics, and if the latter, what is their relation?
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HOW SHOULD LOGIC BEGIN?
3.2
Hegel's arguments concerning science aimed at establishing the
necessity of providing a description of the process whereby con¬
sciousness moves from its initial naive state to the level of
science (or logic), as a prerequisite to any further investigations.
It was only in this way that the philosopher could avoid irration¬
ality. If this procedure is not followed, certain consequences
fo 11 ow.
First, given any proffered starting point, presupposition or defin¬
ition of the science, there will be no undeniable reason why we
should begin with it, contained in it. If an attempt is made to pro¬
vide a definition of logic, such as Copi's, there is no way we can
provide a proof of it, other than by showing ".... the necessity of
(9)its emergence in consciousness" a procedure Copi, (as well as
the other philosophers we have considered here) rejects. Secondly,
the definition will never be completely acceptable to everyone, hence
there will be revisions, qualifications, even alternative starting
points suggested. Any decision on which definition is to be
accepted can only be made in an arbitrary manner. As Hegel remarks,
"In this method of beginning a science with its definition, no
mention is made of the need to demonstrate the necessity of its
subject-matter and therefore of the science itself". And
(9) Hegel: Science of Logic P. bS.
(10) Ibid. P. kS.
154.
such a definition - through the act of definition - would merely
attempt to fix concepts, notions, substances, etc. in an arbitrary
manner without the possibility of comprehending its own act being
open to it.
How then does Hegel begin his Logic? The beginning is made with
pure being a beginning which presupposes pure knowledge,^^ which
latter has its justification in the Phenomenology of Mind. It is
knowledge that no longer contains the opposition of the subjective
and objective standpoints - no longer deals with a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking,
nor apart from it, nor with forms that merely offer themselves
as distinguishing marks for truth. This, as we have seen, would
not be a truly scientific procedure.
Hegel claims that the Phenomenology of Mind has demonstrated that
(12)
pure knowing is the "... Ultimate absolute truth of consciousness".
In logic we deal only with pure knowing, in the total extent of its
development - we operate at the level of the Concept, and in a
sense recapitulate on the development in the Phenomenology, except
(11) A point that is often ignored by those discussing Hegel. A good
example of this is provided by J Veitch in the dithyrambic essay
included in his Method, Meditations and Selections from the
Principles of Descartes. In effect he reiterates the criticisms
of Trendelenburg - failing totally to see the point of view of
the Hegelian Logic; and the criticisms that Hegel makes of the
logic that Veitch subscribes to. (Esp. see PP.CXV - CXXIII).
(12) Science of Logic P. 68.
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that now the development is comprehended in purely conceptual terms,^
What then is this Concept that has reconciled Being and Thought - that
has transcended the limitations of experience?
Hegel says of the Concept that it is charged with negativity, which,
as has previously been mentioned, means that the Concept is the
unity of Being and Thought - or, to say the same, is the unity of
identity and difference. Being such a unity, it is self-developing.
(1 4)
It is 'the simple life pulse'.
Secondly, Hegel sees the Concept as bringing content back into logic.
Traditional logic is seen to rest its forms of correct reasoning on
the laws of identity and contradiction. But this _i_s just the differ¬
ence, it is not correctness of the knowledge of the fact that is
required in logic - but truth. That is, traditional logic ("dogmatic
logic" ^'5)) js seen by Hegel as being concerned with the correctness
of our judgements - i.e. with the rationality and consistency of our
knowledge. But it is not concerned with truth in the sense of the
subject and predicate of a judgement standing " .... to each other
in the relation of reality and concept". Sarlemijn highlights
the significance of Hegel's distinction between correctness and truth
as follows: "An inference can well be correct without having any
correspondence to reality; in this case, the premises do not agree
with reality. It is precisely in this opposition between correctness
(13) The Logic presupposes the Phenomenology " ... which contains and
demonstrates the necess ? ty, and so the truth of the standpoint
occupied by pure knowing and of its mediations" Science of
Logic P.69.
(14) Ibid P.37
(15) Encyclopedia 'Logic' P.304
(16) Ibid, P.305.
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and truth that formal logic differs from dialectical., An argument is
'correct' when it obeys the rules of formal logic, and thus complies
with the requirement of non-contradiction. Thoughts are 'true, when
they correspond to their object .... The requirements which hold for
the knowledge of non-contradictory, motion 1 ess, and ideal laws
and determinations are not necessarily the principles of reality
jjn motion. Dialectical logic, therefore, will not have violated
the formal - logical principle of non-contradiction when it shows that
ideal being is not in accordance with its content and is present in
real, limited objects in a limited and contradictory way - ideal
being as such being unlimited and universal,," " .... it is formal
logic alone which provides the rules of correct knowledge. Yet it
analyzes merely rules, and not ontological laws .... Formal logic
makes possible a correct argument .... the form of movement inherent
in reality belongs to ontology."^^ Thus formal logic is limited,
it does not discuss the question of ontological truth, it is there¬
fore unable to relate its ideal determinations to the reality it
inadequately presents. (it is the concept as un? ting the opposition
(18)
of subjective and objective that constitutes truth. We shall
consider this question further when discussing the relation of formal
logic to dialectical logic. See below, also see part II, § 3.^).
Now, on the Hegelian view, the concept of a thing is not a form of an
actuality separated from it - it is not the mind's reception of
sensations. It is not the being of essence nor the essence of being.
(19)
It is the coincidence of both. To lay down that identity is the
(17) A. Sarlemijn. op. cit. p.92-3. (Also see C.Taylor, op.cit. p.317-8)
(18) Hegel also elaborates on this distinction in Hegel's Philosophy of
Subjective Spirit Vol. Ill, p.75~77 (and P.225-7).
(19) On this point see Phenomenology of Mind P.115.
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form in which thought is to be rendered is to erect into a law a point
of view which Hegel amongst others has shown to be basically inadequate
to its content. For identity only expresses one half of the truth,
of the Concept - it makes process impossible. So it might be added,
does difference express only half the truth, and it by itself would
make unity impossible. Hegel puts the point thus: "Identity, there¬
fore .... is also the determination of identity as against non-
identity". To express identity is already to express more than
identity, for in the process of stating such an identity (i.e. A = A),
the immediacy of A has become mediated by the reflective process
involved here. The determination of identity is only possible (as
(2
we shall show) within a temporal context and as against its negation.
The Concept cannot, thirdly, be treated as the predicate of a subject,
for this would reduce it to a form attached to a content; it would
simply re-introduce the opposition of subjective and objective, without
(22)
allowing any solution to such an opposition. The Concept is not
then a separate, static, finite being, nor a vague indefinable dia¬
phanous vapour. It is the concrete, the actual, in the sense that it
is the objective, the true and the active. All concepts issue out of
the Concept through the activity of the Concept. The negativity each
concept embodies - its necessary interrelation with and sublation in
other concepts - leads to the elaboration of a self-contained structure
of concepts, this being Totality conceptually comprehended - the
Absolutes' self-comprehension. Each concept necessarily implicates
(20) Science of Logic P.413. (On this point see also PP.409 - 416).
(21) See the discussion of this point by M. Kosok: The formaliza¬
tion of Hegel's Dialectical Logic. P.610.
(22) Cf. Part II. § 2.1 above, for explication of Hegel's term
'Concept'.
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others. As Baillie points out in his introduction, " .... any one
category involves all the others, and can be clearly interpreted only
in the light of the entire system. Each mirrors the whole system in
itself, and the whole system can be said to be the unfolding of
(23)"the concept" par excellence".
It must be emphaised that Hegel's view of logic is that of a science
concerned with the (absolute) objectivity of knowledge. His logic is
objective in that it presents the self-development of concepts, that is,
it is solely a conceptual comprehension. And for Hegel, objective
existence is concrete existence, that is - logical existence. Hegel
puts it as follows:
"The concrete shape of the content is resolved by its own inherent
process into a simple determinate quality. Thereby it is raised to
logical form, and its being and essence coincide; its concrete existence
is merely this process that takes place, and is eo ipso logical
•
. „ (24)existence.
Hegel's disagreement with 'the logic of the understanding' and with
Kant's transcendental logic can be developed as follows. In so far
as the understanding has not reached a speculative point of view it is
infected by various inadequacies that make it impossible for it to
comprehend the absolute or the Concept. It separates the infinite
from the finite, the real from the ideal, the universal from the parti¬
cular, and the abstract from the concrete. "Logic is usually said to
(23) Phenomenology of Mind. Introduction p.35.
(24) Ibid p.115.
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be concerned with forms only and to derive the material for them from
elsewhere. But this 'only1, which assumes that the logical thoughts
are nothing in comparison with the rest of the contents, is not the
word to use about forms which are the absolutely-real ground or every¬
thing. Everything else rather is an 'only1 compared with these
(25)
thoughts.1 What logic should be doing is examining " .... the
(26)
forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth.11
The logic of the understanding is concerned with the formal content
of our thought and not with the whole content. Secondly, its sole
(27
concern is with the finite, and the relationship of finite to finite.
Thirdly such a logic is concerned with the correctness of the rules
governing this content, and not with the adequate knowledge of the
whole (i.e. with truth). Again, this logic cannot be properly scien¬
tific, in that it is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the concepts
contained in its basic statements and laws. (We shall return to these
points shortly).
On Kant's transcendental logic Hegel expressed himself as follows:
"What has here been called objective logic would correspond in part
to what with him (Kant) is transcendental logic. He distinguishes it
from what he calls general logic in this way, (a) that it treats of
the notions which refer apriori to objects, and consequently does not
abstract from the whole content of objective cognition, or, in other
(25) Hegel. Little Logic p.51. Also Science of Logic p.48.
(26) Hegel. Little Logic p.52.
(27) "Aristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the under¬
standing; its forms only concern the relationship of finite
finite, and in them the truth cannot be grasped." Hegel
(quoted by Sarlemijn op. cit. p.94).
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words, it contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object, and
(b) at the same time it treats of the origin of our cognition so far
as this cognition cannot be ascribed to the objects .... His chief
thought is to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness as the
u- *• " <28)subjective ego.
Now Hegel's disagreements with this procedure are as follows. First,
it is not the subjective ego, but the absolute subject (i.e. Spirit)
that is the true vindicator of form. Thus Hegel says that Kant's
form of cognition (the subjective ego) " .... has still to be re¬
lieved of the finite determinateness in which it is ego, or conscious-
(29)ness." Kant was unable to resolve the opposition between subject
and object, he was a sub jective idealist. Unable to resolve this
opposition entailed that he was unable to achieve the objective
rationality of all encompassing Spirit. Hegel claims to have achieved
this latter point of view.
Secondly, Hegel says that the result of the Kantian philosophy was
11
.... that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or
subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed by
faith.That is, Kant held that knowledge could not be gained
of the unconditioned (noumena), of things as they are in themselves.
Hegel, on the contrary held to no such transcendent. For Hegel, all
reality is scientifically knowable, all concepts are distinguishable
(28) Hegel. Science of Logic P.62.
(29) Ibid p.63.
(30) Ibid P.61-2 footnote. Also Science of Logic P.51.
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but inseparable developments of the absolute. It is the absolute that
resolves the opposition of subject and object. "The subject whose
moments of thought constitute things is the absolute whole and not
(31)
the human cognitive faculty."
How then does Hegel develop his Logic? The beginning is made with pure
being. Why? Hegel's analysis of the beginning, given in the Intro¬
duction to his Science of Logic explains why. He presupposes pure
knowing - that is - purely conceptual knowledge. Now given the level
of thought, the Concept, the beginning must be made with that which is
first in the process of thought - (of the a 11-encompassing activity
of the absolute thought). What is first for thought is thought itself
without distinction, and as this absolute thinking is the only real
object for Hegel it must, prior to its self-becoming be but pure being.
Thought, as pure knowing is a self-developing, self-forming negativity.
For Hegel, any other beginning for logic would involve more determinate
concepts which would presuppose (at least) pure knowing as their ground.
As in the Phenomenology, we have just simple immediacy present, but
this time we are at the scientific level, having resolved the one¬
sided and contradictory standpoint intrinsic to spatio-temporal
experience. We are in the domain of the Concept, whose first form is
pure being. Let us consider this beginning in more detail.
The beginning must be an absolute and it must be without presupposing
anything, hence it must also be groundless and free from mediation -
(31) A. Sarlemijn op. cit. p.108. He continues: "It is the endeavour
to synthesize and sublate rationalism and Kantianism which causes
Hegel to call his metaphysics a logic. It is the science which
'sublates' both traditional metaphysics and transcendental logic."
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it must be pure and simple immediacy. It must be undeveloped in
the sense that it possesses no determinations with respect to any¬
thing else, nor within itself; it is the undifferentiated whole. The
beginning then can only be pure being and the Science of Logic will
reveal the reason why such an abstract beginning is the only true
beginning.
But any consideration at all of this beginning reveals that though
there must be pure being and nothing else, "Yet there is nothing and
there is to become something. The beginning is not pure nothing, but
a nothing from which something is to proceed ..... The beginning,
therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being
and nothing, or is non-being which is at the same time being, and
(32)
being which is at the same time non-being".
Hegel, in asserting that the beginning is made with pure being is in
fact saying that such pure being is without determination, it is free
of determination, free of being a being - it is then no different
from not-being. But it is also at the same time absolutely different
from not being for itis pure thought. Hence it is not not-being nor
yet pure being - for it is just the beginning, i.e. becoming.
Consistent with this Hegel says that one can in fact omit this con¬
sideration of being and not-being, and consider only the notion of
beginning as such, that is, the beginning of pure thought. Such a
procedure would reveal two subordinate aspects - the two that
Hegel has delineated, for the beginning is a beginning. It is not
nothing nor yet something.
(32) Science of Logic P.73.
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This notion of beginning is not that where we begin with some already
determinate brute given that is then imbued with motion, or is capable
of being further developed. Hegel is really trying to show that his
system has no beginning in this sense. For a beginning is only an
attempt by a form of knowledge to specify the substance of reality
that is due to be grasped. But truly understood, i.e. from no finite
form of knowledge but from absolute knowledge, the beginning is a
false notion. Hegel repeatedly claims that his science is circular,
and d circle has neither beginning nor end.
"The essential requirement for the science of logic is
not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy
but rather that the whole of the science be within
itself a circle in which the first is also the last
(33)
and the last the first".
The Science of Logic will reveal the completeness and circularity of
knowledge when it has completed its description. But prior to this
development - where pure knowing is present in its nakedness, such
a revelation is impossible. Therefore Hegel attempts to present for
thought the conceptual presuppositions of concepts themselves, begin¬
ning with the first concept, that of beginning - with pure thought
itself. Pure thought is then, a beginning or becoming, and as such
is a unity of pure being and nothing.
From the standpoint of Absolute knowledge we could say that this
analysis of the beginning of the Science of Logic, which reveals the
(33) Science of Logic P.71. On this point see A. Sarlemijn
Hegel's Dialectic P.^2.
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notion of the unity of being and nothing, again expresses the char¬
acter of all concepts (the unity of though and being) and hence a
restlessness - one can conceptually comprehend this restlessness,
this negativity in the beginning,, It points to something else, it
is a 'non-being' on the way to being; it drives pure knowing on and
the more it seeks to comprehend these concepts the more the structure
develops. It is, as McGilvary has pointed out - begreifendes Denken -
that is ".... grasping clutching thought, thought that grips its
(34)
object as its own inalienable possession",
Hegel gives as the first, purest, most abstract definition of the
beginning, the identity of identity and non-identity, This definition
is obviously in radical disharmony with the law of identity held by
traditional logic.
However, before considering the relation between the law of identity
and what might be termed the law of non-identity (i,e, the identity
of identity and non-identity), it is appropriate to give precise
expression to Hegel's particular dissatisfaction with the proposition,
for on this viewpoint turns much of the misunderstanding concerning
such things as the nature of the beginning in Hegel's Logic, Hegel
himself says that the proposition "the unity of being and nothing"
is, taken by itself, a false expression of the whole true result.
For unity tends to suggest that we compare two different things and,
finding them the same pronounce upon their unity. The unity is then
seemingly completely unrelated to the two objects being compared -
(34) McGilvary 'The Presupposition Question in Hegel's Logic'
Philosophical Review 1897 Vol. 6, P.502.
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it is something that we supply.The "unrest of incompatibles",
the "movement" involved in this union is not given expression in
this proposition. The unity seems conferred by an external
reflection.
Earlier, Hegel expressed his dissatisfaction with the propositiona1
form by saying that it was contradictory in itself, that it was "a
mere empty form". Here again he says the following:
"
..... the proposition in the form of judgement is not
(37)
suited to express speculative truths."
In judgement only the identical aspect is taken into account. For
example, when we say 'the crow is black' we consider the subject in
abstraction from the other determinations that are possible, and from
the fact that the predicate - a universal - does not apply solely
to crows. But speculative thought demands comprehension; that is,
both the identical and the non-identical aspects. In a word it demands
that the manifold relationships that the subject sustains be included
as essential in the consideration of the subject. Without this
latter, the nature of the subject could not be known, and we would
be left with the mere form of a subject, that is, a subject without
determination, a 'subjectless' subject - an inconceivable. But the
fact that the subject is a crow already means that the subject has
(35) Hegel: Science of Logic P.90-91.
(36) Phenomenology of Mind. P.12A. (Also see the previous
section on Science above).
(37) Hegel: Science of Logic, P.90.
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been determined and is also in the process of being further deter¬
mined. The subject is then nothing more than the unity of past
predicates - and a developing unity. As Gadamer points out, "We
do not take up something new or different in the predicate, for in
thinking the predicate, we are actually penetrating into that which
the subject is. The subjectum taken as a firm foundation is
abandoned, since thought does not think something else in the pre-
(18)
dicate but rather rediscovers the subject itself."
If we consider this judgement as it is usually conceived, the subject
is separated from the predicate which latter is just one of many
possible determinations one can attribute - in external fashion -
to a form of a subject which lies beyond it. As we have noted
earlier, in such a conception 'the form of necessity fails to
get its due1.
Hegel argues that an individual in abstraction from the whole which
individuates it is unintelligible - unreal. We operate within a
unity of discourse - a developing unity. Yet taking an individual
in abstraction is just what the judgement taken in its non-speculative
sense does - a subject or individual is determined through a predi¬
cate (a universal), but only the identical aspect (in our example,
the blackness) is taken into account in the judgement simpliciter.
'The crow' and 'black' are co-extensive as expressed, yet at the
same time they cannot be so, for black is a universal and the crow
(39)
a particular.
(38) H.G. Gadamer. Hegel's Dialectic P„l8. The subject is just another
example of the class of concepts, viz. that they are " ... the unity
of the state of being differentiated and of being undifferentiated".
Science of Logic P.7*K
(39) Or. this point see Hegel: Science of Logic P.627.
167.
It might be argued here that the distinction between the 'is' of
predication and the 'is1 of existence is blurred by Hegel, allowing
the above point to be made. But this is to miss the point that at
the conceptual level, the level of comprehension, the copula does
not conjoin the two moments (subject and predicate) in either an
existential or a predicative manner. For the conceptual level has
transcended such a distinction - a concept, any concept is at this
level spirit in a particular determination. It is the unity of
identity and non-identity which is expressed through the speculative
content of the judgement. As Gadamer puts it,
"Properly speaking the philosophical statement is no longer a state¬
ment at all. Nothing is posited in it which is supposed to remain,
for the "is" or copula of the statement has an entirely different
function here. It does not state the being of something using
something else, but rather describes the movement in which thought
passes over from the subject into the predicate in order to find
there the firm ground which it has lost".
The bare judgement by itself, unless it represents a development of
(41)
a unity - the subject - fails to make sense. Hegel would
thus say that each successive judgement sublates the preceding one
in the sense that the form of each judgement is negated yet retained
as a further expansion of the Whole. If we remain exclusively
(40) H.G. Gadamer, Op. Cit. P.18. We would argue that what Gadamer
holds to be the nature of the philosophical statement applies in
fact to all statements properly considered, due to the nature of
the reflective process itself. Cf. note 96 Page 201.
(Al) For a good discussion of this see R.E.Aquila: Predication and
Hegel's Metaphysics. Kant Studien 6A, 1973. PP. 231 — 245»
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within the domain of identity, nothing can be said, for it is just
the d? fference that judgement expresses - i.e. 'the crow is black1,
and likewise the sublation of this difference in a unity, a more
determinate unity. Similarly if we remain within pure difference
nothing can be said, for no point of contact, no judgement can be
formed. The judgement thus has to express both identity and
difference in its unity, that is, both the relating to and distingui¬
shing from aspects of an identity. What is expressed by the collapse
of the judgement is the unrest of the Whole (of pure being and
nothing) - the judgement itself does not express this. Hence the
unity of being and nothing is likewise a disunity, a becoming.
Becoming is the Whole true result of the consideration of the
(42)
beginning; it is a movement, an unrest. The difference
between pure being and nothing leads to a development in which both
being and nothing become other than they are, they receive a more
adequate expression, they become more determined - they become
more concrete.
This beginning is for Hegel abstract for it is undetermined and
immediate. Nothing more can be said about it, as any further
statement determines it. This point of view is again in complete
opposition to the empiricists 'immediates1 which are seen as the
concrete from which we abstract. The empiricists immediate is
similarly something about which nothing can be said - but this
(42) We can say that becoming is both being and nothing (negatively)
yet neither positively, at the same time - they are inseparable
yet distinct. And a 11 philosophical concepts are examples of
this unity. On this see M„ Kosok. The Formalization of Hegel's
Dialectical Logic P.609.
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is because it is unknowable* The concrete is here the in-itself,
transcendent of experience - unreachable* Hegel, on the contrary
(43)
has no such transcendent.
But before giving a more precise expression to the notion of dia¬
lectic, we can perhaps pause to take account of criticism made in
connection with this mode of beginning logic. We shall concern
ourselves solely with the criticisms advanced by Trendelenburg
as it was he who was largely responsible for the reaction against
u , • (W)the Hegelian Logic.
(45)
In his article "On The Logical Question in Hegel's System"
Trendelenburg advances the following three basic criticisms of
Hegel's beginning of his Logic. Firstly, the logic presupposes
more than pure thought. It also presupposes the concept of local
motion. Thus Hegel assumes movement. Secondly, pure being and
nothing are not mutually "intus-suscepted" or interpenetrating.
There is a complete levelling of both. And, thirdly, it is
(A3) This important point is often missed even by commentators on
Hegel. As M. Kosok has pointed out: "Findlay makes the mis¬
take of treating the universal ("this") as an abstraction from
a "concrete" sense experience which he regards as " ... already
well defined and definite to begin with, and that the process
of universalization dilutes as it were, the original concrete-
ness of the given. However, from Hegel's perspective, the
sensuous material, as well as the subject sensing the sensuous
material are both abstractions of the one concrete process of
experience". The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's
Phenomenology of The Spirit, P.208.
(A4) As G.S. Morris writes: .... "it is notorious that Trendelenburg
did more to weaken the credit of the Hegelian Logic both in
its "general and fundamental point of view", and in its "form",
than any one among his contemporaries". Vera on Trendelenburg,
Journal of Speculative Philosophy Vol. VIII, P.93.
(A5) J. Trendelenburg: The Logical Question in Hegel's System.
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1871, Vols. V, VI.
170.
impossible to think the identity of pure being and nothing, for
nothing appears to be less than pure being,
Trendelenburg's first criticism is developed along the following
lines. Hegel's logic claims to presuppose nothing but pure thought,
a pure thought that is completely free from the taint of the sensuous
or external element. It is by the creating from itself that the
logical is developed, not by the including of sensuous intuition.
Yet Trendelenburg argues that it is impossible to make one move from
pure thought without covertly presupposing some sort of imaginative
conception or intuition. Pure thought is thought purged of its
impurities it " ... lives apart from imaginative impure thought. If
it does not receive from the latter its daily bread, it dies
i rretrievably". Thus what Hegel really does in the beginning
is to introduce motion - not the pure activity of pure thought,
which is a movement, but the " ... movement of intuition, a geo¬
metrical movement which designs forms in the space of the imagination.
This local motion appeared as the presupposition of the presupposition-
(Z+7)
less logic". Pure activity need not necessarily lead anywhere. It
could be the mere static expression of pure thought. But why should
it lead to the categories elaborated in Hegel's logic - in particular
to Becoming? It is according to Trendelenburg, because Hegel drags
in the image of the intuitive, of movement leading somewhere that he
can seemingly show that pure thought creates through itself the logical
system. But, it is argued, this is an illegitimate move on Hegel's
(46) Ibid P.358.
(47) Ibid P.359= This criticism is still being made viz, F.Lombardi,
"After Hegel" in New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy Ed. W.E.
Steinkraus. P.224-5 (though here the criticism is merely
asserted dogmatical 1yi)
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own view of science. The self-development of pure thought would no
longer be a self-development. The system would be under the
guidance of some other agency.
How valid is this criticism? It would appear that Trendelenburg's
criticism is made from the position or point of view of a being who
has not yet reached or accepted the position of Absolute Knowledge -
the thinking in the form of the pure Concept, Hence he takes the
conception of pure thought to be separated from any relation to
experience instead of being its culmination. This point has been
made by various philosophers such as G,S, Morris, A,Bullinger and
H.G, Gadamer, Bui linger puts the point nicely as follows:
"
.,,, Trendelenburg entirely misconceived the "freedom from pre¬
suppositions" which Hegel required in the derivation of the cate¬
gories from the Immanence of pure thought. Thought which does not
comprehend the absolute notion, which goes outside of all experience
is aimlessly looking into mere vacancy cannot develop the categories
(149)
of logic". But the Concept is not outside of all experience,
it is nothing else but experience fully comprehended. If we reject
the Hegelian notion of identity of thought and being, then it is
only self-evident that if we make a beginning with pure thought we
will need to import some notions of being from foreign lands.
However, we find a difficulty with Hegel's beginning akin to the
one Trendelenburg points out above, and this concerns the movement
(*t8) G.S. Morris: op. cit. PP 92-9*4, A. Bullinger: Hegel's Doctrine
of Contradiction. Journal of Speculative Philosophy Vol. XXII,
PP 118-138. H.G. Gadamer: Hegel's Dialectic, P.10-11 and P.15.
(49) A, Bullinger, op. cit. P.128,
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from being to nothing and to becoming. It consists in this, that
Hegel points out that pure being passes over into non-being or
nothing, and nothing passes over into pure being. Now in what does
this 'passing-over' consist? Why, for instance should there not be
a perpetual passing over of pure being into nothing and vice versa
without the concept of becoming even arising?
Hegel points out that when we think pure being or pure nothing we find
that each 'immediate1y vanishes in its opposite'. There is not there¬
fore a 'passing-over', it has already occurred. Being has passed
over into nothing and vice versa. Further to this Hegel adds that
we do not have a relation present. Being and Nothing do not stand
in any relation, the transition from one to the other is non-relational.
Secondly, being and nothing are not concepts; the first concept
would appear to be becoming, a unity 11 ... whose moments, being and
nothing, are inseparable".^^ These 'moments' are abstract, and
are not self-subsistent. And thirdly, Hegel states that the dis¬
tinction between pure being and nothing does not lie in either but
in a third thing, namely in 'subjective opinion', though this con¬
ception does not belong in this exposition of the beginning.
The answer to the above questions would then seem to be that the
result of the analysis of the beginning yields the first concept -
becoming - which contains two 'moments', being and nothing as
negatively present - i.e. present as negated. The transition
(50) Science of Logic. P.103 (See also pages 73 and 7^)
(51) Science of Logic. P.93«
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has always already taken place between being and nothing; it is
the state of immediacy, the immediacy of becoming which is expressed
through the immediate transition or vanishing of its two moments.
But, the result qua result must be mediated (for it to be a result) -
it is thus a mediated immediate. Likewise being and nothing are
mediated immediates. For as expressions of reflection they are
(52)
immediate in relation to mediation. Now this brings up the
problematic introduction of the notion of subjective opinion. It
is this latter which serves as the basis for the distinction between
the moment of being and the moment of nothing. The introduction
(53)
of subjective opinion (or belief) at this point does give an
answer to the question of why thought passes from the non-relational
'vanishing' of being into nothing and nothing into being - but, it
seems, at the expense of pure thought. Pure thought ceases to be a
totally adequate standpoint, another (external) agency is involved.
Gadamer offers clarity on this point as follows:
"Thus if there is recourse to belief at the beginning of the Logic
that is only because we are still at the level of incipient thought,
or, put another way, because as long as we stay at the level of
Being and Nothing as what is indeterminate, determination, i.e.
thought, has not yet begun. For that reason the difference between
Being and Nothing is limited to belief.
(52) The phrase 'expression of reflection' is Hegel's cf. Science
of Logic P.69.
(53) The German Meinung has been rendered as subjective opinion
(Miller), intention (Johnstone and Struthers) and belief
(Gadamer) we have followed Miller's translation here.
Implied in this, however,









Gadamer argues that Hegel considers the question of how becoming
arises out of these two moments to be senseless. For being and
nothing are not self-subsis tent, they exist solely as vanishing or
as their opposite; which is becoming. This is why they are not
conceptual. They are pre-conceptua1 and do not stand in any
relation, for they are not determinations of thought. They are the
emptiness that is to be filled much as light and darkness are two emp¬
tinesses which allow for visual determination. Here, " .... pure
seeing is a seeing of nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are
two voids which are the same thing". Any thing is always seen
in terms of these two 'voids' much as any determination of becoming
is a determination in terms of being and nothing, that is, becoming.
This answers the question of why there is not a mere static passing-
over without development. Pure thought, in attempting to think pure
thought i.e. pure being in its immediacy, thinks nothing. But
there is thinking - the emptiness - which is these two moments.
Again Gadamer puts it succinctly as follows: "Whoever asks how
movement starts in Being should admit that in raising that question
he has abstracted from the movement of thought within which he finds
himself raising it. But instead, he leaves this reflection aside
(54) H.G. Gadamer op. cit. P.88
(55) Ibid P.9K (This is also what McGilvary is struggling to
say in his article on "The Dialectical Method". Mind 1898
Vol. VI I I, P.237).
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thinking it "external reflection". Certainly in Being just as in
Nothing, nothing determinate is thought But even if nothing
other than empty intuiting or thinking is present, the movement of
self-determination, that is, of Becoming, is there.
Trendelenburg's first criticism and our own difficulty in conceiving
of the nature of the movement in Hegel's Logic both arise when thought
separates itself from being and nothing and contemplates them in
this separation - i.e, thinks of them as standing in some relation.
Here thought is about being and nothing, and this signals a failure
in reaching the speculative level of thought. Implicit in the above
criticisms is the reassertion of the propositional form as the
expression of logic and of a logic of mere propositions. Hegel
continually reasserts the radical difference between the point of
view that takes being to be exclusive of nothing (and vice versa),
and the point of view that sees being not as being but as in trans¬
ition into nothing. These are two fundamentally different
points of view.
This brings us to Trendelenburg's second criticism. If being and
I
nothing are constantly passing over into each other (- or have
already done so) why do they not get levelled - annihiliated -
instead of being mutually "intus-suscepted"? If becoming is the
identity of being and nothing as thought, why should these two aspects
continue to move or be active? Where is the rea1 penetration?
(56) Ibid P.91.
(57) Science of Logic, P.56, P.90.
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Trendelenburg argues that in all of Hegel's most essential concepts,
such as finite/infinite, freedom/necessity etc., the real inter-
penetration is forced in from outside the purely logical domain.
Again Hegel would reply that Trendelenburg is arguing from the logic
of the understanding, where thought and being are separated. Hence
being and nothing require some agent to catalyse the penetration, and
of course Hegel could not logically provide such an agent given
this separation. This is why it is vitally important to grasp the
perspective of the Hegelian logician. The view that being and
nothing cease to be active in the identity that becoming is, states
only one half of the truth. For while it is true to say that in
becoming being and nothing are one, it is also equally true to say
that they are not identical. The statement of inactivity merely
seizes on the first identity statement and forgets the statement of
/ rg\
their non-identity - the negativity in the concept of becoming.
Thirdly, Trendelenburg argues that it is impossible to think the
identity of pure being and nothing, for nothing appears to be less
than pure being - viz. empty being. How can two such empty
abstractions complement each other so as to form the concept of
becoming? Here it might be argued that it is just impossible to
think of being without thinking of £ being, hence the nothing
would be less in terms of reality. This would, of course, again
reassert the separation of thought from being, that is, the attempt
to think about something (for Hegel this would be to move from the
consideration of pure being to the consideration of determinate being).
For Hegel thought is inclusive of its object, for Trendelenburg
(58) K. L°6with attacks this onesidedness in Trendelenburg, see
From Hegel to Nietzsche, P.55.
(59)
thought is exclusive of its object. All of Trendelenburg's
criticisms presuppose the point of view of one who has not trans¬
cended the limitations of this inadequate posture. Hegel would say
that if there is a difference between pure being and nothing, in what
does it consist? For the attempt to specify any difference would be
to give further determination to what is undetermined - it would be
to attempt the impossible.
I
This criticism of Trendelenburgs is also made by other philosophers.
J. Veitch states, "Nothing must always be less than Being". And
J~P. Sartre argues that Hegel overlooks the fact that when he says
that being and nothing "are empty abstractions, and the one is as
empty as the other", he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of
something. Being is empty of_ all other determination than identity
with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word we must
recall here against Hegel that being is and that nothingness is not".^
It can again be argued against Sartre that he takes only one side of
the transition to make his point. For when he says that being _i_s
and nothingness is not, it can equally be said that pure being
is not, and nothingness _i_s, for each is the state of transition into
the other. The attempt to think pure being is the attempt to think
nothing - the one passes over into the other.
(59) See McGilvary: The Presupposition question in Hegel's Logic
Philosophical Review 1897, Vol. 6. P. 501.
(60) J Veitch op. cit. P. CXVIi.
(61) J-P. Sartre. Being and Nothingness P. 15-
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But how acceptable is the criticism that Hegel could (we claim)
advance against Trendelenburg's three points? Does the argument that
Trendelenburg has failed to achieve the appropriate level of thought
refute the substance of his arguments - for this type of criticism
is a familiar one made by Hegel against such attacks?
It would appear that Hegel is justified in making the above type of
general criticism of those points of view that fail to reach the
speculative level of thought. Hegel has demonstrated that his system
rests on secure foundations which have been explicated in their
necessity. In doing this Hegel was required through the nature of
the subject matter itself to take account of all the forms of experi¬
ence possible, just as, if he was interested in the phenomena of
colour he would be concerned to lay bare the full spectrum. This
means that all philosophical points of view are in a sense included
in his explication and shown in what relation they stand to the
system as a whole. The sense in which they are included is that
Hegel provides the particular form or structure of knowledge which
subtends the philosophical point of view under consideration. Had
he not provided such an explication, then the criticism of
Trendelenburg would be untouched by the Hegelian reply, and we
would then require a perspective from which to view the adequacy or
inadequacy of such a criticism. Science, as we have already pointed
out, would demand this procedure. But Hegel does provide such an
explication or description - hence he throws the onus back onto
those who would wish to refute him. That is, Hegel demands that it
must first be shown upon what foundations Trendelenburg's criticisms
179 o
rest and how they avoid the philosophically prior criticisms already
(6 2)advanced by Hegel against such foundations. v
This latter could be achieved in a number of ways. Firstly, by
showing that the Hegelian system was incomplete and hence subsumable
within a more complete system. (Thus the Marxist criticism of Hegel
is that he provides the truth for self-consciousness but not for man.
A complete description of Totality (or the 'Absolute') is the phen¬
omenology of the historical process itself. It is not sufficient
to confine such a description to consciousness alone - it is the
whole concrete actually existing man with whom we are dealing. Marx
could thus claim to have completed the one-sidedness of the Hegelian
system. Hegel has given the view from the inside - how dialectical
thought attempts to provide an understanding of the way in which
one's own specific thought processes and the perspectives from which
they operate, limit the results of one's thinking. Marx, on the
other hand, could claim to have given the complete view by adding
the historical perspective in showing how dialectical thought, while
presupposing the Hegelian view in some ways, enables the thinker to
understand his own position in society and in history - and the
limits imposed on him by his own perspective, that is, his class
\(63)
pos111 on. )
(62) As Hegel says: "But the liberation from the opposition of conscious¬
ness which the science of logic must be able to presuppose lifts
the determinations of thought above this timid, incomplete stand¬
point and demands that they be considered not with any such
limitation and reference but as they are in their own proper
character, as logic, as pure reason". Science of Logic P. 51.
(63) On this point see F. Jameson: Marxism and Form P. 372.
Princeton University Press 1971.
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Secondly, one might show the shortcomings of adopting the Hegelian
system by demonstrating the lack of coherence in certain Hegelian
conceptions. This could be achieved by developing an alternative
phenomenology - this would indicate that in Hegel the "form of
necessity had failed to get its due". But unless a refutation of
the Hegelian arguments already advanced is provided, these same
arguments will be continually reiterated - each time the same
basic mistakes are made. From this standpoint - the scientific
standpoint - piecemeal criticism has no place. Criticisms must
be made from a scientific perspective with a 11 that this requires.
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THE NOTION OF THE BEGINNING - FURTHER CONSIDERED
3.3
Hegel gives as the first, purest most abstract definition of the
beginning of logic that it is the identity of identity and non-
identity. What does this mean?
Earlier on it was pointed out that pure being and nothing are not
concepts, they are not therefore related in the way any conceptual
determination would be to any other. They are pre-conceptual , and
are what the first most basic concept - becoming presupposes. Now
this situation can be viewed from two points of view. The first is
the point of view of the process of transition of pure being into
nothing and nothing into pure being. Neither moment can withstand
the other for there is a complete lack of determination. Yet they
are not the same. Hegel points out that " .... they are not the
same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are
unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in
its opposite."
Pure being (identity) passes over into nothing (non-identity) or
more correctly pure being is nothing. Now from the point of view
of the process, we can express this state of affairs by saying that
there exists the non-identity of identity and non-identity, meaning
by this that the 'passing-over' or vanishing process requires that
(64) Science of Logic P.74
(65) Science of Logic P.83.
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there should be a non-identity between pure being and nothing, (other¬
wise there would be no 'passing over1), But from a second point of
view, the process as a whole [i.e. becoming) we regain the unity
(identity) by viewing the state of transition of pure being into
nothing and vice versa as the unity into which both collapse. Be¬
coming is neither being or nothing but the "movement of the
immediate vanishing of the one In the other". The Logic is the
continual expansion or determination of unity (identity) - it is
one process of development. From this perspective we can say that
the beginning - becoming - which is a unity - is the identity of
pure being (identity) and nothing (non-ident?ty),
Both these ways of expressing the situation are the same, they
merely emphasize one aspect more than another. In the first per¬
spective, diversity or difference is emphasised - hence non-
identity, In the second, unity is emphasised (the process as a
whole) hence the identity of identity and non-identity. All levels
in both the Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia are examples of
this dual perspective. And the tension can be seen here, right
in the first concept - that negativity that is embodied in al1
concepts in this process of development. Each unity achieved
immediately expands into a diversity through the factor of nega¬
tivity, which is then held in its diversity but unified at a
higher - Hegel would say a more concrete - level.
This logic is not concerned only with given being - with elaborating
the static separate forms of a being that has already been deter¬
mined or given. It is concerned to describe the process of the
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becoming of being in its completeness. At its center is the opposite
of the law of identity - because it is the opposite of given being.
We are dealing with something (the Concept) being given - not with
given being, with process not stasis,
experience, experience - the being of
Becoming is the being of
(66)
becoming.
(66) "... experience contains identity in unity with difference"
Science of Logic p.415.
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IDENTITY, NON-IDENTITY AND CONTRADICTION
3.4
In the introduction it was stated that the knowledge of process is
just the process of knowledge. The attempt to provide the logos of
that which is being given is the attempt to grasp that which is
both what it is and not what it is. That which is being given
embodies both identity and non-identity - therefore it would seem
to follow that the discourse that reveals this process will be
in-itself affected by such a nature; it will be a perpetual tran¬
sition to a more adequate (concrete) account of this process.
Temporality destroys the adequacy (and therefore the satisfaction)
of the present account, for knowledge is essentially process.
Hegel's point is that the Concept (the complete system of knowledge)
(67)
is Time. "As to Time .... this is the concept itself in the
r r || (68)form of existence .
Thus any account that holds solely to the identity of being will be
an account that negates such process - negates the temporal nature
of knowledge as such - it will be an atemporal account. It will be
an account that takes no notice of the having got to the point of
being able to provide a discourse of being in its identity. It will
have to presuppose the coherence of its presupposed foundations. But
to focus on given being is to focus on only one side of being - for
(67) Cf. A. Kojeve: "A note on Eternity Time and the Concept" in
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.
(68) Phenomenology of Mind, p.104.
%
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given being is merely one aspect of the totality we seek to compre¬
hend; the other side being the being given nature of totality it¬
self of being in its relation to its other.
This two sidedness can be seen in the comprehension of any concept.
For example the boundary or limit of a concept is at the same time
both the limit for the concept and the limit for what it is not.
Understanding, in holding to identity must perforce fix on the in¬
side of the limit - the in-itself - it must stay within the limit
of each concept. This is the paralysis of the process. Equally
to concentrate solely upon the outside of the limit - the for
itself - would be to make being totally unintelligible - discourse
would be impossible. The unity of both these positions or sides
gives the concept both in its being (identity) and in its nothing
(non-identity) - it gives the concept in its becoming (in itself -
for itself).
Perhaps a more striking example of this dual process is that of human
being itself. We do not say of a living person that he is what he
a
is up to the present and no more - this would annihilate the future
for him. This would signal his death (" ... identity is merely the
determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; ... ").
But nor do we say that this person is some ineffable substance of
which we can only catch temporal glimpses. We take the person as
that which develops and becomes what he has it in him to be. Thus
at any temporal instant we would say that this person is of such and
such a character knowing full well that this typification is being
(69) Science of Logic. P.^39-
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transcended as we speak. We have the complete person when the person
is no morel Thus human being is both identity (that is given being),
and non-identity (the negation of this given being) in their unity.
And experience is - as we have said - just the being of becoming.
However we must further clarify these notions of identity and non-
identity.
It has been said that Hegel's logic has the opposite of the law of
identity at its core, that from the first concept onwards we find
both identity and non-identity in unity in each and every concept.
Prior to the first concept we have merely the state of indeter¬
minacy - whether at the level of the Phenomenology where there is
no distinction between self and other (hence no experience), or at
the level of pure logic (science) where there is no difference
between pure being and nothing.
However, once the attempt is made (at either level) to determine one
or the other - as soon as the first reflection or determination is
made (once we have an expression) we have immediately two determina¬
tions - one the negation of the other. Each needs the other (they
are correlative) yet each is the negation of the other. At the
phenomenological level experience begins with a first reflection -
it is a process of "separation from" to "relate to" something -
any relation separates and at the same time relates. Here we have
Spirit manifesting itself as a subject - object process. Both
subject and object have their being through the other and presuppose
the ground from which they appeared. Yet both have their negation
in the other.
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At the level of science the first determination (concept) is immed¬
iately two sided and presupposes the ground (pure thought) from
which it arises. Becoming is the identity of pure being that has
passed over into nothing and vice versa. It embodies both identity
and non-identity (negatively) in their unity. Thus at both levels
we begin with the identity of identity and non-identity - with the
unity of being and thought.
We can perhaps further develop this nature of all concepts by retur¬
ning to our previous examples of memory, and to the notions of
"negative presence" and "positive presence" developed by Kosok.
His analysis brings out the nature of this relationship - a doub1e
relationship - of identity and non-identity in their identity most
clearly.
Consider a present experience. It has a particular content or meaning
and a particular form - that of being the present experience. Yet
no sooner is it so than it is not. It ceases to be present, it is
past. Yet it is retained by us in memory. It is retained in the
present as past. It is a past present, present as past - that is,
it is negatively present. The positively present, i.e. the present
experience requires this negative presence of the previous experience;
for the present would be nothing (would have no meaning) without the
past or the future. We can say that the present is the future
grasped through the agency of the past. Memory is just this negative
(70) M. Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology
of the Spirit. (Unpublished Thesis - Columbia University 1964).
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presence which gives unity and meaning to the present - it provides
the ground. Likewise becoming is both the negative presence of pure
being and nothing but the positive presence of neither. There is
here a retention of both pure being and nothing as negated and this
is just the concept of becoming - the identity of identity and non-
identity. Now this retention of positive presence as negatively
present is no simple linear progression. We have here a continual
expansion of a unity at ever advanced levels. Hegel, in discussing
what he calls the absolute method (of the Concept) puts it as
follows: ".... at each stage of its further determination it raises
the entire mass of its preceding content, and by its dialectical
advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind,
but carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches
and consolidates itself".
Likewise a persons character or personality does not develop in a
mere collective fashion - it is the continual expansion of the sub¬
jects perspective and the enrichment of its content through the
negation and retention of past experiences. These latter give the
meaning to the present. We thus do not have a 'set1 of 'characters'
which collectively express a person^ character through time - such
discreteness would be laughable. There is but a continually develop¬
ing person. (As Kosok puts it: "The subject stands as the ever-
present past or "essence" or field of negative presence to
(71) Science of Logic p.840. Also P. 84.1. "The highest most concen¬
trated point is the pure personality which, solely through the
absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less embraces and holds
everything within itself, because it makes itself the supremely
free - the simplicity which is the first immediacy and
universality."
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which the objects appear as the ever present present of activity, and
their joint process is the ever-present future of subject-object
activity."
For there to be knowledge, there must be Time. Knowledge expresses
the temporal nature of its aspects through the negativity that drives
it on. Without negativity, without the negative presence of pure
being and nothing there could be no becoming, no time and hence no
knowledge. Time then can only be "the concept itself in the form
of existence." But, if we take the Hegelian proposition of the
identity of identity and non-identity logically, how is it possible
to avoid the charge of contradiction? If identity is the same as
non-identity (or difference) then it is not different from it - so
surely we have only one conception. This point raises the general
problem of the relation between traditional logic - which is based
on the laws of identity, excluded middle and contradiction - and dia¬
lectical logic, which latter is based on the 'law' of non-identity
and the development through contradiction. This point also bears
|;
directly on the notion of foundation - of having justified ones own
point of view - both with respect to Husserl, and to any non-Hegelian
logician. It is therefore necessary to examine these notions (i.e.
of identity, difference and contradiction) in some detail.
Traditional logic rests on the law of identity, and following from
this the laws of excluded middle (or difference) and of contradiction.
The law of identity can be expressed in the following manner: that
(72) m. Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology
of the Spirit, p.223.
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if A is anything at all, then A = A, and this relation is held to be
both transitive and symmetrical. Now the problem arises of how we
are to show that this law is a properly scientific production and
that it does not rest on mere presupposition. For it is generally
held by traditional logicians that no deductive proof of such a law
can be given that does not already presuppose this law.
There are various answers to this problem, such as, that it is plain
common sense that a thing is what it is and not another thing. Or
again it is stated that this law is intuitively obvious - it is
apodictica11y self-evident; it is the minimum presupposition of
rational thought itself. Yet these answers fail to satisfy the
Hegelian demand for a truly scientific beginning to logic. They
either presuppose identity in their arguments or else ground identity
in the non-discursive 'beyond'. It can immediately be replied to
the above answers that experience manifests just the opposite of
the law of identity (i.e. the being given nature of given being);
and, if this is the case, on what basis, or from what perspective do
we decide which point of view is correct? For the law would have to
be placed in suspension while under investigation. Thus we look for
the explication of the process of arriving at a logical point of
view, of arriving at the enunciation of the law of identity. It then
appears that an explication of such a type is the last thing such
logicians could provide. For upon closer consideration, these three
laws show themselves to be contradictory, and, from the point of view
of traditional logic, unrelated. Hegel puts the point succinctly as
fol1ows:
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"The several propositions which are set up as absolute laws of
thought, are, therefore, more closely considered, opposed to one
another, they contradict one another and mutually sublate them¬
selves. if everything is identical with itself, then it is not
different, not opposed, has no ground. Or, if it is assumed that
no two things are the same, that is, everything is different from
everything else, then A is not equal to A, nor is A opposed to A,
and so on. The assumption of any of these propositions rules out
the assumption of the others. The thoughtless consideration of
them enumerates them one after the other so that there does not
(73)
appear to be any relation between them.
Further to this Hegel claims that there is no good reason why these
"single determinations of reflection" - that is, identity, difference,
and contradiction should alone be held as the absolute laws of thought.
We could with equal right include all the other categories so far
developed in Hegel's logic - that is, all the "determinatenesses of
the sphere of being." There is thus a lack of necessity in the way
such laws are developed.
Further to this, Hegel, in the above quoted passage is drawing attention
(74)
to the central weakness of such determinations of reflection. For
when it is said that if no two things are the same then A is not equal
to A, Hegel is arguing that there can be no relation between these
two things at all. For there to be a relation of any sort, the two
(73) Science of Logic, P.All.
(7^) In the Little Logic, Hegel points out that the weakness of such
a consideration - Le.taking Identity as a category of reflection
and hence abstractly - " .... is the touchstone for distinguishing
all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of
philosophy." P.214.
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things must differ in some respect, yet this is just what is being
denied. There can be no such relation as, for example, identity
simpliciter. For such 'pure' relations are not determinations at
all but "the absence of determination." Let us consider this weakness
in more detai1 .
The law of identity states the truth for mere abstract identity -
because it separates the object from the subject, and then separates
the object from its ground (or manner of existing in this world).
We are left with a formal monad. This sort of consideration
separates the object from the subject in that the reflection on
A which gives rise to the expression of identity, plays no part in
the determination of A as self-identical. As Hegel has pointed out
"
.... the law of identity already contains the movement of reflec-
(75)
tion ... , it is a product of reflection. Unless this reflec¬
tion is grasped as an essential moment or aspect of identity, the
latter collapses into the abstract - and we get the violation of the
law whenever it is asserted. (This latter point will be considered
in more detail shortly).
Secondly, if focuses on A in its being as abstracted from all relation
to the Whole (or world). It thus becomes a static timeless being -
it is A merely "in-itself" in exclusion from A "for itself". But by
such an abstraction it fails to determine A at all. A as self-
identical is still i ndetermi nate. It cannot be said of A in
(75) Science of Logic p.4l6.
(76) Ibid. p.413.
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what its identity consists because identity here excludes difference.
This is why Hegel says that this sort of identity can have no
ground - for it is not opposed to anything. Identity, as determinate
is the opposite of this because it has negated its own identity. The
process of being determined is just the process of cancelling abstract
identity - indeterminate identity - through difference. A = A, as
the expression of identity is held to be a tautology, and to be
contentless - yet it has difference at its center. For the proposi¬
tion sets out to determine A, and determination is d? fference. Hence
in attempting to determine A as self-identical, A must stand out
against itself to be so related, Hegel says that "Such identical
talk therefore contradicts itself. Identity, instead of being in
its own self truth and absolute truth, is consequently the very
opposite; instead of being the unmoved simple, it is the passage
beyond itself into the dissolution of itself." Therefore what
the assertion of identity states is much more than, and wholly
different from the abstract identity - the "In-itselfness" in
exclusion from relation - as held by the traditional view of this law.
The propositional form itself destroys the simple A in its passage
beyond A to determine A as self-identica1 - reflection has entered,
there is negativity in the content. The law of identity then, goes
much further than the assertion of abstract identity, it asserts in
fact the exact opposite. Identity is " .... the determination of
/ 78)
identity as against non-identity" - or else it is an indeter¬
minate. We note here that McTaggart in his commentary on Hegel's
Logic, completely ignores this point that Hegel stresses, viz. that
(77) Ibid p.415.
(78) Ibid p.413. We give an elaboration of this process in Section 6.
The Dialectic Process).
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The law of identity is contradictory in that it leads one to expect
a further determination which it does not give, i.e. "A is .... "
then "A is A". This is a negation of determination, a contra-
i; _ J. ; _ _ (79)cii c11ono
The law of excluded middle states that anything must be either A or
not A (-A). This means that A and not A are separate and can be
written A # -A. Now two problems immediately arise. The first is,
how do we reach negation from the identity which was purely affirma¬
tive? The law of identity gave us the indeterminate A - the self-
identical monad. Now this law is asserting opposition - no two things
are the same - but not giving any basis upon which such an opposition
or difference could be reached. The law of identity provides no
basis, for, as was shown above, there is no relation - no for-itself-
ness - hence difference now turns out to be a lack of difference. As
Hegel points out, if everything is different then A is not equal to
A, nor is A opposed to A. This can be put in another way. Negation
cannot be derived from affirmation alone without collapsing the dis¬
tinction between these two concepts. Difference is difference of
something - negation is negation of something. The law of identity
by excluding the reflective process, failed to provide such a deter¬
minate being. It provided merely indeterminate being - ultimately
(79) J.McTaggart: Commentary on Hegel's Logic, S.110, P.105° McTaggart
says here that the law of Identity is a complete tautology, 11 ....
its truth rests, not on identity in difference, but on the absence
of all difference". Hegel would argue that an identity without
difference is not an identity at all, it is an indeterminate.
It is just this point that McTaggart fails to grasp. He goes on
to say, "That A is A would surely be quite consistent with the
facts that A is not B, that A and C are polar opposites, and
that A and D have a Ground E". (P.106). If A = A simpliciter,
then it is groundless because indeterminate.
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reducible to one formal monad. Thus to be consistent the logician
must posit difference as another fundamental axiom to complement the
law of identity - but cannot show in a properly logical (i.e,
scientific) manner the connection between the two. There is a
separation between identity and difference, which because the ground
of such a separation is excluded, is not seen as an opposition.
Secondly, the law of excluded middle, taken by itself, also turns out
upon further consideration to be internally contradictory. In order
to specify difference it is necessary to affirm the identity of the
determination in which the two differ. Without providing this
affirmation it is impossible to obtain determinate being. As Rosen
puts it, " .... if we assert separately -A ^ A, then no two things
are the same, in which case there is no basis for them to be compared
or related.
A universe of radically disjunct monads, however, provides no basis
for distinguishing one from the other." Again difference
cannot coherently be taken in separation from identity anymore than
identity can be taken in separation from difference. One of neces¬
sity involves the other, they are opposed and therefore related
moments. This is why Hegel says that the assumptions of any of the
propositions involved in either of the two laws rules out the
assumptions of the other. Because the separation of identity from
difference is laid down (together with the exclusion of the reflec¬
tive process) at the beginning, we get a series of contradictions
both in the laws themselves and in their relation to each other.
(80) S. Rosen. G.W.F. Hegel P.116.
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Hegel sees this situation collapsing through opposition into a
more thoughtful consideration, where contradiction is seen as the
unity of the diverse moments of identity and difference. However,
we need to consider the law of contradiction as traditionally
expounded before further specifying the Hegelian viewpoint.
The law of contradiction states that nothing can be both A and not A.
Contradiction is impossible in the sense of something existing that
has both of two contradictory qualities - or is typified by two
contradictory predicates. This poses many problems.
First, how is one to conceive of this law of contradiction, for the
traditional statement of it fails to show this? If one is dealing
with given being in separation from reflection and from the concrete
process of experience (ignoring for the minute whether this is, or
is not possible), then the law of contradiction asserts correctly,
but how small is its truth; that a something is characterised as
being of a particular determination, or not of a particular deter¬
mination, but not of both determinations. The difficulty with this
"small" truth is that it reduces to nullity - for the law of contra¬
diction merely expresses the result of the two previous laws. The
laws of identity and of excluded middle were shown to stand in
contradictory relation if conceived in traditional terms. The
assertion of identity without difference reduced to a lack of deter¬
mination as did the assertion of difference without an underlying
identity. Therefore how can a law that embodies these two aspects
fare any better?
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Secondly, by dealing with given being, with a well formed and atemporai
universe, contradiction must result in nullity - in a return to ground
as Hegel says, for the only recourse upon arriving at a contradiction
is to return to the pre-contradictory state of affairs in the hope of
being able to provide a better account that avoids such a contra¬
diction,, This is an impossible task„ To recognise the true signifi¬
cance of a contradiction is to move from the consideration of given
being in itself to the perspective of given being being given through
the reflective process itself,, Hegel says in his Early Theological
Writings that " .... what is a contradiction in the realm of the dead
(8l)
is not one in the realm of life", meaning by this that contra¬
diction is not nullity but the expression of life itself,, Life is
itself the refutation of such a law„ Thus when Hegel says that life
is "an infinitely finite, an unrestricted restrictedness" he means
that life is just the process of developing through contradiction,
because life grasps the contradictory moments of itself in their
unity. We shall have more to say on this score in the following
section on reflection. But, in proleptic fashion we can add the
following. When Hegel says that everything is inherently contra¬
dictory he means that the act of positing itself reveals contradiction.
Indeed " .... every determination, every concrete thing, every Concept,
is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable moments,
which by virtue of the determinate essential difference, pass over
into contradictory moments."
(81) Early Theological Writings, p.261.
(82) Science of Logic, p„4420
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It must here be remembered that with the unity of thought and being
(the absolute point of view) every concept contains opposites in
unity - each is an identity of identity and non-identity. Now, the
expression of a contradiction, qua expression, is a reflection. Even
simple immediacy itself is an expression of reflection. As such, every
expression propounded of necessity excludes another expression that
is not propounded. Reflection is driven on in an attempt to rectify
/o-j)
this situation. It seeks the adequate discourse - the Concept -
which is the Whole fully conscious of itself as the Whole: it is
Time. Each reflection is a temporal act seeking to grasp Totality
itself - Time itself. This does not mean that reflection is involved
in an impossible task (because it is a contradictory task). It is
not an impossible task because reflection is not an abstract identity.
Rather it is a questioning process, which by determining something in
opposition to itself leads to "higher order" comment on both the
determinations made and the thought position or point of view from
which these were made. This is what the traditional logician fails
to cognize. Unconvinced of the point of view of absolute knowledge -
of the unity of being and thought - he fails to see the transition
of one determination into its opposite, and hence the need for con¬
sciousness to reconcile any of its categories. Movement lies
totally outwith his domain. Hegel thus reviews the antinomies and
contradictory formulations these logicians provide of such categories
as finite/infinite; part/whole; universa1/particular; immediacy/
mediacy; identity/non-identity; concrete/abstract; etc. They fail
to see that the negativity in each concept or category (that is, the
(83) See Early Theological Writings, p.312.
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reflective process itself) leads any determination as a negation (or
difference) into opposition and into contradiction„ Language itself
gives expression to contradiction because experience is in itself
contradictory (as was pointed out earlier). It is when contradiction
is expressed that progress is made, "Only when the manifold terms
have been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active
and lively towards one another, receiving in contradiction the
negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of self-movement and
spontaneous activi ty." The expression of contradiction effects
the transition to a point of view that is able to reconcile such
contradiction, through a more adequate (i,e„ complete) discourse,
Bosanquet puts the point nicely when he says that contradiction is
"
.... an unsuccessful or obstructed Notion: Notion a successful or
(Or)
frictionless contradiction," Contradiction does not reduce
to nullity because the negation of a determination is itself part
of the totality we seek to comprehend. Contradiction is 'aufgehoben1,
that is, negated yet retained as negated - it is negatively present.
There is then no abiding contradiction in the Hegelian Science - due
to this notion of negative presence.
Identity and non-identity are thus negatively present (but positively
absent) in every concept - they are distinguishable but inseparable
moments. And any particular concept is insufficient to the task of
comprehending Totality or the Whole due to this negative presence.
This insufficiency generates for thought the movement to completion -
to the complete discourse. Negativity in contradistinction to
(84) Science of Logic, P.442.
(85) B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, P.232.
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nothing provides this vitality, this activity leading somewhere0
Nothing - nullity - terminates discourse,, But contradiction properly
understood does not lead to nullity because reflection is embodied
in, not excluded from the result. This is to say that contradiction
is not final, Kojeve puts this point as follows: "Negativity
(86)
differs from Nothingness in that it is inserted into Totality."
In the consideration of these three laws of thought it is evident that
there is at least one fundamental fault. They presuppose a point of
view that has not transcended the opposition of thought and thing.
The laws thus bare contradictory relations to each other, they are
unscientifically developed, and they are contradictory in themselves.
There is a collapse of identity into non-identity and vice versa;
there is a collapse of negativity into nothingness; there is a
collapse of determination into indeterminacy. There is a failure
to show in scientific fashion the necessity of such 'laws'. Hegel
rightly stresses this point time and again. No vital study of logic
can be made until one is convinced of the point of view of absolute
knowledge. The Hegelian logician does not take thought as exclusive
of thing - as being a merely mediating activity taking place between
the self in separation from the world of things - he sees thought as
i ncl us i ve of thing, and thing as Jjnclusive of thought. Thought is
this 'begreifendes Denken' that "grips its object as its own inalien-
(871
able possession", and it does so through the process of experience.
(86) A. Kojeve. Op. Cit. p.23^. In terms of the earlier example con¬
cerning memory the same point can be made. Negation giving nothing¬
ness would be equivalent to a total loss of memoryl On this see
M. Kosok. The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic, p.605°
(87) See McGilvary: The Presupposition Question in Hegel's Logic.
Philosophical Review, 1897, P.502.
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It is thus possible to provide the following contrast. Traditional
logic is dualistic, Hegel's logic is monistic (though not a monism by
reducing one aspect to the other - difference does not vanish here).
Traditional logic is concerned with given being in abstraction from
the thought process, of being in exclusion from negativity - Hegel's
logic is concerned with the being given nature of Totality, From
the former perspective it is not surprising that such propositions
as "the identity of identity and non-identity" appear incom-
prehensible.
We need to now return to experience and clarify the process whereby
thought is able to grasp its object in its truth. It is therefore




"Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within
(88)
its experience". All knowledge is a product of experience - to
be known is to be experienced. Against Husserl (and Kant) all know¬
ledge begins with experience and also arises from experience.
There are no transcendent forms waiting outside experience, to make
it intelligible when it comes on the scene. There are not for Hegel
two types of experience; real experience - where, the subject receives
sensations, and an ideal experience of the apriori ideal forms or
logical forms separate from this real experience, by which such real
experience is to be moulded. Before experience, there is for Spirit
as consciousness nothing, for no determination has yet been made. There
is then no subject, no object, no consciousness, no knowledge, no ideas,
no discourse, no form, no content, no meaning, no reflection and no
language for consciousness. There is but indeterminacy or lack of any
form of relationship. Hegel later typifies this stage of spirit prior
to experience as that of "soul or natural spirit", as immediate or
impl ici t spi ri t.
Still experience does begin and there are things known. How? Experi¬
ence begins with this immediacy becoming mediated. It is an act in
which a subject - consciousness - " ... distinguishes from itself
something, to which at the same time it relates itself ...
(88) Phenomenology of Mind p.96
(89) See Bail lie "everything falls within experience and experience
contains all reality and even the appearance of reality"
Phenomenology of Mind p.44.
(90) Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Vol.I p.79.
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(91)there is something for consciousness". Just as in perception
it is not until one looks at something that there is a "looker"
and a "looked at" - that there is perception, likewise it is not
until this distinguishing from and relating to activity that there
is a subject and an object - that there is experience. But why
does this act occur, why does experience begin?
The act occurs due to the nature of the Whole, Spirit, or the Absolute.
It is this nature that is set forth in the phenomenological descrip¬
tion of experience. It is therefore impossible to provide an account
of this discourse without eo ipso providing the complete discourse.
The description of the nature of the Whole cannot be anticipated nor
intuitively presupposed. Temporality cannot be collapsed into the
present so that the question concerning the nature of the Whole can
be answered. To do so would be to make process incomprehensible.
The question itself presupposes the completion of certain experiences
so that the meaning of the question is conveyed, i.e. that the
question is taken as a question. It also presupposes the completion
of the discursive elaboration of the Whole for its answer.
We could, in proleptic fashion say that it is the factor of negativity
that generates the Whole, but then the question would again recur,
only this time it would turn on the nature of negativity. It would
be a process of attempting to ground conceptions, and show their
meanings, a process which would in the end result in the elaboration
(91) Phenomenology of Mind P.139.
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of the complete discourse. Knowledge must be patient - there are
no quick and easy-roads to truth. It must first be shown what is
involved in each and all possible forms of experience before such
questions can be answered. We need to know what is meant by such
terms as truth, knowledge, consciousness, experience etc. These
terms presupposes a significance which has yet to be achieved.
In Part I it was argued that Husserl fails to provide an adequate
account of the meaning of such terms because he fails to show how
they arose in the first place. It is unclear what Husserl meant by
the term experience both because he failed to provide a systematic
elaboration of this concept before he employed it; and, also, be¬
cause he changed his view as to what constituted experience as his
philosophy developed. That is - from a somewhat Kantian conception
in his early works to the conception of pre-predicative experience
(given expression in such works as Experience and Judgement)later
on. Science demands that the necessity of the conceptions be demon¬
strated, that the understanding of the nature of the above terms
is shown to be based on a coherent, true and necessary point of view.
To return to Hegels account of experience - it is when the immediacy
becomes mediated by consciousness distinguishing from itself, its
'other1, that experience begins. So from this immediacy or 'feeling
soul' or 'pure ego' which is a unity we get division - the subject -
object complex. We could perhaps express the same thing by saying
that Spirit, (.the Absolute, or Time) becomes other to itself by
presenting itself in time, as appearing - as a series of shapes of
itself. Hegel says that consciousness is the immediate existence
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of Spirit - immediate in that it does not know itself but is also
presented with the necessity of coming to know itself as Spirit as
its end. Thus Spirit (a unity) presents itself in a subject
(consciousness) - object complex (in difference); that is, as
experience which culminates in Spirit knowing itself through its
experience, (as a unity in difference - a difference in unity,). This
is a self-generating process.
The moment of consciousness appears as the moment of separation into
the distinction between consciousness and object. This separation
is effected by Spirit as consciousness. "In consciousness there is
(92)
one element for an other." Consciousness distinguishes itself
by distinguishing the other and this other is for consciousness an
immediate. Now consciousness is, according to Hegel " .... on the
one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness
of itself; consciousness of what to it is true; and consciousness
of its knowledge of that truth. Since both are for the same
(93)consciousness it is itself their comparison."
It is through the nature of consciousness that both truth and know¬
ledge are compared. Previously when it was said that "consciousness
distinguishes from itself something to which at the same time it
relates itself" Hegel was showing that through this activity both
truth and knowledge of truth are present and related. When con¬
sciousness distinguishes from itself, it posits an object as over
(92) Ibid p. 1^0 Hegel calls this mode of Spirit "Spirit in relation¬
ship or particularization" Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective
Spirit Vol.1 p.79.
This is contrasted with spirit as immediate or natural. In this
work this anthropological development comes before and is the
presupposition for the phenomenological development. This raises
the question as to the relationship of the Phenomenology of Spirit
to the entire system, a question which seems to have no definite
answer.
(93) Phenomenology of Mind P . 141.
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against itself, i.e. as external to it, as in itself. But to dis¬
tinguish from is ipso facto to relate to, otherwise there could not
be any basis for distinction. Hence consciousness also posits an
object as for it, as related to it. Consciousness is thus complex.
Consciousness is always consciousness of an object but this con¬
sciousness has the above two sides And consciousness compares
itself in its distinguishing activity with itself in its relating
activity. Consciousness examines itself, 'it is itself their
comparison1.
Hegel says with perfect consistency that consciousness compares its
consciousness of what for it is true, i.e. the object in itself,
with its consciousness of its knowledge of that truth, i.e. as
related to it. it compares its truth with its certainty. It is
this comparison that characterises experience. And if the knowledge
of the object does not correspond with what consciousness takes the
object to be in itself, consciousness 11 ... seems bound to alter its
knowledge in order to make it fit the object. But in the altera¬
tion of the knowledge the object itself also, in point of fact is
altered; .... with change in the knowledge the object also becomes
different since it belonged essentially to this knowledge." Any
change in the 'distinguishing from' aspect is a change in the
'relating to' aspect. Consciousness is always a consciousness of
something and something is always something for consciousness.
Analyzing one brings the other into view - they are mutually mediating.
Thus as Hyppolite points out "The theory of knowledge is at the same
(9A)
time a theory of the object of knowledge."
(9A) Hyppolite Op. Cit. p.23.
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Experience is then the process - the dialectical process - of con¬
sciousness examining itself; examining both its knowledge of the
object and the object of this knowledge by the standard or criterion
of the consciousness in question. The standard - immanent in con¬
sciousness - implies conditions that both moments of the experience
of consciousness need to fulfil. Each successive collapse of the
form of knowledge due to the contradiction between the object as con¬
sciousness knows it, and the object as it is in itself, gives rise to
a new form of knowledge in which the previous experience is now the
object - the experience of the object becomes the object of experience.
There is a continual attempt made by consciousness to construe the
object as providing the objectivity of knowledge. This however trans¬
poses itself in the activity of consciousness - objectivity moves from
the side of the object to the side of the subject. Or to put the
matter differently, consciousness finds itself in its object and its
object in itself. Consciousness thus finds the situation as follows:
"What at first appeared as object is reduced, when it passes into
consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the implicit
nature, the real in itself becomes what this entity, per se is for
consciousness: this latter is the new object, whereupon there
appears also a new mode or embodiment of consciousness of which the
essence is something other than that of the preceding mode. It is
this circumstance which carries forward the whole succession of the
(35)
modes or attitudes of consciousness in their own necessity".
Experience has its necessity, it is Spirit or the Whole on the way to
the knowledge of itself through its various necessarily interconnected
appearances. The description of this process is the phenomenology
of Spirit.




Hegel's Phenomenology is the description of consciousness1s trans¬
formation from naive to scientific consciousness (Reason). As such
it is the description of a dialectic process. This description is
presented in two ways. Firstly, it is presented to us, to the
philosophical consciousness observing the experience that con¬
sciousness is immersed in. Here Hegel specifies the contradiction
lying in the object of consciousness as well as the contradiction
lying in the consciousness of this object. We are here able to see
the contradictory knowledge that emerges from this mode of experience
and see its resolution into a more adequate mode. Secondly, Hegel
describes the dialectic from the point of view of the consciousness
under consideration - that is how _i_t is able to grasp the experience
it is involved in so that it is led to change its understanding
of its object.
These two presentations differ since the significance of each par¬
ticular form of knowledge can only be adequately grasped, i.e.
grasped in its necessity - grasped scientifically - from the point
of view of the Whole or Absolute Knowledge. So the ful1 signifi¬
cance of the contradictory state of affairs that consciousness is
involved in at any particular level of knowledge, will not be known
to that consciousness. We see the development of the object of
consciousness and correlative1y the consciousness of the object as
arising out of the preceding relationship through the negation of
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that mode of knowledge whereas the consciousness immersed in the
experience claims to have discovered a new object. This 'new'
object is for us the experience of the previous experience, such
that the knowledge of the first object becomes our second object.
The new object is in truth .... "the experience concerning that
first object". We seek now to elaborate on the way this new
object arises (- the "dialectic process which consciousness
executes on itself.").
To make a start we need remind ourselves that throughout the des-
• /
cription of naive consciousness education to the level of science
there is only one content involved - that is, the Whole, Spirit,
in its various presentations. The process is a continual deter¬
mination of this content, which by determining it, develops it.
As we have said consciousness is the immediate existence of Spirit
(or the Whole) and is as such the beginning of such a determination,
because consciousness is not merely separated off from a reality
(or object) but both consciousness of an object and consciousness
of itself. It is Spirit that is " .... the self-supporting
absolutely real ultimate being. All the previous modes of conscious¬
ness are abstractions from it. They are constituted by the fact
that Spirit analyses itself, distinguishes its moments, and halts at
each individual mode in turn. The isolation of such moments pre¬
supposes spirit itself, and requires spirit for its subsistence,
in other words, this isolation of modes only exists within spirit,






Spirit is then the ground out of which experience arises and to which
it returns. It is the one content of the whole phenomenology. We
thus find the criticisms of Hegel, to the effect that he has
merely reduced being to the thought about being, as being unfounded.
Spirit is not mind. Spirit is the all of which at a particular
level of experience mind becomes present as an integral aspect. Hegel's
Spirit is monistic - a unity, but a unity of opposites. Idealism and
realism equally miss this point. Spirit is the ground out of which
these distinctions arise it is not the particular philosophical
expression of one form of experience. And, because it is negativity -
an unrest - it develops its content (through the development of
experience). It is the going beyond itself through expansion to
recover itself.
Now Hegel says of consciousness that it " .... is to itself its own
(99)
concept". That is, consciousness is to itself its own appearance
or posit. Consciousness is then both itself and also outside itself,
attempting to comprehend itself - to examine itself. To do this con¬
sciousness must be other than merely self-identica1. It must be the
(TOO
unity of identity and difference and it is this through experience.
Consciousness is thus complex - onto logica11y complex.
Consciousness examines itself in the sense that each experience it has
(98) This is the general Marxist argument against Hegel.
(99) Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p.138. On this point see Heidegger:
1 Hegels Concept of Experience1 p.76-85.
(TOO) Hegel Science of Logic P.^15, 11 ••• experience contains identity
in unity with difference". (See also our previous section on
Identity and Non-identity).
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becomes an object for consciousness' next experience. As has been
said, the new object that consciousness considers is llthe experience
concerning that first object". And that experience - any experience -
is but the process of consciousness examining both the object of its
knowledge and the knowledge of its object. Hegel's point is that
this examining is an expansion of a unity but which continues to be
a unity none the less. We can perhaps consider Kosok's attempt to
clarify this point as his description of the process of experience
brings out this peculiar character of the type of relation that
occurs in experience, and also highlights how this illustrates the
difference between the dialectical and traditional logics.
We said earlier that reflection is embodied in every expression,
even in the expression of immediacy itself. What does this mean?
It means that there is no such thing as an immediacy that stands
apart from consciousness and which is capable of affecting it. For
to reflect on anything is to mediate it. Reflection is the setting
of an object for a subject, in which the object is an object for a
subject and the subject is a subject through its process of revealing
or reflecting on its object. This is to say that in any reflective
process there is a mutual mediation of each through the other. To
say that there is an immediate - some kind of brute given or simple -
is also to say that it is a mediated immediate, that it is only a
given for a subject. And it is also to say that such a state of
affairs is contradictory - for either it is immediate and thus not
mediated or it is mediate. So what can such a mediate immediate be?
Z I Zs
Suppose we call such a postulated immediacy A. Then to determine it
as A is to go beyond the initial state of affairs. It is to assert
that A is present in the field of consciousness, or that A is not
present. "Thus the very act of affirming an immediacy, asserting
or announcing a given, or recognizing what _i_s present, is to set up
the condition for its negation, since to affirm is to reflect, and
allow for the possibility of negation. That which is initially given
can be referred to positively as that which is present (called "posi¬
tive presence") and negatively as that which is lacking (called
"negative presence" since the given makes itself evident as a
lack)". <""»
The immediacy as such, cannot be comprehended. For to be so would be
to presuppose an already existent universe of discourse (i.e. an
accepted set of ideas etc.), it would be to already have had some
11-02)
experience. Reflection thus introduces through its own activity
a development of the initial unity. Kosok puts the point succinctly
as follows:
"Thus reflection on an original indeterminate element A quantifies
this element into two determinate modes: itself (its-self) and its-
other functioning as alternatives and in this state defines a
reflected universe of discourse/A/. Assertion and negation (i.e.
(A) and (-A)) are hence functions of reflection. It should be
mentioned however, that both A and -A, pure immediacy of the given,
and pure negation, are _pre-reflected in nature even though -A
(101) M. Kosok: The Formalization of Hegels Dialectical Logic p.598.
(102) See M. Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomeno
logy of the Spirit, p. 252-3-
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appears as the gap in the process of reflection. This means that
the first reflected state reveals two component elements prior to
itself: the given and the transition from the given (A and -A).
Thus the state of immediacy in its prereflected mode cannot be
looked upon as a static state void of negation, for this would not
allow for the process of reflection to arise and yield the reflected
state as its result." ^3)
Reflection therefore transforms A into the assertion of A, (A),
which then implies the assertion of the negation of A, (-A).
Reflection transforms a pre-formal, pre-reflected, pre-positive
or negative content A into a determined A. The act of reflection
is that which transforms A, producing the assertive or determinate
quality of A. Kosok sees such an act as issuing in a new unity
a' as determined by consciousness (i.e. within a context of mediation).
This new unity is expresssed as (A) f—) (-A), and this new unity
can then be taken as the object of a further reflection (as we have
previously stated,the experience of the object becomes the object of
experience). But this further reflection transforms the new object
through the act of reflection itself and resets it within a further
context of mediation - a new universe of discourse. The process is
thus ontological as well as dialectical. We have a meta level
transformation - and this is the nature of reflection, to a 1 ways
involve higher order comment on an experiential form previously








(the original immediacy (unity)l in an ever expanding universe of
discourse such that the one content is continually re-establishing
its own unity through the distinguishing action of reflection.
Let us further explicate this process. Reflection begins with an
unreflected content, the initial immediacy A. To reflect on A is
to reset A in a context, i.e. in relation to consciousness. The
assertion of A is accomplished through a context which is the
negation of A. A is determined as A over against or as limited by
what _i_t_ i s not.
Therefore both the assertion of A and the negation of A are required -
they are correlative, they are mutually mediating. This process then
has the following characteristics: it has one content A; it has two
forms, assertion (A) and negation (-A); it has three phases; the
reflection on A produces the assertion of what is, i.e. (A), the
assertion of A implies negation (-A), and this negation implies
assertion such that both are correlative - what Kosok calls self-
negation (A) f—) (-A) , ^'"^or A7 . In this result both (A) and
(-A) have been negated, yet retained as negated, as moments in a more
determined unity. Both are negatively present in A/.
This expression (A) {—> (-A) is called the principle of Non-I dentity.
It expressed the fact that the result contains both (A) and (-A)
as negatively present but positively absent. If A is presented both
as (A) and (-A) than a contradiction exists. But if A is presented
as A' where both (A) and (-A) are not present as such but are in the
(105) Kosok: The Formalization of Hegels Dialectical Logic, p.599.
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state of passing over into their opposite then no violation of the
law of contradiction occurs. ^^ A then expresses the immediate A
mediating itself into two contrary moments, neither of which can
stand in separation from its other.
It is in this formulation of the principle of Non-identity that the
difference between traditional logic and dialectical logic can be
precisely delineated. in traditional logic the determination of A
as self-identica1 does not involve any context of mediation, there
is thus no transformation of the content A. It is essentially an
atemporal account. A has been already fixed by definition and is
not influenced by any contextual modification or reflective process.
But as has been shown in the earlier consideration of the law of
identity, it is not possible to understand such a law. For any
attempt to do so is ipso facto to reflect on A in its identity, and
this transforms the law of identity into its opposite. As Kosok
remarks, "The law of identity is not false: it is simply empty
since "A is A" is not definable within a temporal context .... it
operates within a system in which the ambiguity of definition is
eliminated by fiat. Thus every element is well-formed in-itself,
and is not influenced by contextual relatedness." ^
Non-identity expressed the other side of the question. To specify
A as self-identica1 is, we have seen, to have specified A as A
(106) Though the law of excluded middle is violated. Cf. Kosok.
The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegels Phenomenology of
Spirit, P.115.
(107) ibid, p.611 .
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insofar as it is not not A. That is, A cannot be defined as self-
identical in a temporal logic without at the same time defining
it as non-identical. Identity could only be expressed through a
complete and consistent discourse where all content had been given.
But if this has not been achieved then we have the process of the
content being determined through the reflective process, a process
which of necessity produces continually higher order unities
through meta-level analysis. The expression (A) <—> (-A) indicates
the incompleteness of the determination of A, and is then capable
of being further reflected upon such that this specification of A
is transformed and expressed in a more adequate manner - more adequate
because more of the content has been determined or made explicit.
This development is, further, a one way temporal process. It
follows that if reflection transforms the content of the object
reflected upon, then it is impossible to ever return to the position
prior to reflection. This "non-conservative" nature of the temporal
development in dialectical logic is due to the inseparability of
content from its context of mediation. "Thus negations are "non-
conservative", since an attempted return or repet?tion from the
initial A to not A and back to the initial A by means of a double
negation retains within its representing structure the activity of
movement that has generated the A which appears as a resu1t of
negation: one cannot return unmodified to the original state."
In traditional logic, —A can be replaced by A, because A is abstract
(108) Ibid p.605.
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and separate from the reflective process. Dialectical logic is
unable to treat double negation as affirmation because (A) and (-A)
are not logical contradictions due to the way (A) and (-A) are
related, i.e. (A) 4 » (-Al. Thus by negating the result of the
first reflection on the immediacy A we obtain -(A) and -C~A). In
traditional logic this would amount to holding -(A) and (A) - a
contradiction. But dialectical logic holds that neither -(A) nor
-(-A) can be positively present - they are negatively present in
the one result (A) ^—» (-A), i.e. A7. And -(-A) cannot be replaced
by A due to the transformative quality of the reflective process
and the inseparability of -(-A) from -(A). That is, to express
such a negation is to take the result of the first reflection and
proceed to make a second reflection. Hence the impossibility of
referring to -(-A) in the original universe of discourse. In a
temporal and irreversible dialectical logic -(-A) cannot be
replaced by (A). This later move could only be made in a
completed system where all had been given, in a finite universe of
discourse where all had been determined. But the essence of the
reflective process is just the opposite of this - there is an
expanding and developing universe of discourse - a temporal and
ontological development. We are thus never in the position of
being able to apply the logic of any atemporal non-ontological
symmetrical system.
Memory presents a good example of the negative presence of a content.
0 09 j See Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Pheno¬
menology of the Spirit p.108 f. (Also on this point see
A. Sarlemijn, Hegels Dialectic p.84f).
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Suppose we negated the memory by reconsidering or attempting to
experience that experience as if for the first time. Such a pro¬
cedure would never amount to the positive presence of the experience
itself. It would instead be a transformation or development of the
original content Cor experience). For the context - the memory
structure - is that through which immediate experiences are given
meaning. One could perhaps argue that a loss of memory would allow
for previous experiences to be had again "as for the first time",
but one could then query as to whether the person was the same
person; and, secondly, even if we accepted that he was the same
person one could still maintain that the loss itself would be such
as to condition the experience - it could never be relived in its
originality. ^ ^ Repetition must always involve a transformation
of what is experienced. The experienced is not isolable from the
context - the structures of meaning - that subtend it. Conscious¬
ness implicates itself in its experience - it cannot stand apart
from its object.
Hegels notion of aufheben is the expression of this negative presence.
In terms of the above example it could be said that the memory is the
past experience that has been overcome in the sense of being one¬
sided or separate from the abiding context. It is overcome or
annulled but it is retained as incorporated into the context or
frame of reference of the individual concerned such that it together
(110) As G. Mure puts it: "The least reflection on human experience at
once develops it and at the same time reveals that its inherent
nature _i_s to develop actively from level to level. And this
reflection resolutely pursued is philosophy." A Study of Hegels
Logic, p.355-
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with the other memories that it is now in a unity with serve to
mediate the current experience. By such an incorporation the
memory is preserved at a superior level of knowledge.
In Hegel's Phenomenology, the process that consciousness undergoes
is this continual expansion and development of its reality through
the sublation of each form of experience as incapable of achieving
the truth, it is cancelled but also preserved as a dialectical
moment at a higher level.
Again in the explication of the beginning of logic previously con¬
sidered, pure being and nothing were seen as having already passed
over into the other such that they were sublated in the concept of
becoming. Becoming is a more adequate way of expressing the iden¬
tity of identity and non-identity at this particular level, i.e.
the level of pure being and nothing. Kosok puts the point as follows:
"Thus the "synthesis" concept of Becoming for Hegel is that "which
is not either Being Caffirmation) or Nothing (negation)", but
rather the indeterminate state of transition between that which is
and is not: becoming is defined in terms of that which it is not".^^'
Becoming is both Being and Nothing negatively but neither positively -
it i s d ial ect i cal .
Traditional logic is then unable to cope with this "restlessness"
in each and any concept - it is therefore unable to know the truth.
(Ill) Kosok: The Formalization of Hegels Dialectical Logic. P.608.
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It specifies the correctness of inferences not the truth of the
whole. As Sarlemijn puts it: "The requirements which hold for
the knowledge of non-contradictory, motionless and ideal laws and
determinations are not necessarily the principle of reality in
motion." Because traditional logic is based upon the laws
previously adumbrated it is not able to elucidate the true
knowledge of the Whole. ft is also unable to give a scientific
account, of these laws. Dialectical logic is able to provide a
scientific account of our knowledge of the Whole as it is not
confined by the same laws.
( 1 12) sariem;jn Op. Cit. p. 93 •
( 113) "Aristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the under¬
standing; its forms only concern the relationship of finite
to finite, and in them the truth cannot be grasped." Hegel
(as quoted in Sarlemijn Op. Cit. p.9^)-
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THE DIALECT PROCESS AND FORMALIZATION
3.7
We have developed the notion of a dialectic process in part through
a consideration of Kosok's formalization of Hegel's dialectical logic.
However there are certain difficulties associated with the attempt at
formalization that need to be clearly stated.
Hegel would see formalization as an operation of the understanding,
the latter adopting a form of knowledge that is essentially inadequate
to the task of comprehending the true (i.e. the Absolute). To
formalize is to abstract from the process of self-externalization of
the Absolute - to attempt to render the form of this process according
to the static formal elements of the intellect (understanding). As
Hegel puts it: "This whole analytic approach lacks the basic con¬
sciousness that the purely formal appearance of the Absolute is con¬
tradiction. Such consciousness can only come into being where specu¬
lation takes its point of departure in Reason..." The 'purely
formal appearance' is a subjective appearance that lacks unity
(synthesis). The terms of this appearance stand in an external
relation to each other. Now, given this characterization of the
limitations of formalizing thought, how far or to what extent does
(114) On this see Hegel. The Difference between Fichte's and
Schelling's System of Philosophy p.103 footnote 25. The
difference between the way the intellect and Reason understand
such formulas as A= A.
(115) Ibid p.109.
(116) Ibid p.177 "Since the analytical way of philosophying rests on
absolute opposition, it is bound to overlook the philosophical
(i.e. speculative) aspect of philosophy precisely because the
laLLer aims at absolute synthesis."
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Kosok's attempt at formalization fall to these criticisms?
Kosok gives the following characterizations of the Absolute. He claims
that "... the Absolute is the very process of this continual transform¬
ation and redefinition, and does not appear at any particular stage as
such, expressing rather the principle of Non-Identity that to be is to
become, and becoming is the foundation of being." ^7) |_je a|so pUts it
as follows: "... the Absolute is the very process of meta-level
transition." The principle of Non-Identity is, as we have seen,
(A)«h* (-A). This formula is the Absolute, which generates a dialectical
n |
matrix (according to the recursive formula (R) A= A ), this being
the self-externalization of the Absolute.
Now the following problems arise. On Hegel's view above, we would expect
the Absolute as formalized to be presented as a set of formal items
standing in external relations. It would seem that the synthesis itself
(the Absolute as unity) is not given expression in this formula. The
synthesis is 'invisible1. This is not surprizing if we are attempting to
represent the Absolute through finite formal structures. This is the
source of the difficulty that has led some philosophers to argue that
it is not possible to formalize the non-forma1izab1e, and that it is
useless to try. ^
(117) Kosok M. Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic, p.625
(118) Kosok M. The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology
of Spirit p.83.
(119) H. P. Kainz argues the former, op. cit. p.52 Also Rosen S. Hegel
p.88 "There is no form which corresponds to the synthetic act
itself". H. S. Harris argues the latter, Philosophy and
Phenomenologica1 Research Vol.XXVI I I Jan. 1978 No.A p.578.
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Further to this, one can argue that the formal presentation leaves
out the intuitive synthesis of the formal items (A) and (-A) and
the formal relation between them (<—*). Thus the Absolute is not
presented through the formal presentation but through the intuitive
aspect that Kosok provides through his non-forma1 presentation.
Kosok does indeed claim that his formalization is special in the
sense that it does not leave out content^^^, and that it is use¬
ful in that it reveals levels of structural relationship generated
by the activity of conscious reflection. But it is difficult
to accept such arguments solely in terms of the formal structure he
develops.
The "expanding matrix of terms" generated by the reflective activity
inherent in the principle of non-identity is seen by Kosok as cul¬
minating" at the limit stage"^^^ in the return to the pure subject
(spirit). That is, he argues that the seemingly open and infinitely
developing expansion through reflection - which process would appear
to be linear - returns to the pure subject - at the limit stage. But
is not this latter a merely external abitrary and inadequate concept¬
ion, for it is hard to see how such a mathematical notion could deter¬
mine the complete self-externalization of Spirit (or the Absolute)?
(120) Kosok M. The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hesel's
Phenomenology of Spirit p.83.
(121) Kosok M. The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic
p.596-7.
(122) Kosok M. The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit p.364 (my emphasis)
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The notion of a limit makes sense for mathematical cases but it
seems hard to grasp what meaning such a term could have in relation
to a process that Hegel claims is logical and ontological.
Two further difficulties arise in this connection. Firstly, how
can a formal procedure capture the ontological and transformative
nature of the dialectic process when formalizing thought by its very
nature excludes the ontological aspect? Secondly, and following from
the above, in what way can such formal presentation include what Rosen
(123)calls "the pulsation-process" of the Absolute?
In considering Kosok's account of the dialectic process, it was seen
that he saw reflection as being a reflection on an unreflected
immediacy A, setting A in a context of mediation that is given in
the form outlined in the previous section. Now what is it that
effects such a reflection - what generates the development from A
/
to A? On Kosok's formal account it seems difficult to answer this
for the unity of Spirit which presents itself to itself through self-
external ization does not seem to be capable of formalization. Kosok
does say that the initial state of immediacy cannot be viewed as 'a
static state void of negation1 for this would not allow for the pro¬
cess to begin. But the positive nature of such a state - the dynamic
element - seems conferred upon this process by an external agent viz.
Kosok's own intuitive presentation of this process. This point can
also be put in the following manner. For Hegel, the dialectic pro¬
cess of experience is the temporal externalization of Spirit, which
qua finite and therefore contradictory, becomes negated as the true
(123) S. Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel p.132. It is the "moving spirit",
which is (as Hegel expresses it in the Preface to the Phenomen¬
ology p.96-7) "... the dissimilarity which obtains in conscious¬
ness between the ego and the substance constituting its object,"
that we claim Kosok does not (and cannot) include in his
formal presentation.
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presentation of Spirit but retained as a moment of a more determinate
self-presentation of Spirit. The unity is Spirit - the negativity of
the process.
Kosok's formulation insofar as it splits the unity of Spirit into the
content (A) and the form of its presentation (i.e. assertion () ) seems
to loose this dynamism of Spirit as negativity, for to formalize it is
to present it, i.e. it is to externalize and hence negate the pure
(124)
negative activity per se.
But Kosok's attempt at formalization is useful in that given the above
limitations, we claim it does present an alternative possible structure
to the formal items of assertion, negation and double negation that
allows for a structure - an expanding formal matrix - to be developed.
This formal presentation attempts to show how an ever expanding richness
of determination can arise. That it does in fact arise is due to the
non-formal elements of Kosok's presentation. We claim that it is only
because Kosok attempts to fuse his intuitive presentation of the formal
matrix with the formal presentation of the matrix that such formalization
can be seen as a process - and that it can be intelligible. To the extent
that Kosok fails to see this dua1 nature of his procedure to that extent
does he fail to present the structure as alive - as a self-movement. The
purely formal presentation fails to include the "pulsation-process" that
is the sine qua non of the dialectic process itself.
(124) As Hegel says, it would be but "a paralysed form" of the
"essentially negative activity" Phenomenology of Mind p.104.




To complete this justification of an acceptable point of view we
need to specify in what sense we use the term truth. Following
this we will be in a position to reconsider Husserl's point of
vi ew.
in the discussion of Science, we made the following points concerning
truth. Firstly, truth is the known Concept. Truth is only possible
as the self-development of concepts (culminating in the complete
system of concepts - the Concept). This truth is then the Absolute
Truth. Secondly, each particular level or form of knowledge has
its own truth, but a truth that is one-sided and is transformed into
a more adequate truth. Does this mean that the earlier truth was in
fact a falsity masquerading as such? This question assumes that
the universe of discourse for both levels remains the same such
that a Yes/no answer can be given to the question. But as has been
shown above, the transformation from a form of knowledge to a more
adequate one is a transformation of experience - an ontological
transformation. Thus the negativity embodied in the prior form of
knowledge - in the expression of what for consciousness was the truth
leads to the sublation of that form of knowledge. And due to the
nature of consciousness truth does not reside in either the object
external to consciousness, nor in a consciousness external to the
object, but in the complete conceptual comprehension of experience.
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As consciousness is always consciousness of an object and objects
are always objects for consciousness, and as consciousness is not
an identity - a yes/no answer fails to provide a true answer to
this question. As experience is the dialectic process of conscious¬
ness attempting to grasp the truth, experience will illustrate
the change in the criterion of truth along with the transformation
of the form of knowledge itself.
Thirdly, because each concept embodies negativity, it also must
be inadequate to express truth because negativity is what drives
consciousness on - it is the immanent truth seeking its expression
through a more adequate, integrated and interrelated reflection.
Negativity thus signals incompleteness and hence untruth, though
this negativity and this untruth are continually providing the
system - are bringing the truth into existence. The sublation of
a particular form of knowledge is both a denial (i.e. negation)
of that form of knowledge but a negation the elements of which are
held as negatively present in the higher level achieved. This is
why Hegel says that "true reality is merely the process of reinstat¬
ing self-identity," .... we reachieve a unity of experience by
developing the previous experience.
We can note here that this view of truth contrasts sharply with other
philosophical theories of truth. On the above view, any separation
of subject and object, of thought and being makes the achievement of
truth an impossibility. For example the correspondence theory of
truth asserts that a proposition is true if it corresponds to a
fact or state of affairs, that is, if there is an identity between
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reality and the proposition that gives it expression. ('^6) ^ere
reality is something that we attempt to express - it is external
to us, separated from us. Thus comes the paradox that to know that
the state of affairs or reality, stand in a relation of identity to
the proposition that gives it expression is to know what cannot be
known for we merely produce another proposition which seeks to achieve
what a proposition by its very nature cannot achieve. If reality is
external to us it is external to us and notions such as correspondence
and reflection loose their meaning. Again we have previously
commented upon the proposition as being an inadequate means of
expressing the truth.
In Part I Husserl's view of the nature of truth as presented in the
Prolegomena was examined. It was seen that Husserl made a complete
separation between the real and the ideal - science that concerned
themselves with the former could not also investigate the latter -
that is, the realm of pure law, of general truths.
But together with this separation Husserl also claimed that there was
a relationship between the two realms. Truth, as "... an experience
of primal givenness" was the way something ideal could be experienced in
a real act. Further to this he states that "One must clearly
(126) This is a very general specification of the correspondence
theory, which does not do justice to the variety of manners
in which it has been presented. My purpose in making the
general point against this theory hopefully makes the
specification of each variety of its expression unnecessary.
(127) See Parti Section 10
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grasp what the ideal is, both intrinsically and in its relation to
the real, how this ideal stands to the real, how it can be immanent
/ | oy)
in it and so come to knowledge." To be able to clearly grasp
this Husserl states that we must first clarify what is understood
(129)
by the concepts of inner evidence and truth.
In following this intention we will begin by looking at the way
Husserl develops his concept of truth (.in the Prolegomena) in relation
to the things such truths express, and also in relation to the con-
„ , . . . (130)cept of inner evidence.
Husserl makes a distinction between two interconnections that are
intrinsic to scientific thought. There is on the one hand ... "an
interconnection of the things to which our thought experiences are
intentionally directed", and on the other "... an interconnection of
truths, in which this unity of things comes to count objectively as
being what it is." ^0 Now both these interconnections are given
to us in an apriori and inseparable manner, and further to this
Husserl adds that the interconnection of things is "truly in" the
interconnection of truths. ^'^2)
(128) L. I. p.193 (.my emphasis)
(.129) Ibid p. 19*t
(130) We recognise that Husserl developed his views concerning truth
and evidence in L.I.VI, and in all his latter works i.e., Ideas
Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic. We




This creates the following problem. How can the realm of truth qua
ideal unity be separate from the realm of things and at the same time
be immanent in the latter, while the latter is "truly in" the former?
This would appear to be the source of the ambiguity that A. De Waelhens
(133)
accuses Husserl of being guilty.
This ambiguity can be spelled out as follows. On the one hand it would
appear that the realm of truth is independent of the realm of things.
Truth is a purely ideal object, it is not temporally conditioned. ^^*0
A thing however is a real empirical phenomenon, and is temporally con¬
ditioned. A thing becomes truly present insofar as it is grasped in a
scientific manner; it becomes objective by being presented in an evi¬
dent judgement. Science, as an "ideal interconnection of truths" is
composed of self-evident judgements. Each such judgement has a truth
as its content.
It would seem to follow that a thing is objectively known only insofar
as it is the content of an evident judgement qua evident, that is, inso¬
far as it is ideal. L. Dupre puts this point neatly as follows: "The
eternal kingdom of truths is made up of pure logical relations. It
seems to be autonomous, and its sole criterion is the internal coherence
of logical relations. The order of things receives its entire objective
value from the order of truth" .... "It would seem, then, that one might
(133) "According to A. De Waelhens1 Phenomenlogie et Verite, Husserl's
concept of truth labors under an extreme ambiguity." L. Dupre,
The Concept of Truth in Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research Vol.2k, 1963~^ p.3^6.
(13*0 L.I. p. 1 10
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summarize Husserl's position by asserting that the world of truths
rules the world of things, without being ruled by it." ^5)
The "world of truth" - of pure laws - does admit of a transformation
(a "mode of use" , and it is in such a transformation that
truth becomes related to evidence. Husserl puts it as follows:
"The pure laws of logic say absolutely nothing about inner evidence
or its conditions. We can show, we hold, that they only achieve this
relation through a process of application or transformation, the same
sort of process, in fact, through which every purely conceptual law
permits application to a generally conceived realm of empirical cases.
The propositions about inner evidence which arise in this manner keep
their apriori character, and the conditions of inner evidence that
they assert bear no trace of the psychological or the real. They are
purely conceptual propositions, transformable, as in every like case,
into statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities." ^'^7)
All the propositions of pure logic are for Husserl, insofar as they are
true, also capable of being grasped with inner evidence. Truth and
inner evidence are for Husserl equivalent, but they do not state the
same thing.
(135) L. Dupre1 , op. cit. p.346-7-
(136) L.I. p.157 (Also see L.I. p. 17^+ where Husserl explains how ideal




A proposition of the form 'A is true1 makes no reference to any
individual's subjectivity or real natural condition - it is the
logical objective aspect that is being expressed. To say that it
is possible to judge A to be true in an inwardly evident manner
is to focus on the subjective (noetic) aspect. This latter sub¬
jective aspect is not (as we have seen in Part l) a psychological
natural feeling of the truth of the proposition A, it is the "...
ideal conditions whose roots lie in the form of subjectivity itself." ^
It is difficult to see what the exact difference is between the
truth of a proposition A and the evidential nature of the same pro¬
position. For though evident is often used as a synonym for true,
Husserl is not using evident in this sense. Rather evidence is the
experience of the idea of truth. Patzig puts this point clearly as
follows: "Rather we have here a sort of cross-connection between
truth and evidence, namely through the assertion that an evident
judgement as such is the actual experience of the idea of truth and
qua such an experience it is a particular case of that which is
experienced in it, therefore of the idea of 'truth'." ^^9)
The difficulty with this relationship is that if truth is an ideal
unity, the experience of this ideal unity as the object of a self-
evident judgement does not give as the rea1ity that is being truly
(138) L.I. p.136.
(139) G. Patzig, Husserl on Truth and Evidence. In Mohanty (Ed.)
Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations p.184.
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presented. This point can be developed if we return to the inter¬
relationship of things, truths and evidence. If truth gives us the
objective unity of things, and evidence gives us the experience of
the objective unity of things, then the latter must be subjective
in that the experience of the objective unity of things need not
necessarily be congruent with the actua1 unity of things. Truth,
if it is used in the sense of the agreement between the sense of a
judgement and the existing state of affairs, and not as a synonym
for correctness would seem to entail the exclusion of the
real from the realm of truth, it being the phenomenal that is under
consideration. We are here in agreement with both Dupre1 and Patzig.
Dupre1 puts it as follows, "It would seem to me that both the
logical relations (the kingdom of truth) and the 'things' (in the
Husserlian sense) are ideal elements of pure consciousness."
(140) L.I. p.184 footnote: "The concept of correctness is
correlative with that of truth"...
..."The logical predicates True
and False, taken in their proper sense, only concern pro¬
positions in the sense of the ideal meanings of assertions."
(141) L. Dupre' op. cit. p.348-9. G. Patzig puts it as follows:
Husserl and his followers "...did not see that evidence pre¬
supposes experienced truth, that experienced truth as little
guarantees actual truth as experienced movement is the same
as actual movement." op. cit. p.194 On this point also see
Levin D. M. Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology
p.47.
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It would appear that if Husserl is to render his conception of truth
and evidence in a consistent and systematic fashion he will have to
adopt an idealist position. However this latter would have the
demerit of failing to provide a satisfactory ground for the understand¬
ing of the relationship between the ideal and the real. For the real
would cease to denote the independent world and would instead stand for
the world as constituted by us in our acts of consciousness. We shall
have more to say on this point in part III.
Husserl's attempt at relating truth to self-evidence, and his explica¬
tion of the notion of truth (as specified in the prolegomena, do not
appear to be satisfactory. If this is correct it implies that the
relation of real to ideal will not be satisfactorily explained. For it
seems that on Husserl's account truth remains on the ideal side unable to
unify with the reality it is in fact 'giving'. It would seem that if self-
evidence and truth are separate, there is needed some tertium quid
that will facilitate the connection, and this would seem to involve
insuperable problems. Qne argUe that there is no real
difference between truth and self-evidence but then the problem of the
(142) D. Hemmendinger claims that it is striking that Husserl in fact
"... never gave a systematic treatment of evidence, considering
its importance to him." Husserl's Concepts of Evidence and
Truth. Monist Vol.59 No.l 1975 p.85. But as against this, it
would certainly appear to be the case that in the Formal and
Transcendental Logic Husserl explicitly studies systematically
the different forms of evidence that give the different types of
objectivities. On this latter question see S. Bachelard, A Study
of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic p.101 f.
(143) In this connection we note the peculiar way in which Husserl
characterizes "the formations with which logic is concerned."
He says that "... they float obscurely between subjectivity and
Objectivity. "Formal and Transcendental Logic p.81-2.
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relation of ideal to real would remain unresolved. Certainly in that
Husserl places the real outside the ideal and outside the experience
of the real he must reduce the real to the phenomenally real. That
is, truth remains within the subject and experience provides the evi¬
dence of its ideality. The object or thing then seems to remain as an
unknown (and unknowable) residue - reality becomes logically incompre¬
hensible. Husserl would appear to be assuming the Kantian point of
vi ew.
For Hegel, there is always but one content - Spirit - which is on the
way to a scientific knowledge of itself - of reality - through the
dialectic process previously described. As each concept contains
negativity it leads to further development of this content through
conceptual development. Absolute knowledge - the domain of truth -
is for Hegel the rhythm of the Whole (structure of concepts). Each
concept presents Spirit as consciousness with the accent and meter of
its existence. And because it is the unification of thought and being,
the Concept expresses the truth of both - it is logical and ontologica1.
Husserl's 'concept' arises out of "an ideational intuition founded on
certain experiences" (L.1.252) but they are "independent of the partic¬
ularity of any material of knowledge" (L.I.237)- Hence truth must here
be delimited to the logical and not the ontological. Also Husserl's
first main objective for pure logic is to lay down the basic concepts
of science in an unequivocal and unambiguous manner. An objective that
destroys any development of these concepts such that truth can find a
progressively more adequate expression. For the relations that hold
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between such concepts are external - a relation conferred upon these
concepts purely by virtue of their having the mark of inner evidence.
And given that in the Logical Investigations truth is timeless for
Husserl it becomes difficult to see how these truths can have any
manner of participation in the here and now.
This is the problem with Husserl's critique of relativism - it is a
purely logical one. When he says that relativism presupposes "the
objective point to which things are relative" (L.I. 151), he fails
to conceive of the possibility of the criterion of truth itself
changing because consciousness and its object have developed. Truth
by being timeless must lie outwith the subject as a real being. The
experience of the real seems to differ toto caelo from the 'experience'
of idealities. There are thus two subjects.
The point that Husserl misses is that relativism is unacceptable as he
rightly insists against Sigwart (et al) from a logical point of view
as no specification of 'the objective point' can be given. However,
on the dialectical account 'the objective point' is immanent in
experience and it is this that gains more adequate expression as
experience proceeds through meta level transitions to Absolute Knowledge.
It is expressly through this transformative process that the conceptual
truths of various forms of knowledge can be united as the rhythm or
truth of the Whole. On Husserl's account any such unity is
achieved by purely definitional means, and the 'unity' so achieved is
(]kk) "To be in its concept that which reveals and is revealed - this
is, then the true shape of spirit; and moreover, this shape,
its concept, is alone its very essence and its substance".
Phenomenology of Mind. P.759.
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not of the whole but of the ideal in separation from the real.
We need now to return to a consideration of the criticism advanced
in Part I and show briefly how the justification of these has been
achieved, by the development of a scientific (Hegelian) standpoint
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PART I I I
HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY
In Part I the following criticisms were advanced against Husserl.
First, that the real was not separated from the ideal by a
"never to be bridged gulf". By making such a separation Husserl
makes the real external to knowledge - makes it incomprehensible.
As he puts it: "No conceivable gradation could mediate between
the ideal and the real", (L.I. 104) „ Yet on what basis does
Husserl make such a separation? We argued there that Husserl
merely asserts that such a point of view is the correct one without
showing how it arose in the first place. He develops this point
of view through a critique of psychologism which he sees as des¬
troying the possibility of any distinction between the ideal and
the real, but he makes the opposite mistake by asserting the com¬
plete separation of what are only distinguishable aspects of
experience. The psychologistic view Husserl rightly criticises
for relativizing truth, but his view seems to eliminate truth
altogether - we are left with correctness. Let us then, develop
this first criticism advanced against Husserl and see to what
extent Hegel avoids it through his description of the real and
the idea 1.
1, The ideal and the real
It is difficult to be precise as to what Husserl actually meant by
real. He does say that real refers to what is "in" consciousness
as well as to what is outside it - its distinguishing mark being
that it is temporal being- "What is real (real) is the individual
with all its constituents: it is something here-and-now (L.I.351)
But this can apply both to the phenomenally real and to the indepen¬
dently existing real. And it is on these two different concepts
of real that the difficulty turns. For Husserl is a realist in the
Logical Investigations to the extent that he holds there to be real
independently existing things, but he also denies that these things a
able to be phenomenologically investigated - this latter would be
a metaphysical task. What he _i_s concerned to investigate is the
"immanent" object (or intentional object) and how it is constituted
in consciousness.
There is then a sort of bracketing being performed by Husserl in
the Logical Investigation, a bracketing which we claim denies just
that aspect of the object that needs to be developed - the onto-
logical or transcendent aspect. We are therefore in agreement with
Th. De Boer, when he argues that "..... there is in the Logical
Investigations an epoche and a disconnection of the existence of
the extra-mental object. And here 'reduction' has the meaning which
it is so often wrongly said to have in the first volume of the
Ideas: putting within brackets the real existence of the object.
Here one does indeed lose something". '
Indeed, in his Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic
(l) Th. De Boer. Op. Cit. P.325.
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(published six years before the Logical Investigations) we find
Husserl distinguishing between the phenomenal and the transcendent
thing and arguing that it is the former that is meant when we refer
to things in the world.
"First we must distinguish between the phenomena 1 thing and the
transcendent thing. To the concept of an objective unity of parts
and properties, articulated in such and such a manner and co-existing
independently of our consciousness, there of course corresponds no
intuition. To suppose so would be a contradiction. But this concept
also has no currency in the domain of common thought .... To
natural thought, that very sequence of reciprocally cohering con¬
tents (accompanied and encompassed by certain psychical acts) which
we live through in the "observation of the thing from all view¬
points", under normal conditions of perception, just _i_s the thing
itself. And it alone is what is meant whenever a thing, a house,
a tree or the like, is spoken of .... We can also express our
view in this way: Talk of an intuition always involves a reference
to some sort of representative. The question of whether intuition
of things is possible therefore leads us back to the question about
the nature of the intention of the correlative representative. If
we take 'thing' in the sense of a transcendental unity, then eo
ipso we rule out talk of intuition. But if we take the word in the
sense of the representatives of natural consciousness - as, for
example, that sense adheres to the words 'house', 'tree', and the
like - then the ultimate fulfillment of those representatives lies
in the continuous course of intuited contents, which is encompassed
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by an undivided act enduring continuously the same throughout the
successional variety of the contents, and which, thus is immanent in
(2)
the undivided act."
Thing then is reduced to phenomenal thing,, Real is reduced to
Reel 1. There are two responses that can be made to this. First,
from what perspective is the distinction between phenomenal and
transcendental thing made? That is, is it possible for Husserl
to even make such a distinction without involving himself in
contradiction? For if the phenomenal object is the real thing
there seems to be no way in which we can gain access to the
transcendental object, we have here an 'epistemological impasse1.
This is of course the criticism that Hegel would direct at Husserl
(3)(and does direct at Kant.)
Secondly, it would appear that the concern with what is immanent
in our acts - the content of our acts - and the intuition of this
content would lead Husserl to the idealist position. Husserl in
fact clearly recognized this. He says that idealism " .... alone
(2) E. Husserl: Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic.
The Personalist Vol. 58, No.4, 1977, p.309-310. Husserl
later (1906) described this work as a first sketch of the
Logical Investigations. See D. Willard: Four essays Published
by Edmund Husserl in the 18901s. The Personalist Vol. 58, No.4
1977, P-295.
(3) "The Ding an sich is still concealed behind the phenomenal object.
The problem of transcendence, formulated in the question, "How
can ! gain access to an external world?" is evaded rather than
solved." Th.D. Boer op. cit. p.326.
D.M. Levin argues that Husserl's epoche fails to engulf the per¬
ceptual object, it " ... maintains its transcendental irreduci-
bility; it stubbornly resists the Husserlian Method." Husserl's
notion of self-evidence. In Pivcevic (ed) Phenomenology and
Philosophical Understanding p.59= (On this point in relation to
Kant see J. Maier, On Hegel's critique of Kant P.75 )=
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represents the possibility of a self-consistent theory of knowledge.1
It would appear then that Husserl is giving expression to the ideality
of reality but not to the rea1ity of ideality.
How does Hegel employ these two concepts? For Hegel the only true
reality is the Absolute, which as the Absolute is the process of
presenting itself through its various "particularizations". "The
Absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable 1ife, self-knowing truth,
and is a 11 truth. It is the sole subject matter and content of
philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness within it, and
its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-
determination or particularization, it has various shapes, and the
business of philosophy is to cognize it in these." Insofar
as it cognizes itself in its various shapes it "embraces those
shapes of real and ideal finitude ....," ^ Hegel's Science of
Logic was concerned to describe the way the Absolute presented itself,
in pure thoughts - in concepts. This logic is claimed to be object?ve,
all determinations or shapes or concepts exist only in the Absolute
(the concrete universal). We are not here concerned with something
only in principle or as something ideal in abstraction from the real.
Hegel is concerned with the content of such characterizations insofar
as they are aspects of the real ideal - the Absolute. Hegel puts
his point nicely when he attacks the view that the ego as intellectual
intuition is the beginning of logic, " .... although the ego could
(4) E. Husserl. Logical Investigation P.338. G.A.Schrader argues
that the lack of "... any relatedness of appearing to a being
beyond the appearance" leads Husserl to subjective Idealism.
Hegel's contribution to Phenomenology. Monist. Vol.48, 1964.
On this point also see R. Ingarden op.cit. p.13 f).
(5) Hegel, Science of Logic p.825. Also see p.28.
(6) Ibid p.825.
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in itself or in principle (an sich) be characterized as pure knowing
or as intellectual intuition and asserted as the beginning, we are
not concerned in the science of logic with what is present only in
principle or as something inner, but rather with the determinate
reality in thought of what is inner and with the determinateness
possessed by such an inner in this reality." ^ The thought
referred to here is pure thought - thought not burdened by the
oppositions of consciousness (thanks to the Phenomenology of Mind)
hence not burdened by the opposition of ideal and real. Here, in
pure knowing the ideal (qua universal) subsists in rea1ity, it is
then not detached from the real particularizations of itself.
It is by "abandoning" ourselves to the concepts (in this case the
particular and the determinate) that we shall discover the abiding
presence of the universal and the illusory presence of the uni¬
versal qua the particular. Sarlemijn puts this point clearly as
follows: "The content of reality is universal and ideal; what is
(8)
real merely represents an accidental combination of ideal structures."
The "shapes of ideal and real finitude" show through their contra¬
dictory natures, the reality of the Absolute. They show this through
their negation as independently existing things and their retention
(9)
as moments in the process of the Absolute's externalization -
(7) Ibid P.77.
(8) A. Sarlemijn, op. cit. p.21„
(9) "According to common conviction and practice, all determinations
exist separate from one another and 'for themselves'. The
Logic refutes this belief, and grinds off finitude and 'separate-
ness from our concepts." Ibid P.85 (my emphaises).
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they are 'negatively present' in the Absolute,
Hegel's logic is therefore metaphysical and ontological as well as
formal and logical, ^^ It sees the finite forms of the under¬
standing as essentially related to that understanding, an under¬
standing that is contradictory, Hegel shows through his logic how
a 11 reality is rational, there is no (irrational) residue that lies
outwith the domain of knowledge, and how such a logic is objective.
He claims to have shown the objective nature of his logic through the
detailed presentation of the world of experience in the Phenomenology
of Hind, This presentation shows the unreality of the various forms
of knowledge and their correlative subject and object. We get a
continual return to ground - to the Absolute as the actuality which
is expressing itself. The real as finite and temporal is shown by
Hegel to be illusory, - what is real is the ideal - the concrete
universal - the actual,
Hegel provides a solution to the relationship between ideal and
real being based upon his demonstration in the Phenomenology of
Mind that Spirit is the only true actuality and that it is Spirit
that sets forth " „,,, its process of becoming Spirit," The
whole development is but the continual activity of Spirit collapsing
each of its particular externalizations of itself, the transcending
(10) Hegel, Science of Logic p,63: "The objective logic, then takes
the place rather of former metaphysics which was intended to
be the scientific construction of the world in terms of thoughts
alone. If we have regard to the final shape in the elaboration
of this science, then it is first and immediately ontology whose
place is taken by objective logic,"
(11) Phenomenology of Mind, P,806.
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through negation of all real-izations of itself (qua ideal-Spirit).
The logic then depends for its truth on the achievement of the
Phenomenology. To the extent that Hegel has shown the reality
of the ideal through the dissolution of the real as specified
in the dialectic process that is experience he has provided the
necessity for the proposition that the Absolute alone is actual.
This leads to the second criticism advanced against Husserl, which
was directed to the manner in which Husserl introduced the notions
of inner evidence, experience, truth, concept and consciousness.
He introduces these notions without showing their necessity, that
is, how they arose in the first place. By so introducing these
notions he presupposes their intelligibility, and that they can be
employed to distinguish the particular spheres of knowledge that
he describes. For example, Husserl uses the notion of inner
evidence to separate true from false judgements yet nowhere does
he satisfactorily elucidate what he means by inner evidence nor
does he show how such a concept emerges for consciousness as the
latter is given in a particular form of knowledge. He fails to
warrant this concept necessary.
By saying that inner evidence is a 'mark' that true judgements
possess - that it is a 'luminous certainly1, an 'insight in the
pointed sense' of the truth of a judgement - we are in no way
advanced in our understanding of this concept. Husserl does
indeed specify that there are two different types of conditions
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that need to be fulfilled for inner evidence to occur. The first
type comprises the real or natural conditions which pertain to
human beings in so far as they are natural empirically existing
beings. Such conditions are discovered by the empirical sciences
and especially by psychology. But the most important conditions
are the ideal ones, and the phenomenologist has to demonstrate the
necessary relations that exist between the pure laws of logic (i.e.
the ideal truths) and the ideal conditions for possible inner
evidence. Husserl then points out that "The understanding of
our distinction between the real and the ideal 'theory of inner
evidence' presupposes, on the other hand, correct concepts of
inner evidence and truth" (L.I. 193_i0 , and as we have shown
(section 3.8 above) Husserl fails to clarify these two concepts in
a satisfactory manner. For the claim that (say) the law of contra¬
diction is inwardly evident would seem to assume the laws of logic
(12)
as the ground for finding this law of logic as inwardly evident.
Husserl's claim that to deny the ideal conditions of inner evidence
that attach to this law is to be irrational is just such an assump¬
tion. This is not a properly scientific procedure.
Again, in his discussion of the nature of pure concepts he points out
that they are " .... independent of the particularity of any material
(12) In the Logical Investigation (P.191) Husserl claims that he
stresses " .... the ideality of the possibility of evident
judgement which can be derived from logical principles, and
which we see to reveal their apriori validity in cases of
apodeictic self-evidence ...." As we have already seen, there
is considerable difficulty in clearly grasping what Husserl
understands by evidence and truth. But here validity would
seem to presuppose the logical laws that are supposed to be
being judged.
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of knowledge" (L,l . 237), and that the first task of pure logic
is to fix the meaning of these pure concepts in an unambiguous
and precise manner. The independence of these concepts from the
domain of the real is logically implied by Husserl's prior separa¬
tion of real from ideal. This latter separation has been found
to be unacceptable. To the extent that a concept fails to express
the unity of these two aspects (the real and the ideal) just so
will if fail to elucidate the Whole we seek to comprehend -
being in itself will remain external to thought as some irrational
(13)
residue. And secondly we have argued that concepts cannot be
simply laid down due to the very nature of the reality to which
they give expression. A concept is on the Hegelian view a
revealed reality - but a reality that is still being given - it is
the Concept which "brings forth its form from within itself."
The reality that is presented by a concept contains both reality
and consciousness in process. A concept is then on the Hegelian
view part and parcel of an onto logical as well as a logical process.
Husserl's pure concept is a logical entity in exclusion from the
ontological.
The third criticism was directed to
science was for Husserl nomological
(called descriptive or ontological)
Husserl's view of science. Proper
science, the other sciences
taking their theoretical elements
(13) Hegel would claim that Husserl is here (in the specification of
what he holds to be the nature of pure concepts) operating at
the level of the understanding, where the general object " ...
falls apart into form and content, universal and particular,
into an empty implicitness and the determinateness which comes
to this from without, - that in the thought of the unders tand ? ng
the content is different to its form, whereas in rational or
notiona1 cognition it brings forth its form from within itself."
Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol.3, p.225.
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from nomological or abstract science. Scientific knowledge is
grounded knowledge, in that it is based upon certain general laws
and the proof of these latter rests ultimately on basic laws. The
basic laws themselves are not further provable. Now while it is
agreed that scientific knowledge is grounded knowledge it is not
grounded in the sense that Husserl gives to this word. On the
view of science elaborated in Part II, grounded knowledge is
knowledge that contributes to the complete conceptualization of
reality - of the absolute subject. Hegel's own summary of the
import of his Phenomenology serves to substantiate this point
It (the Phenomenology)includes the various shapes of spirit within
itself as stages in the progress through which spirit becomes pure
knowledge or absolute spirit.... The apparent chaos of the wealth
of appearances in which spirit presents itself when first con¬
sidered, is brought into a scientific order, which is exhibited
in its necessity, in which the imperfect appearances resolve them¬
selves and pass over into the higher ones constituting their
proximate truth. They find their final truth .... in science, as
(1 4)
the result of the whole.
Knowledge is grounded (that is, not presupposed), when it is shown
as issuing out of, and as being a contradictory presentation of
Spirit. This grounding is for Hegel not of a purely formal nature.
Hegel criticises the formalism that attempts to ground ideal laws
(14) Hegel, as quoted by M.J. Petry in his Introduction to Hegel's
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 1, p.lxvll
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in exclusion from any materiality of existence. For example, in
criticising Reinhold (though his criticism would apply in many
ways to Husserl) he says, " .... from what is formal in an
absolute sense one cannot reach anything material; the formal
and the material are absolutely opposed .... The alternative to
all this is to connect cognition with the Absolute, so that it
becomes an identity of subject and object,of thinking and its
stuff, but then cognition is no longer formal
Husserl's nomological science is not seen as being capable of even
attempting to conceptualize reality as it is totally separated
from it. We are reminded of Wittgenstein's phrase that problem
(16)
and method pass one another by. On the Hegelian view, the
basic laws of nomological science could not be shown to be a
satisfactory position from which to erect science as they exclude
negativity, and they presuppose conceptions which are antinomical
i.e. the separation of form and matter, of ideal and real, of finite
and infinite etc. Without the objectivity of the absolute we
shall argue that Husserl's point of view reduces to that of the
subjective idealist.
We have shown in the earlier section dealing with logic that the
traditional logic itself fails to be properly scientific - hence
we can say that nomological science requires for its possibility
(15) Hegel, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System
of Philosophy, p.180-1.
(16) L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations p.232e. Wittgenstein
was of course not referring to Husserl - but to psychology, and
the inability of the experimental method to even deal with the
philosophical problems it attempts to solve.
250.
the prior phenomenological description of the way consciousness
comes to such a form of knowledge, and see to what extent it can
answer the problems that this form of knowledge sets itself.
This leads into the fourth area of criticism which deals with
Husserl's lack of system. By failing to transcend the dualities
of being and thought, of real and ideal, there is the tendency to
eliminate being (the metaphysical) or at least to claim that it
lies outwith the domain of pure (i.e. proper) science. But such a
tendency also removes truth, that is, ontological truth (the know¬
ledge of objective reality) from the domain, we are left with the
correctness of a given form of argument, with logical truth but
not with truth as the rational depiction of reality itself. We do
not get the systematic development of experience to the point where
the existence of the essence given by a form of knowledge, is the
same as that essence itself. Rather we get a formal severance of
existence as real existence from the ideal correlate - the
intentional object. This severance was in Husserl's later works
to become explicit in the phenomeno1ogica1 reduction, where
questions concerning the actual nature of what was being phenomeno-
logically investigated were bracketed or suspended. This raises
the question as to just what was understood by Husserl when he
talked of phenomenology, for it does seem that he is using this
term to denote a different activity from that of Hegel. Let us
pause to give expression to phenomenology as presented in Husserl's
Logical Investigations and to see in what sense this conception
differs from the one developed in Part II above.
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2. Phenomenology
Husserl, In the first edition of the above work had described
phenomenology as descriptive psychology, though a psychology that
was carefully distinguished from any theoretical psychology (of
which psychologism is an example). He was concerned to specify
a special class of descriptions, those that " .... describe the
empirical objects whose genetic connections the science wishes to
pursue, (and) also form the substrate for those fundamental abstrac¬
tions in which logic seizes the essence of its ideal objects and
connections with inward evidence." (L.I. 263). But Husserl was
quick to point out his own error in this conception of phenomeno¬
logy. In the second edition of that work, phenomenology is now
seen as providing the necessary basis for psychology as well. For
any psychology, even if it deals with the general must still be
concerned with the empirical. Phenomenology however, excludes the
empirical or natural order. It is concerned to establish the
"self-evident truths of essence" that concern the foundation of
any theory at all. Existence is, therefore, not of concern to the
phenomenological investigator. The tasks of pure logic are pheno-
menological. "Our great task is now to bring the Ideas of logic,
the logical concepts and laws, to epistemoloqical clarity and
definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin." (L.I.251).
Husserl, later on in the Investigations, gives the following precise




Husserl, writing in 1925 on the Logical Investigations says the
following: "There is still another, and perhaps the most
important and essential novelty of the psychologica1-phenomeno-
logical method which I have not yet indicated and which for the
first time appeared in the Logical Investigations and thoroughly
determined their mode of enquiry. It became clear very soon
that a descriptive investigation having the sort of goal as the
Logical Investigations had, could not by any means have the
character of a merely empirical psychological enquiry, it could
not be descriptive in the sense of a psycho-physical psychology
or in the sense of a naturalistic psychology. The exclusive
theme of the Logical Investigations was the psychical modes
which are correlative to the objectivities (and especially
the logical-idea1 ones) which are intended, psychical modes in
whom, purely in the immanence of psychical life, concepts,
judgements and theories form themselves as ideal, identical
unities of sense together with the modes of being merely
supposed or of being evidently true, as the case may be."
E. Husserl, The Task and the Significance of the Logical
Investigations, In Mohanty (Ed.), P.210.
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"Let us now shift from our natural-scientific, psychological stand¬
point to an idea1-scientific, phenomenological one. We must
exclude all empirical interpretations and existential affirma¬
tions, we must take what is inwardly experienced or otherwise
inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fancy) as pure experiences, as
our exemplary basis for acts of Ideation. We must ideate universal
essences and essential connections in such experiences - ideal
species of experiencing of differing levels of generality, and
ideally valid truths of essence which apply apriori, and with
unlimited generality, to possible experiences of these species.
We thus achieve insights in a pure phenomenology which is here
oriented to rea1 (reellen) constituents, whose descriptions are
in every way "ideal" and free from 'experience', i.e. from pre-
(18)
supposition of real existence." (L.I. 577)
As here specified, phenomenology constitutes a turn inward, an
abstracting from the physical-natura1 (real) standpoint. Yet it
seems that this turn inward is still based upon the natural-
psychological conception of man. We just exclude the real
physical aspect and concentrate exclusively upon what is inwardly
present - the 'psychical modes' of the psycho-physical subject.
Later this 'naturalistic prejudice' of the independent physical
realm is rejected by Husserl as he develops his transcendental
(18) "In fact, what the Investigations had in view, and necessarily
so, was the laying bare of a revealing inner intuition of the
acts of thinking hidden for the thinker himself, an essential
description moving itself within pure inner intuition and
relating to the pure givenness of experience." Ibid P.202-3.
253.
idealism. As Husserl explicitly states in the Preface to his Ideas:
"If we now perform this transcendental-phenomenological reduction,
this transformation of the natural and psychologically inward
standpoint whereby it is transcendentalized, the psychological
subjectivity loses just that which makes it something real in the
world that lies before us; it loses the meaning of the soul as
belonging to a body that exists in an objective; spatio-temporal
(19)
Nature." On this latter view objectivity, the real, will be
developed from out of the transcendental subject-consciousness thus
becomes the foundation for being. The early informal bracketing
of the real existence of the object is no longer necessary as the
view that there is such an object is an illusion.
Let iis now draw out some further details from the above specification
that will be able to be directly compared with the Hegelian view of
phenomenology to be specified shortly.
Husserl's essences are logical items, that is they are self-identica1
and conform to traditional logic. Each essence as such is what it
is for eternity. Further to this there is no 'pulse-beat' or
negativity in these essences such that they develop into a parti¬
cular dynamic structure. There is no notion here of a dialectical
development of essences as the self-presentation of the Absolute.
Husserl's Phenomenology is concerned with epistemologica1 questions.
He is concerned with the "Exhibition of the necessity of an epistemo-
(19) Ideas. Preface to the English Edition P.1^4.
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logical foundation for the apriori sciences through transcendental
phenomenology - the science of transcendental subject i vi ty ."
This latter is termed science in that it is governed by formal
(21)
logic and mathematics, and is apriori. Hegel would see such
an epistemological concern - such a science - as being limited and
dogmatic, it being the standpoint of the understanding.
For Hegel, phenomenology as presented in the Phenomenology of Mind
is the science of Spirit as appearing (as experienced); it is also
at the same time an introduction to science, taking us from the most
undeveloped level of experience to the transcending of experience
itself. The culmination of the phenomenological development is the
point at which Spirit or the Absolute can grasp the necessity of
the process itself. It is the level of conceptual comprehension -
a comprehension not flawed by any separations. Phenomenology
therefore can be seen as an introduction to the level of
science - the scientific system of Absolute Spirit, and having
reached this level we (qua Spirit) are then able to grasp the
necessity of the phenomenological presentation of Spirit as one
(22)
part of the system. (We recognise that there is much dis¬
cussion concerning the exact role that the Phenomenology of Mind
plays in Hegel's system given that in the Philosophy of Spirit
Hegel presents a truncated version of phenomenology which latter
(20) E. Husserl, The Task and the Significance of the Logical
Investigations. P.214.
(21) Ibid. P.214-5.
(22) For a more extensive discussion of this point, and the question
of how Hegel's view of the relationship of the Phenomenology of
Mind to his system changes see W. Kaufmann, Hegel's Conception
of Phenomenology. In Pivcevic (Ed) P.212 f.
Also see M. J. Petry, Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,
Introduction P.XIII (also P.XIVI note 21) and S. Rosen,
G.W.F. Hegel, Chapter 6.
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is seen to be the outcome of anthropology and the presupposition
(23)of psychology.
As we have seen, for Hegel the only concrete actuality is Spirit
or the Absolute, This is the concrete universal. If this is
not understood Hegel's system becomes unintelligible. Given this
Absolute, we as finite consciousness'es are able to realize
our 'truth' (that we are moments of the Absolute) through the
description of the process of experience itself. For this latter
must be able to demonstrate the completeness of its process if it
is to be able to claim Absolute knowledge, Hegel's requirement that
we demonstrate the necessity of a point of view or form of knowledge
is the demand that we show how such a point of view can provide
us with knowledge of the Whole,
Hegel is not then concerned with a purely epistemological develop¬
ment, Epistemological questions arise with a particular level of
experience - with a particular externa 1ization of the Absolute,
Hegel's phenomenology is therefore fundamentally different from
Husserl's, As Rosen succinctly expresses it: "There is in Husserl
no sense of dialectic, no over-coming of the paradoxes of finite
logic, no idea of completeness, no account of Spirit as Absolute
no explanation of consciousness or self-consciousness, and therefore
no account of the relation between subjectivity and the constituted
(24)
content of subjectivity. Or so it would be claimed by Hegel,"
(23) M,J„ Petry provides a good description of the way Hegel, and his
commentators saw the relation of the Phenomenology to his system,
Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol, 1,
(24) S„ Rosen, G,W,F, Hegel, p,28.
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Hegel's phenomenology represents the justification for the pure
development of logic. It represents a solution to the relation
between knowledge of an object and the (self-conscious) knowledge
that we do know such an object (that is, truth). Experience, as
(25)
we have shown, is the link between these two domains. Hegel
sees but one subject (Spirit) as the ground that is being deter¬
mined. Thus the subject - Spirit - is neither a pure essence nor
a pure object. It is neither a real physical object nor a pure
ideal object - it is given through the process that includes itself
as consciousness attempting to know an object and attempting to
state what this known object is (truth).
But is this Absolute or Spirit but a presupposition that Hegel adopts
to resolve the dualist problem? Hegel would claim that the Phenomeno¬
logy of Mind demonstrates the necessity for such a conception simply
by showing how the process of experience can in no other way avoid
absurdity. Hegel thus claims to provide the necessity for such a
subject by showing the inability of all previous attempts to
demonstrate the truth of their knowledge. Husserl as we have seen
(25) R. B. Pippin gives a clear presentation of how Hegel demon¬
strates that consciousness must become self-consciousness.
"Put it into its broadest Hegelian terms, the issue is the
relation between consciousness of an object (knowledge)
and self-consciousness (truth, or knowledge or knowledge,
or finally, transcendental knowledge). As is infamous,
Kant thought he could "deduce" the move from the latter to
the former, but as has already been shown, Hegel rejects such
a methodological relation. His move is to argue instead for
what he calls the "experience" of consciousness as the middle
term, occasionally speaking of the "history"of this experience
as the only way for consciousness itself to become self-
conscious ...." Hegel's Phenomenological Criticism, Man
World 8 Aug. 1975, P.301-2.
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does not satisfactorily demonstrate the truth of our knowledge
because he fails to provide an adequate account of the relation¬
ship between the experience of the object and the experience of
the truth of that experience. The separation of real from ideal
is not adequately grounded, it is not shown to be necessary. The
criticism, repeated throughout this thesis, that Husserl fails to
demonstrate how he reached such a standpoint, is this Hegelian
argument.
This failure was spelled out by focusing on Husserl's lack of
justification for his own point of view. Because consciousness
implicates itself in its own criticism (in its own knowledge) -
because all consciousness is consciousness of something - we need
to provide a justification of this point of view, of our own
particular consciousness of something so that the significance
of what is asserted vis a vis the knowledge under investigation
(i.e. psychologism) can be truly grasped. This requires a pheno-
menological description of consciousness' development up to this
point - a description that does not presuppose any method but
merely "gives itself" to the development in question and describes
the forms that consciousness takes in its consciousness of things
(being). It is by such a procedure that Hegel can claim to have
substantiated his claim that Absolute knowledge - Spirit knowing
itself as Spirit - is necessary, scientific, complete and pre-
(26)
supposition less. Here no external agents are involved and
(26) Harris, E.E. puts the point thus: "So far as the phenomenologist
fails to make good his claim to transcend the antithesis of
idealism and realism, Hegel has already advanced beyond him;
so far as phenomenology succeeds it has been anticipated
by Hegel." Hegel's Theory of Feeling. In Steinkraus (Ed)
P.91.
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no assumptions are made. It is, as we have argued, but the one
content which is being given and which finally arrives at the
complete scientific presentation of itself. It is at this moment
that the spatio-temporal development is transcended. There is
(27)
but the complete circle - but Time itself.
Husserl, as we have seen, repudiates any such idea of providing
consciousness1 prehistory up to the present - of providing the
description that will show the necessity of the foundations upon
which his own view rests. Husserl's sense of presuppositionless-
ness is but the logical exclusion of the metaphysical from the
domain of the purely ideal . Pure logic does not for Husserl make
any ontological presuppositions - it does not presuppose any
relation to the here and now of determinate material existence -
hence such a procedure as Hegel demands would be seen by Husserl
(28)
as otiose. But Husserl's procedure has been called into
question in that he presupposes the laws of (traditional) logic
(27) Hegel's view here, of the process as a Whole could be seen to
be exactly what some modern theories in physics are approach¬
ing - that there is a certain universe for the astro-physicist
such that Time is circular and closed and, as Time, has no
Temporal succession. For a discussion of this view and the
paradoxes it entails for traditional logic see the interesting
discussion by B. Williams and D„ Sciama, on Time. (Open
University 3rd level Arts Course on Problems of Philosophy.
Televised discussion chaired by S. Wilson).
(28) It is the elimination of the on to log? cal difference between the
ideal and the real that separates Husserl (in the Logical
Investigations) from Hegel. We would argue that Husserl never
developed a dialectical phenomenology because the ontological
aspect was formally excluded from consideration. Thus his
conception of intentionality is equally non-dialectical. But
a thorough examination of Husserl's philosophy in its entirety
would be required to substantiate this argument.
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without showing the necessity (and hence extension) of such laws,,
This method grounds pure logic in non-science (whether it be in the
form of silence, non-discursive presence, intuition or myth)„ Logic
cannot be grasped scientifically without the phenomenological
description of the way this form of knowledge arises, and how
the laws it holds are developed and interrelated, and how they con¬
tribute to the knowledge of the Whole, Part I I was concerned to
indicate the way logic should be developed - but we have been only
concerned in the main with the way it should begin. The investi¬
gations throughout this thesis have concentrated on beginning - with
the way philosophy should begin if it is to attain its goal - the
conceptual comprehension of reality.
3. Hegel - A concluding note
In this thesis it has been argued that philosophy, if it is to be
properly scientific, must begin with the phenomenological des¬
cription of the process that gives rise to such a philosophy. It
is only by such a procedure that the necessity for, and the truth
of such a philosophy can be established. This argument was developed
through a critical examination of Husserl's arguments concerning
the grounding of logic as developed in the Logical Investigations
(Part I).
In developing the Hegelian arguments for how philosophy should begin
we passed over many problematic areas in Hegel's philosophical
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system. We would like to now indicate very briefly three of these
areas, as being in need of investigation.
In the first place we merely noted that Hegel's use of the term 'we1
(29)
has been seen by Hegel scholars as problematic. In what sense
are 'we' who are guided through the 'shapes of Spirit' able to
find this development intelligible? Especially in the transition
to Absolute Knowledge, do we cease to be 'we' in being able to grasp
such knowledge? And if this final transition is not intelligible
this has important ramifications for the system as a whole, for
the logic would then not be able to presuppose the level of concep¬
tual thought as being demonstrated by the phenomenology, or its
claims to have performed such a demonstration would be severely
curtailed (i.e. we could claim that it is only intelligible by
Spirit itself and not by us, which would introduce a separation
into what Hegel would see as an inseparable union).
Secondly, we noted that there has been much discussion as to the
exact role Hegel saw phenomenology as fulfilling. For in the
Philosophy of Spirit Hegel presents phenomenology with a much
reduced subject matter. It is here presented as being the result
of the anthropology and itself (in concluding with the
resolution of the subject-object antithesis), as being the immediate
(29) See K„ R. Dove, Hegel's Phenomenologica1 Method. In Steinkraus
(Ed). p.34 f.
M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, P.149
S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel, p.278 f.
261.
presupposition of psychology., That is, it is psychology that deals
with the development of Spirit,^^ How then, does the anthropology,
phenomenology, psychology and logic interrelate, and can the notion
of circularity - a necessary conception if Hegel is to claim
completeness and consistency - still be maintained?
Thirdly, there is the need to investigate the precise nature of
each transition as expressed in the Phenomenology - each step in
the dialectic process of experience. Only after such a detailed
and complete investigation of each form of knowledge and its
transitions into a more adequate one, could it be established
without a shadow of a doubt that Hegel had in fact 'delivered the
goods'. This would be an investigation that does not judge Hegel's
depiction of the forms of knowledge from some other finite form of
knowledge (as we argued, for example, that Trendelenburg does)
but merely attempts to present in its clarity the detail of the
process itself. Such an investigation would be valuable in that
in being carried out, either all the other philosophical positions
would be unmasked as inadequate, or else Hegel's own system would
be revealed as being inadequate, leading through sublation to a
more adequate one.
Therefore while we have agreed with Hegel in the need for adopting
a phenomenological description of experience as leading to scien-
(30) M. J. Petry gives a good account of the changes in Hegel's
conception of phenomenology, Hegel's Philosophy of
Subjective Spirit, Introduction to Vol, I,
See also W. Kaufmann, Hegel's Conception of Phenomenology,
In Pivcevic (Ed,)
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tific knowledge, in experience being a dialectic process, and
in that subject and object are but two distinguishable aspects
of a dynamic totality Hegel calls Spirit, there is still much
that needs investigating before the Hegelian system can be
adequately evaluated. The rallying cry is then "back to a
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